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PROMOTING PROPORTIONATE JUSTICE: 
A STUDY OF CASE MANAGEMENT AND PROPORTIONALITY 
 





This work examines the principles of proportionality and active case management that were 
introduced by the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (the ‘CPR’). The aim is to consider precisely what 
‘proportionality’ means in a case management context, how it has been applied to date, and 
whether there is any need or scope for improvement. 
 
Consideration is given to proportionality as a general principle of law. This establishes a 
conceptual background against which to consider the principle in an English procedural 
context. After reviewing the introduction and development of both proportionality and active 
case management in English civil procedure, case management proportionality is placed 
against that background. In doing so, and in identifying similarities and differences, the 
principle is given greater definition. The heart of this work is a review of case law dealing with 
case management issues. This identifies inconsistencies in both how proportionality has been 
applied and the extent to which courts have taken on the management role required of them 
by the CPR. It also highlights the fact that litigants and their legal representatives retain a 
crucial role in ensuring that litigation proceeds in a proportionate manner, but that in many 
instances that role is not fulfilled. The review also provides a wealth of information that may 
assist in tackling these issues and inconsistencies.  
 
That information, together with points drawn from a review of management techniques in 
other common law jurisdictions, is taken forward into some proposals for the improvement of 
case management proportionality. Those proposals fall into two general categories: the 
publication of guidance and amendments to the CPR. The aim is to provide practical 
suggestions that may have a tangible impact on improving the consistency with which case 
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Inter partes proportionality A determination of proportionality that considers 
and balances only the interests of, and prejudice 
to, the parties to a given case. 
 
 
Procedural justice The application of a fair procedure. The definition 
of ‘fair’ will depend on the aim of the civil justice 
system and the role of procedure within that 
system. Determines the scope of the inquiry to be 
made in the search for substantive justice. Under 




Procedural law The law which dictates how parties vindicate their 
rights under the substantive law, and which sets 
out the formal structure within which rights and 
liabilities are determined. 
 
 
Substantive justice Justice done by adjudicating on parties’ rights and 
liabilities, and by applying substantive law to 
findings of fact or agreed facts. 
 
 
Substantive law The law applied to findings of fact, or agreed facts, 
to determine parties’ rights and liabilities. 
 
 
Systemic procedural justice Procedural justice provided through fairness in the 
allocation of judicial resources between all users 
of the civil justice system. 
 
 
Systemic proportionality A determination of proportionality in a given case 
that considers and balances the interests of, and 
prejudice to, all users of the civil justice system. 
 
 
The Overriding Objective Rule 1.1 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. 
Pre-April 2013: ‘to deal with cases justly’. 






Proportionality is central to the nature of justice provided by the modern English civil justice 
system. This principle, and active judicial case management as the means of its implementation, 
lie at the heart of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (the ‘CPR’). The implementation of 
proportionality through case management should inform each step in a litigation action, 
thereby shaping and directing the progress of a case. It has been over twenty years since the 
CPR came into force, but certain questions remain under-investigated. There has been no 
detailed consideration of what precisely ‘proportionality’ means in a case management context, 
and no comprehensive analysis of the practicalities of its application (Chapter One). The 
author’s aim is to fill those gaps and consider how implementation of proportionality within 
the case management process might be improved. 
 
The starting point must be broader than civil procedure. It is instructive to consider the role 
and meaning of proportionality in areas of law that are either part of domestic English law or 
have close connections to it (Chapter Two). In some of these areas, detailed consideration has 
been given to the constituent parts of the proportionality analysis. In others, it is clear that 
some aspects of that analysis are already familiar to English judges. The focus can then be 
narrowed to proportionality in English civil procedure, through an overview of its place in the 
CPR’s Overriding Objective, the aims and means of its introduction, and its development 
through amendments to the CPR (Chapter Three). Similar attention must be given to judicial 
case management, as the practical means by which the Overriding Objective and the principle 
of proportionality are implemented. The crucial role of parties in ensuring that litigation is 
proportionate must also be considered. The transfer of control of litigation to the court through 
the introduction of active judicial management did not render the parties irrelevant. At this 
point, the value of commencing with the broader analysis becomes clear, as it provides 
comparators which can be used to better define case management proportionality.  
 
The core of this work is an analysis of post-CPR case law (Chapter Four). This identifies how 
proportionality has been applied in a case management context. There are clear inconsistencies 
in the extent to which judges actively manage cases, and in the factors that are taken into 
account when conducting the proportionality analysis. These inconsistencies cannot be 
explained by the fact-specific nature of either the analysis or of case management decisions 
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themselves. It is also clear that parties often fail to comply with their duty to assist the court in 
furthering the Overriding Objective. Yet more inconsistencies can be identified in how courts 
treat and deal with such behaviour. The inescapable conclusion is that neither proportionality 
nor judicial case management are as strongly embedded within the civil justice system as they 
could or should be. Identifying these inconsistencies is in itself valuable. However, the case law 
review also provides a wealth of information that can be drawn on to improve the application 
of case management proportionality. Before considering how that might be done, however, it 
is useful to consider how cases are managed in other common law jurisdictions, specifically the 
United States, Canada and Australia (Chapter Five). These jurisdictions featured in Lord 
Woolf’s and Sir Rupert Jackson’s procedural reviews. Each incorporates a concept of 
proportionality and some form of judicial management into its civil litigation system. An 
analysis of their procedural rules, in particular the management powers given to judges and 
the requirements imposed on parties and lawyers, illuminate different ways of controlling 
proceedings that might usefully be incorporated into the CPR.  
 
Consideration can then be given to how, practically, the application of case management 
proportionality might be improved (Chapter Six). Three general points are drawn from the case 
law review, namely the inconsistencies referred to above, the importance of the relationship 
between parties and the court, and the fact-specific nature of the proportionality analysis. 
Before making specific suggestions, it is important to define what ‘improvement’ means in this 
context, and what the aims of any improvement measures should be. This allows the proposals 
that follow to be targeted and realistic. Those proposals fall into two categories: the publication 
of guidance for judges and practitioners, and amendments to the CPR. The former is aimed at 
removing, or at least reducing, inconsistencies by providing guidance on both broad questions 
of meaning and the practicalities of proportionate case management and progression. As part 
of this guidance, it is suggested that factors relevant to the proportionality analysis be collated 
in the form of a checklist (Appendix One). The proposed amendments to the CPR are aimed 
first at ensuring that the information available at the initial case management stage of 
proceedings is as comprehensive as possible, and secondly that parties and lawyers comply 
with their duty to assist the court in furthering the Overriding Objective. These two categories 
of proposals complement each other. The CPR provide the context within which any guidance 
is applied.  
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This work undertakes a close analysis of the principle of proportionality, and its application in 
civil case management, that has hitherto been missing from the procedural literature. The value 
of this analysis is that it provides an in-depth look at how the principle works at the granular, 
practical level of the decisions and actions that characterise every litigation matter. 
Proportionality can be discussed in conceptual terms, and there will be some such discussion, 
but conceptual analysis alone is insufficient. Case management is a practical exercise, 
undertaken by judges with real cases before them, supported by parties who have tangible 
interests in those cases and lawyers who must deal with the everyday tasks involved in running 
a litigation file. The analysis, and any resulting proposals for improvement, must embody this 
practical perspective. Only in doing so can improvements be made that will have a concrete, 
positive effect on the day-to-day management of cases and, by extension, on access to the 





































THE EXISTING LITERATURE  
 
 
There is some discussion of proportionality in the context of case management in the literature. 
Andrews has highlighted the pervasiveness of proportionality in procedural law, including in 
case management1 and litigation costs.2 He identifies judicial control of process to ensure focus 
and proportionality as a core principle of civil justice.3 Clark and Jackson give some explanation 
of what proportionality is and what it means, and provide examples of what might amount to 
‘proportionate’ and ‘disproportionate’.4 Sorabji has considered the centrality of both individual5 
and collective6 proportionality to the Woolf and Jackson reforms,7 as well as the problems that 
plagued implementation of proportionate justice post-Woolf8 and what may practically be 
required for its implementation.9 In one of the most recent books devoted to civil procedure, De 
Saulles treated proportionality and case management as core aspects of the topic, in a broad 
consideration of objectives, operation and reform. He noted that proportionate preparation is 
‘one of the golden keys’ to ensuring a fair hearing.10 Zuckerman has recognised the importance 
of both inter partes and systemic conceptions of proportionality.11 He states that considerations 
of proportionality ‘come into almost all procedural decision-making’,12 and that it requires the 
terms and consequences of management orders to be proportionate to the aim which that order 
seeks to achieve.13 Proportionality ‘can only be achieved by way of a cost-benefit analysis’ in 
which the crucial issue is the advantage that is likely to be gained from taking a particular 
procedural point, bearing in mind the features of the particular case, such as the complexity of 
 
1 Neil Andrews, Andrews on Civil Processes I: Court Proceedings (2nd edn, Intersentia 2019) 178. 
2 ibid 529. 
3 ibid 696. 
4 Stephen Clark and Sir Rupert Jackson, The Reform of Civil Justice (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) 
32-33. 
5 i.e. inter partes proportionality. 
6 i.e. systemic proportionality. 
7 John Sorabji, English Civil Justice after the Woolf and Jackson Reforms: A Critical Analysis (CUP 2014) 
167-9. 
8 ibid ch 7. 
9 ibid 229ff. 
10 Dominic De Saulles, Reforming Civil Procedure: The Hardest Path (Hart 2019) 16. 
11 Adrian Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2021) ch 1, paras 1.58-1.63. 
12 ibid para 1.66. 
13 ibid ch 11, para 11.155. 
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the issues and their importance.14 Elsewhere, he has summarised the interplay between 
proportionality and case management, stating that ‘the CPR provide the court with sophisticated 
means of matching process to dispute to ensure that the means of resolving the dispute are 
appropriate in view of the complexity of the issues, their importance, and the parties’ reasonable 
needs.’15 He has also identified some specific ways in which the court may do this, for example 
by controlling the issues in dispute and excluding evidence.16 These texts do not, however, 
consider the details of how proportionality works as a case management tool, nor precisely how 
a court might determine whether a particular management decision is proportionate.  
 
There is often a focus on proportionality in the context of costs, which is understandable given 
the generally accepted failure of the Woolf reforms to reduce the costs of civil litigation,17 and 
Sir Rupert Jackson’s explicit focus on rendering those costs proportionate.18 Several 
commentators have considered proportionality in this context, both generally and in respect of 
specific aspects of the Jackson review and subsequent reforms.19 There is also an occasional yet 
notable tendency to treat proportionality as an issue that relates only to costs. Dunne began an 
article entitled ‘Proportionality’ by stating that ‘[w]ith the introduction of the CPR came the 
new concept of proportionality in relation to costs’.20 Gladwell, writing six months after the CPR 
came into force, only referred to proportionality in context of costs.21 Regan, writing shortly 
after the Jackson Reforms, stated that ‘[w]hat is, perhaps, less obvious is that in recent times 
proportionality has been invoked to dismiss claims or to prevent them from being pursued’,22 
suggesting that little attention was paid to proportionality prior to Jackson. In O’Hare and 
Browne’s book, proportionality only has a separate index entry in relation to costs,23 in respect 
 
14 ibid ch 1, para 1.66. 
15 Adrian Zuckerman, ‘Litigation Management under the CPR: A Poorly-Used Management Infrastructure’ in 
Deirdre Dwyer (ed), The Civil Procedure Rules Ten Years On (OUP 2009) 93–94. 
16 Zuckerman, Principles of Practice (n 11) ch 11. 
17 See ch 3 at 60. 
18 ibid. 
19 John Sorabji, ‘Prospects for Proportionality: Jackson Implementation’ (2013) 32 CJQ 213; Joshua Folkard, 
‘Extending Jackson’s Patchwork Quilt: A Disintegrated Approach to the Costs-Shifting Rule’ (2015) 34 CJQ 
172; Masood Ahmed, ‘Costs Management and the Implied Approval of Incurred Costs’ (2016) 35 CJQ 259; 
Andrew Higgins and Adrian Zuckerman, ‘Lord Justice Briggs’ “SWOT” Analysis Underlines English Law’s 
Troubled Relationship with Proportionate Costs’ (2017) 36 CJQ 1; Simon Middleton, ‘Proportionality - CPR 
r.44.3(5) in Practice’ (2018) 4 CJQ 8; Andrew Higgins, 'Keep Calm and Keep Litigating' in Andrew Higgins 
(ed), The Civil Procedure Rules at 20 (OUP 2020). 
20 Robin Dunne, ‘Proportionality’ (2017) 2 JPIL 136. 
21 David Gladwell, ‘Modern Litigation Culture: The First Six Months of the Civil Justice Reforms in England 
and Wales’ (2000) 19 C.J.Q. 9, 15. 
22 Dominic Regan, ‘The P Word’ (2012) 162 NLJ 802. 
23 John O’Hare and Kevin Browne, Civil Litigation (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2019) 733. 
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of which it also has a dedicated section.24 There is no express reference to proportionality as a 
general management principle in the chapter on judicial case management, although there is 
reference to the concept of systemic proportionality.25 Not all these sources are academic texts. 
However, practical texts should not be ignored when dealing with concepts that must be 
understood by practitioners and law students (many of whom are future practitioners) as well 
as academics. 
 
Another focus within the literature is the vexed topic of relief from sanctions. This is 
unsurprising, given the potentially fatal effects that sanctions may have on litigation, and the 
well-publicised changes that were made to the regime post-Jackson. Those changes were then 
the subject of two major cases in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd (2013)26 and Denton v 
TH White Ltd and another (2014).27 This issue did not, however, come to the fore as a subject 
of commentary solely post-Jackson. Piggott examined this topic in 2005,28 arguing that 
proportionality provided insufficient certainty to satisfy the systemic role of sanctions.29 He 
considered the inconsistent balance struck between competing dimensions of justice in the 
context of strike out applications.30 There was, however, an increase in the volume of literature 
on relief from sanctions as a result of Jackson, the subsequent amendments to CPR 3.9 and the 
decisions in Mitchell and Denton.31 Higgins, writing after publication of the Jackson reports but 
before the amendments to CPR 3.9 came into force, proposed a two stage approach to relief 
from sanctions applications which linked the court’s response to non-compliance to what he 
identified as its major case management responsibilities, namely protecting the right to fair trial 
and equitably allocating court resources.32 Akerman commented on the balancing of competing, 
 
24 ibid 591–596. 
25 ibid 516. 
26 [2013] EWCA Civ 1537. 
27 [2014] EWCA Civ 906. 
28 D.S. Piggott, ‘Relief from Sanctions and the Overriding Objective’ (2005) 24 CJQ 103. 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid 123. 
31 Adrian Zuckerman, ‘The revised CPR 3.9: a coded message demanding articulation’ (2013) 32 CJQ 123; 
Steven Akerman, ‘There Can Only Be (CPR) 1: The Reasonableness of Mitchell (and Litigation Generally) Is 
Confirmed’ (2014) 3 JPIL 191; Stuart Sime, ‘Sanctions after Mitchell’ (2014) 33 CJQ 133; Jack R. Williams, 
‘“Well, That’s a Relief (from Sanctions)!” - Time to Pause and Take Stock of CPR r.3.9 Developments within 
a General Theory of Case Management’ (2014) 33 CJQ 394; Andrew Higgins, 'CPR 3.9: the Mitchell 
guidance, the Denton revision, and why coded messages don't make for good case management' (2014) 33 
CJQ 379;  Stuart Sime, 'Lord Dyson and the implied sanctions doctrine' (2015) 34 CJQ 267; Ravi Nayer, 
'Post-Denton: an appraisal of Court of Appeal decisions on relief from sanctions' (2016) 35 CJQ 97; D.J. De 
Saulles, ‘Defending the Civil Justice System: The Function of Sanctions’ (2017) 36 CJQ 462. 
32 Andrew Higgins, ‘The Costs of Case Management: What Should Be Done Post-Jackson?’ (2010) 29 
CJQ 317, 323-334. 
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sometimes diametrically opposed, criteria of the Overriding Objective in this respect.33 Sime, 
writing after Mitchell but before Denton, set out a number of procedural concerns in respect of 
the former case, perhaps the most worrying in his view being that the decision seemed to give 
undue precedence to resource considerations.34 Ahmed, writing shortly after Denton, argued 
that the post-Jackson approach, even as clarified in Mitchell and Denton, failed to guide judges 
in appropriately balancing proportionality, efficiency and substantive justice.35 He proposed 
changes in judicial understanding and approaches to the Overriding Objective, the imposition 
of a positive obligation on parties to keep the court informed of procedural progress, and robust 
enforcement of unless orders.36  
 
De Saulles considered the function of sanctions post-Mitchell and Denton, noting that imposing 
sanctions that are proportionate is a continuing challenge for the civil justice system.37 Higgins, 
writing now post-Mitchell and Denton, argued that the rule on relief from sanctions must give 
clear practical guidance to courts when exercising their discretion, including indicating the 
relevant factors, the weight to be given to each, and whether any are preconditions to granting 
relief.38 He stated that, while the circumstances that lead to non-compliance may be infinite, 
the factors relevant to deciding whether to grant relief are not. This means that a rule can be 
devised that contains an exhaustive list of factors that a court should take into account, namely: 
whether non-compliance was intentional; whether granting relief would adversely affect this or 
other litigation; and whether there was a good reason for non-compliance.39 In Denton, Higgins 
argued, the Court of Appeal could and should have made clear that the ‘trivial breach’ and ‘good 
reasons’ principles outlined in Mitchell are the relevant circumstances that have to be considered 
under CPR 3.9(1) to deal with the case justly. The focus of the literature on relief from sanctions 
is non-compliance. Sorabji has noted that this problem rests on an assumption that the initial 
case management order, which was not complied with, was consistent with the Overriding 
Objective.40 He queries whether this assumption is always correct and identifies a so-called 
 
33 Akerman (n 31) 202. 
34 Sime, 'Sanctions after Mitchell' (n 31) 147. 
35 Masood Ahmed, ‘Procedural Non-Compliance and Relief from Sanctions after the Jackson Reforms: 
Striking the Balance’ (2015) 5 IJPL 71, 91. 
36 ibid 92. 
37 De Saulles, Reforming Civil Procedure (n 10) 483. 
38 Higgins, ‘CPR 3.9: the Mitchell guidance’ (n 31) 392. 
39 ibid. 
40 John Sorabji, ‘Compliance Problems and Digitizing Case Management in England and Wales’ in 
Rabeea Assy and Andrew Higgins (eds), Principles, Procedure and Justice: Essays in Honour of Adrian 
Zuckerman (OUP 2020) 156. 
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‘compliance problem’ which may embed disproportionality through compliance with orders that 
are not consistent with the Overriding Objective.41 
 
Some in-depth analyses have been undertaken in the relief from sanctions context. Nayer 
considered the post-Denton appeal decisions concerning CPR 3.9, organising a broad typology 
of situations into seven categories and considering how, as of 2016, relief from sanctions has 
been approached in each of those categories.42 The focus is a review of past cases, with the main 
forward-looking assertion being a general one that the Court of Appeal must act to safeguard 
court resources by giving as little encouragement as possible to non-compliance, with mere 
exhortation being insufficient.43 Nayer also noted that a review of lower court decisions is 
required to determine whether parties are ‘avoiding trivial breaches from descending into 
satellite litigation’.44 Sorabji proposed a two-stage approach to dealing with proportionality in 
the context of relief from sanctions. He identified the need to turn a ‘nebulous theory’ into 
something that courts and parties can act upon, particularly where open-textured concepts like 
proportionality are concerned.45 The first stage would require a party applying for relief to show 
that its default was no more than minimal in extent, requiring the court to consider the degree 
of amendment required to the case management timetable and the extent to which relief would 
cause prejudice to other court users and the efficient use of court resources, and that it arose 
from exceptional circumstances.46 The second stage would require the court to consider three 
factors: first, whether delay and cost would be disproportionate as between the parties in terms 
of efficient and economical prosecution of the claim; secondly, whether any prejudice caused 
to the respondent could be compensated in costs; and finally, the nature and importance of the 
application in terms of the duty to secure substantive justice. This third factor would require it 
to be shown that the claim could not proceed to trial and judgment absent relief. Central to 
Sorabji’s two-stage approach is the fact that it considers systemic proportionality before inter 
partes proportionality, and indeed makes satisfaction of the former a condition precedent to 
consideration of the latter.47  
 
 
41 ibid 157. 
42 Nayer (n 31). 
43 ibid 112. 
44 ibid. 
45 Sorabji, English Civil Justice (n 7) 235. 
46 ibid 247–8. 
47 ibid 246. For further discussion, see ch 6 at 218. 
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More detailed research into case management was conducted by Peysner and Seneviratne.48 
Their 2005 report set out the results of interviews and focus groups carried out in 2003-4.49 
They looked at case management on the fast and multi tracks in order to determine how the 
legal world had reacted to case management, whether the Woolf reforms had initiated a culture 
change, and whether there was generally more co-operation in the litigation process.50 They 
concluded that overall litigation culture had changed for the better,51 although there were 
mixed views on whether delay had been reduced. with some judges taking the view that case 
management actually increases delays.52 On the practice of case management, they noted that 
case management conferences (‘CMCs’) are one of the major successes of the CPR,53 and that 
the system is working well, with courts taking the lead in setting the pace of litigation.54 They 
noted that case management can be directive, but that in many respects it is employed subtly, 
for example it is evident that many CMCs are preceded by discussions between parties and the 
filing of proposed agreed directions.55 In the present context, however, this research has 
limitations. The first is the timeframe, in that it was published only six years after the CPR came 
into force. While it does set out in general terms how and the extent to which case management 
is seen as having achieved Lord Woolf’s objectives, it does not go into detail on precisely how 
case management decisions are made, nor how proportionality is applied in the context of those 
decisions.  
 
One point emphasized in Peysner and Seneviratne’s report is that there is a perceived lack of 
clarity and certainty in respect of proportionality and case management decisions. Some 
practitioners thought that the Overriding Objective gave too much discretion to the court, 
meaning that the system had become inconsistent and unpredictable, especially at first as there 
was no practical guidance on interpretation and no precedents to follow.56 The emphasis on 
proportionality under the CPR had resulted in procedural points not being argued in small cases, 
even where solicitors believed that this was unjust.57 No details are given as to how procedural 
 
48 John Peysner and Mary Seneviratne, ‘The Management of Civil Cases: The Courts and Post-Woolf 
Landscape’ (Department for Constitutional Affairs 2005) 9 
<https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dca.gov.uk/research/2005/9_2005_full.p
df> accessed 29 November 2018. 
49 ibid 6. 
50 ibid 10. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid 14. 
53 ibid 25. 
54 ibid 18. 
55 ibid 25. 
56 ibid 15. 
57 ibid 16. 
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points were being dealt with in order to prompt this response. However, this point on 
proportionality is made in the context of comments on uncertainty and solicitors stating that, 
because of this, they might not make applications where they would have done in the past.58 
 
Lack of consistency and guidance is a common thread running through the literature. This first 
became visible not long after the CPR came into force. Piggott, writing on relief from sanctions 
before Jackson, noted that complete uncertainty as to how the court would respond to 
procedural non-compliance would mean that parties are unable to make informed choices about 
matters of procedure.59 Unless the court’s response is tolerably predictable, parties will not know 
whether to expect sanctions, and credibility will be lost. The CPR itself does not indicate where 
the balance between competing dimensions of justice should be struck.60 Piggott also 
highlighted proportionality’s limitations in striking this balance, in that intensity of 
proportionality review can vary greatly,61 and its case by case operation can cause difficulties in 
terms of consistency of applicability and the lack of availability of guidance in previous cases.62 
Lord Dyson, writing shortly after Jackson, identified a lack of clarity and consistency in key 
aspects of case management which the changes to CPR 3.9 required to be remedied.63 Sorabji 
identified the need for guidance from the courts on how proportionality is to be applied, in 
respect of both proportionality as a general facet of the Overriding Objective and the specific 
issue of costs.64 This involves difficult questions, particularly in respect of CPR 1.1(2)(e), such 
as how much access for one set of proceedings is too much access, when weighed against the 
need to conserve a proper share of court resources for other litigants?65 Sorabji warned that in 
the absence of guidance from the Court of Appeal, these questions are likely to be interpreted 
differently by different courts.66 Elsewhere, he has noted that it is not enough for courts to 
simply reiterate the nature of the test for proportionality consistently and over a sustained 
 
58 ibid. 
59 Piggott (n 28) 120. 
60 ibid 121. 
61 ibid. 
62 ibid 122. These and other limitations arising from the fundamental nature of proportionality will be 
important considerations in the analysis going forward. 
63 Lord Dyson, ‘The Application of the Amendments to the Civil Procedure Rules (Eighteenth Lecture in the 
Implementation Programme)’ (District Judges’ Annual Seminar, Judicial College, 22 March 2013) 129 
<https://www.judiciary.uk/announcements/18-the-application-of-the-amendments-to-the-civil-procedure-
rules/> accessed 13 January 2019. 
64 Sorabji, ‘Prospects for Proportionality' (n 19) 225. 
65 ibid 226. 
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period of time. They also need to explain the rationale underpinning the relevant test.67 In the 
context of the ‘compliance problem’ identified above, Sorabji highlighted the importance not 
only of consistent and clear guidance over a sustained period from appellate courts,68 but also 
of judges receiving sufficient information in each case to enable them to make management 
decisions that are consistent with the Overriding Objective.69 
 
The central importance of proportionality and case management to the procedural regime 
governed by the CPR has been recognized by the existing literature, both in general terms and 
in relation to specific areas such as litigation costs and sanctions. Problems have been identified, 
and solutions proposed. What is missing is a detailed analysis of how proportionality works at 
a case-specific level. This is essential to understanding whether proportionality and active 
judicial management operate effectively and consistently. A picture of the extent to which cases 
are managed and litigated proportionately must comprise the practical actions and decisions of 
judges, parties and lawyers in individual cases. Such a close analysis will ensure that any 
improvement measures are evidence-based and appropriately targeted. The CPR has been in 
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PROPORTIONALITY AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF LAW 
 
 
The concept of proportionality, although relatively new to procedure, has acquired a distinctive 
meaning in other legal contexts. Case management proportionality can be better defined and 
understood if it is placed within the context provided by that meaning. The word 
‘proportionality’ and related terminology (such as ‘proportionate’ and ‘disproportionate’) 
import a common sense meaning which describes the relationship between two or more factors. 
The concept cannot exist in the abstract: something must be proportionate or disproportionate 
to something else. Proportionality suggests a relationship of appropriateness and balance, and 
of no one factor having either excessive prominence or insufficient weight in the analysis. It 
has been said that an appeal to proportionality ‘indicates a claim about the existence of a broad 
moral or practical equivalence or comparability between two different phenomena’, such as 
wrongful act and punishment, or perceived social problem and governmental response.70 It has 
connections to general notions of justice and has been described as a ‘source of fairness, justice 
and hope’.71 Those connections, and the principle itself, have ancient origins. 
 
The idea at the core of proportionality was considered by, amongst others, Aristotle, Plato and 
Cicero. Aristotle, in the context of distributive justice, wrote that ‘the just in this sense is a mean 
between two extremes that are disproportionate, since the proportionate is a mean, and the 
just is the proportionate’.72 For Plato, justice was ‘ultimately a question of proportional 
equality’,73 with proportionality being ‘built into the very structure of the cosmos’.74 Cicero 
distinguished between two forms of justice, aequitas and aequabilitas. Central to the latter was 
proportionate equality, the idea that more was owed to the ‘superior’ and less to the ‘inferior’.75 
Proportionality has been identified in clause 20 of Magna Carta, which stated that ‘[f]or a trivial 
 
70 Nicola Lacey, ‘The Metaphor of Proportionality’ (2016) 43(1) J.L.& Soc. 27, 30. 
71 Sofia Ranchordás and Boudewijn de Waard, ‘Proportionality crossing borders: why it is still difficult 
to recognise sparrows and cannons’, in Sofia Ranchordás and Boudewijn de Waard (eds), The Judge 
and the Proportionate Use of Discretion (Routledge 2016) 1. 
72 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics: with an English Translation by H. Rackham (London and 
Cambridge, 1962), 271-273 quoted in Izhak Englard, Corrective and Distributive Justice: From Aristotle 
to Modern Times (OUP 2009) 5. 
73 Thomas Poole, ‘Proportionality in Perspective’ (2010) 2 NZ L Rev 379. 
74 ibid 380. 
75 ibid 382. 
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offence a free man shall be fined only in proportion to the degree of his offence, and for a 
serious offence correspondingly but not so heavily as to deprive him of his livelihood’.76 During 
the Middle Ages, the ‘Just War’ doctrine incorporated the need to balance the overall utility of 
war with the damage it may inflict.77 Craig, in the context of administrative law, has identified 
‘a concept akin to that of proportionality’ from the late sixteenth century78 which was applied 
to the level and legitimacy of regulatory burdens. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, stated that the concept of civil liberty should be found only within ‘natural liberty 
so far restrained by human laws (and not farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general 
advantage of the public’.79  
 
These concepts are not identical to modern ideas of proportionality. However, the core notions 
of balance, fairness, and the imposition of no greater detriment than necessary are central to 
those modern ideas. Today, much focus is given to proportionality as a global principle of 
constitutional, administrative and human rights law. In those spheres, it is generally seen as 
originating in late nineteenth century Prussian administrative law. In the Kreuzberg decision 
(1882), the Prussian supreme administrative court examined whether a measure taken by 
police exceeded in intensity that which was required by the pursued objective.80 In cases 
following that decision, police conduct was deemed illegal when disproportionate.81 
Contemporary usage of the term ‘proportionality’ is not necessarily congruent with the 
historical one, and in the nineteenth century the question was essentially whether a measure 
was necessary.82 The Prussian courts did, however, develop a substantive principle that 
constrained police measures by subjecting them to a judicially reviewable means-ends 
analysis.83 Here, we see the judicial control of state action that is central to the modern 
proportionality principle in some contexts.  
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81 Barak (n 76) 179. 
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The remainder of this chapter will focus on four legal topics. Proportionality is an established 
principle within the first three: European Union (‘EU’) law, European human rights law, and 
English public law. The first two topics have become embedded within English law,84 and the 
third is the context in which the principle has developed most prominently in English law. The 
fourth area of focus is domestic private law. Although there is no established, structured 
principle of proportionality in that area, it makes clear that the thought processes underlying 
core aspects of proportionality are familiar to English judges. Those four areas will then be 
brought together in a discussion on the nature of the proportionality analysis. 
 
I. PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE 
 
THE ROLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
 
In EU law, European human rights law, and some aspects of domestic public law, 
proportionality is a review standard applied by courts with supervisory jurisdiction to actions 
taken or measures enacted by public bodies. Its purpose is to ensure a fair balance between the 
aims of such actions or measures and the rights and interests of those that will be affected by 
them. It aims to ensure that administrators show proper respect for individuals and that 
relationships of power between the state and individuals are understood as clear relationships 
of law.85  
 
Proportionality is a general principle of EU law.86 It applies to two categories of legal 
instruments. The first is EU-made law, being instruments made by EU institutions such as 
regulations, directives and decisions, and EU-derived national law, being national measures 
implementing those instruments. The second consists of measures taken by Member States 
under national law that qualify or impinge on EU law. Proportionality is enshrined in Article 5 
of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’), which states that ‘[u]nder the principle of 
proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Treaties’. Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
 
84 At the time of writing it is not clear how, if at all, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will affect the use 
or development of proportionality in English law.  
85 Robert Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (Hart 2000) 2, 15. 
86 Case C-331/88 R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Federation Europeene de la 
Sante Animale (FEDESA) [1990] ECR I-4023 [13]. 
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European Union by the Treaty of Lisbon, states that EU legislative acts ‘shall take account of 
the need for any burden … to be minimised and commensurate with the objective to be 
achieved’. National authorities must enact EU measures ‘in compliance with the general rules 
of Community law’, including the principle of proportionality.87  
 
The analysis is again part of a supervisory jurisdiction in European human rights law. Here, the 
jurisdiction is exercised by the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) over actions of 
signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’). Proportionality is a tool 
for monitoring compliance with ECHR rights88 and runs through the entire Convention,89 
although the terms ‘proportionality’ or ‘proportionate’ are not used. The most prominent use of 
proportionality is in the context of the qualified rights in Articles 8 to 11, which allow 
interference with a particular right where it is ‘necessary in a democratic society’.90 Such 
necessary interferences may be, for example, in the interests of public safety or for the 
protection of health or morals.91 The ECtHR has also identified a proportionality requirement 
in articles that do not permit ‘necessary’ restrictions.92 Article 14 prohibiting discrimination, for 
example, is framed in absolute terms, but discrimination is possible where it is not 
disproportionate.93 An unfair trial is never compatible with Article 6 no matter the objective 
pursued, but fairness depends on a proportionate relationship between procedures and the 
purposes for which they are provided.94 Proportionality in the context of the ECHR is therefore 
based on the diptych structure of some articles and the interpretation of others.95  
 
In domestic public law, proportionality is applied when courts review the actions of, and 
measures imposed by, government authorities and public bodies. The aim is to check the 
exercise of state power so that it does not have an overly detrimental effect on the rights or 
interests of those over whom it is exercised. In this domestic context, proportionality forms part 
of the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. The review process is contained 
 
87 Joined cases C-480/00, C-481/00, C-482/00, C-484/00, C-489/00, C-490/00, C-491/00, C-497/00, 
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88 Catherine Haguenau-Moizard and Yoan Sanchez, ‘The principle of proportionality in European law’ 
in Sofia Ranchordás and Boudewijn de Waard (eds), The Judge and the Proportionate Use of Discretion 
(Routledge 2015) 143. 
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91 ECHR Articles 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2). 
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entirely within the constitutional framework of the United Kingdom, rather than as part of a 
supranational project. Proportionality is applied where the court deals with EU law or ECHR 
issues. It has been suggested that, at present, proportionality is not a general head of judicial 
review in English law.96 It does remain tied to questions of EU law and fundamental rights, and 
views differ on its relationship to other domestic standards of review and the extent to which 
it should be extended beyond its current remit. A full discussion of the development of 
proportionality in English substantive law is beyond the scope of this work, however it seems 
unlikely that it has reached the end of its development process. 
 
The main function of proportionality in each of these areas is as a control applied by courts to 
ensure the lawful exercise of power by national or public authorities. In fulfilling that function, 
the application of proportionality must focus on the facts of the case at hand.97 However, 
application in an individual case may have a broader effect. This may be termed the ‘educative’ 
function of proportionality. Judicial application of proportionality can inform national 
authorities, public bodies and private parties as to the type of actions that may, for example, 
amount to illegitimate infringement of an ECHR right or inappropriate use of state power. This 
may in turn shape their future behaviour. The fact-specific nature of the proportionality analysis 
should not, therefore, be focused on to the exclusion of understanding the broader effect that 




There is no universally applicable ‘proportionality test’, but four limbs of the analysis can be 
identified. First, an action or measure must be in service of a legitimate aim. Secondly, it must 
be suitable or appropriate for achieving that aim. Thirdly, it must be necessary to achieve the 
aim, in that there is no less restrictive or burdensome means of doing so. Finally, the costs or 
detriments imposed by the measure must be proportionate to its benefits. This final limb is 
sometimes referred to as ‘proportionality stricto sensu’, or proportionality ‘in the strict sense’. 
Some of these limbs may be omitted, and the extent to which a structured test is applied may 
vary.  
 
In EU law, the case most often cited as authority for the proportionality test is Fedesa (1990): 
 
96 Paul Craig, Administrative Law (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 633. 
97 The fact-specific nature of the proportionality analysis is discussed below at 45. 
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[b]y virtue of [the principle of proportionality], the lawfulness of the prohibition of 
an economic activity is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures are 
appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued 
by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate 
measures recourse must be had to the less onerous, and the disadvantages caused 
must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.98 
 
Each of the four limbs can be identified here. The ECJ in Fromançais v FORMA (1982), on the 
other hand, focused on the suitability and necessity limbs, stating that in order to establish 
whether a provision of Community law is proportionate, ‘it is necessary to establish, in the first 
place, whether the means it employs to achieve its aim correspond to the importance of the 
aim and, in the second place, whether they are necessary for its achievement’.99 The UK 
Supreme Court in R (Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board (2015) stated that ‘[i]n practice [the ECJ] 
usually omits [the proportionality stricto sensu limb] from its formulation of the proportionality 
principle. Where the question has been argued, however, the court has often included it in its 
formulation and addressed it separately, as in [Fedesa]’.100 Common to these tests are the 
requirements of suitability and necessity. Fromançais gives more detail on the suitability limb, 
which requires the means to ‘correspond to the importance of the aim’.101  Fedesa, on the other 
hand, gives more detail on the necessity limb, stating that where there is ‘a choice between 
several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the less onerous’.102 This requires the 
court to consider alternative means of achieving the same end. In doing so, the relevant 
objectives must be clearly identified. In Fedesa, the applicants’ argument that the measure in 
question was unnecessary was based on the premise that the only objective was allaying 
consumer anxieties. The ECJ identified additional objectives of health protection, the removal 
of barriers to trade and distortions of competition which could not have been achieved by the 
less onerous measure proposed by the applicants.103 
 
The most structured approach applied by the ECtHR is a three-part enquiry. This asks whether 
the interference with or limitation of rights is in accordance with or prescribed by law, whether 
 
98 Fedesa (n 86) [13]. 
99 Case 66/82 Fromançais v FORMA [1983] ECR I-00395 [8]. 
100 [2015] UKSC 41 [33] (Lord Reed and Lord Toulson). 
101 Fromançais (n 99) [8]. 
102 Fedesa (n 86) [13]. 
103 ibid [16]; Lumsdon (n 100) [46] (Lord Reed and Lord Toulson). 
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the aim of the interference or limitation is legitimate, and whether the interference or limitation 
is necessary in a democratic society.104 Sometimes the ECtHR moves directly to the third 
question.105 The court in Silver v United Kingdom (1983) summarised the meaning of ‘necessary 
in a democratic society’, the court’s functions in the examination of issues turning on that 
phrase and the manner in which it performs those functions: 
 
(a) the adjective “necessary” is not synonymous with “indispensable”, neither has it 
the flexibility of such expressions as “admissible”, “ordinary”, “useful”, “reasonable” 
or “desirable” (see the Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, 
p. 22, § 48); 
 
(b) the Contracting States enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin of appreciation 
in the matter of the imposition of restrictions, but it is for the Court to give the final 
ruling on whether they are compatible with the Convention (ibid., p. 23, § 49); 
 
(c) the phrase “necessary in a democratic society” means that, to be compatible with 
the Convention, the interference must, inter alia, correspond to a “pressing social 
need” and be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” (ibid., pp.22-23, §§ 48-
49); 
 
(d) those paragraphs of Articles of the Convention which provide for an exception 
to a right guaranteed are to be narrowly interpreted (see the above mentioned Klass 
and others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 21, § 42).106 
 
The comments on the meaning of ‘necessary’, drawn from Handyside v United Kingdom 
(1979),107 do not provide a clear definition. It has been said that they only make clear that 
necessity is a ‘rather vague’ notion.108 The equation of ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to a 
‘pressing social need’ also lacks clarity, but it does indicate that the relevant aim must have a 
high level of importance. Precisely what amounts to a ‘pressing social need’ will depend on an 
 
104 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks, Clare Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (7th 
edn, OUP 2014) 342; Haguenau-Moizard and Sanchez (n 88) 145. 
105 Rainey, Wicks and Ovey (n 104) 342. 
106 (1983) Series A No 61, para 97. 
107 (1979) Series A No 24. 
108 Janneke Gerards, ‘How to improve the necessity test of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
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analysis of the facts. The ECtHR often applies a more general ‘necessity’ test, in the sense of 
‘relevancy’ or ‘pertinency’, as opposed to the ‘least restrictive means’ test favoured by the ECJ,109 
although the ECtHR does apply the latter in ‘rare cases’.110 
 
In B v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2000), Sedley LJ sought to summarise 
proportionality in the context of English public law ‘in a nutshell’:111  
 
[i]n essence, [proportionality] amounts to this: a measure which interferes with a 
Community or human right must not only be authorised by law but must correspond 
to a pressing social need and go no further than strictly necessary in a pluralistic 
society to achieve its permitted purpose; or, more shortly, must be appropriate and 
necessary to its legitimate aim.112 
 
This suggestion of an identical approach in respect of EU and human rights law is contradicted 
by subsequent case law. In the context of fundamental rights, it is now generally accepted that 
a four-stage test applies, summarised by Lord Sumption in Bank Mellat (2013): 
 
… the question demands an exacting analysis of the factual case advanced in 
defence of the measure, in order to determine (i) whether its objective is sufficiently 
important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right; (ii) whether it is rationally 
connected to the objective; (iii) whether a less intrusive measure could have been 
used; and (iv) whether, having regard to these matters and to the severity of the 
consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual 
and the interests of the community.113 
 
The four limbs of the proportionality analysis can be identified, although the fourth refers to a 
balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community, rather than a 
more general ‘proportionate’ cost-benefit analysis. The ‘most important judgment to date’114 on 
the meaning and application of proportionality in the domestic EU law context is Lumsdon.115 
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111 Michael Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (6th edn, Hart 2012) 427. 
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Lords Reed and Toulson stated that proportionality in the EU context differs from that under 
the ECHR and that while there is some common ground, the four stage Bank Mellat analysis is 
not applicable to proportionality in EU law.116 The extent of the differences, however, was left 
unexplained.117 The Supreme Court in Lumsdon set out a two stage test dealing with suitability 
and necessity, and noted that there was ‘some debate’ about the existence of a third question, 
‘namely, whether the burden imposed by the measure is disproportionate to the benefits 
secured’.118 This is the ‘proportionality in the strict sense’ analysis that is sometimes, but not 
always, conducted by the ECJ. Bjorge and Williams identify an overlap, in that there will be 
instances in the context of fundamental rights where a court will not pose all four Bank Mellat 
questions, or will apply a less intense version, meaning that much of what the Supreme Court 
said about EU proportionality in Lumsdon will apply in other contexts.119 
 
Three fundamental notions underpin these tests. The first is the nature of the objective, which 
must be ‘legitimate’ or ‘sufficiently important’ to justify the imposition of a limitation of rights 
or a detrimental effect to interests. The second is the relationship between means and ends, 
reflected in the ‘suitability’ and ‘necessity’ limbs. The former requires analysis of whether a 
particular means is appropriate for achieving the specified end. The latter incorporates a ‘least 
restrictive means’ analysis, requiring consideration of whether there are alternative, less 
burdensome, ways to achieve the same objective. This ties into the final common thread, the 
cost-benefit analysis, in that a measure that imposes a more onerous than necessary burden is 
more likely to fail that analysis. Even if the means employed to achieve a legitimate objective 
are suitable and necessary, they must also be proportionate to that objective. This requires 
balancing the value of attaining an objective with the costs incurred in achieving it. It involves 
a means-end analysis, but one that weighs and compares the relative values and costs of those 
means and ends.120 Balancing does not always involve a means-end relationship, but 
proportionality is a relational concept which requires analysing the quality of the relationship 
between factors rather than simply considering whether one is weightier than another.121 This 
final limb has been called ‘notoriously vague’.122 Certainly, requiring a determination of 
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‘proportionality’ within a test for proportionality is not particularly helpful. Referring to this 
third limb as a cost-benefit analysis, rather than using the term ‘proportionality in the strict 
sense’, would ensure greater clarity.  
 
II. EUROPEAN AND ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW 
 
The application of the proportionality analysis is not homogenous, and the intensity of review 
that courts undertake will vary. The term ‘intensity of review’ refers to the level of scrutiny that 
a court will apply. It determines how close the court’s analysis will be and the height of the bar 
at which a measure will be deemed disproportionate. The standard applied will be more or less 
exacting depending on the character and context of the measure under review.123 The court is 
not the primary decision-maker, rather it is reviewing a decision of another autonomous body. 
The proportionality analysis will be affected by the relationship between the court and that 
other body, the subject and circumstances of the decision, and the extent of the decision-
making body’s discretion in taking it.  
 
Under EU law, in areas where EU institutions are given a wide discretion, proportionality is 
applied with minimal intensity. A measure will only be disproportionate if it is ‘manifestly 
inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to 
pursue’.124 The same approach is taken to the review of national action implementing EU 
measures, where those measures require the national authority to exercise a discretion 
involving political, economic or social choices, especially where a complex assessment is 
required.125 Greater intensity is applied where a national measure is alleged to interfere with 
rights conferred by the EU treaties and the four fundamental freedoms.126 The court must first 
determine whether the measure is suitable to achieve the legitimate aim in question, and then 
whether it is no more onerous than is required to achieve that aim, if there is a choice of equally 
effective measures.127 The justification for the restriction will be examined in detail,128 and close 
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examination will be given to whether other measures could have been equally effective but less 
restrictive of the freedom in question.129 
 
Proportionality is central to the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature and to 
the division of powers between the EU and Member States.130 It highlights the appropriate 
degree of Community interference and that, where possible, Member States’ legal systems 
should be respected.131 In areas such as the Common Agricultural Policy and Common 
Transport Policy, efficiency requires decision-making institutions to be given a degree of 
latitude when making economic policy choices.132 The term ‘manifestly inappropriate’ 
delineates the ECJ’s perception of the limits of the judicial function regarding the review of 
measures involving economic policy choices.133 The ECJ retains tighter control in cases 
concerning potential infringement on Treaty rights and the four freedoms. National 
governments and institutions cannot be permitted such broad latitude where EU-wide 
fundamental principles are concerned. Even in that context, however, where a relevant public 
interest is engaged in an area where EU law has not imposed complete harmonisation, a 
Member State is allowed a margin of appreciation in choosing an appropriate measure and in 
deciding on the level of protection to be given to the public interest in question.134 
 
The ECtHR also allows a margin of appreciation which reflects the level of discretion allowed 
to contracting states in fulfilling their ECHR obligations.135 The margin of appreciation doctrine 
was created to ‘preserve state autonomy in assessing the solutions needed to solve problems’.136 
The ECtHR in Handyside explained the relationship between the court and national institutions 
embodied in the margin of appreciation: ‘it is for the national authorities to make the initial 
assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion of “necessity”’.137 
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Contracting states are not, however, given ‘an unlimited power of appreciation’.138 The ECtHR 
is ‘empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” or “penalty” is reconcilable’ 
with the right in question, and ‘[t]he domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand 
with a European supervision’.139 The UK Supreme Court has noted that the margin of 
appreciation ‘reflects a recognition on the part of the Strasbourg court that in certain 
circumstances, and to a certain extent, national authorities are better placed than an 
international court to determine the outcome of the process of balancing individual and 
community interests.’140 
 
The margin of appreciation is flexible, its scope varying ‘according to the subject-matter and its 
background’.141 It ties into the intensity with which the ECtHR scrutinises the decisions of 
national authorities, which in turn will depend on the circumstances and the ECHR rights 
involved. The ECtHR will be more deferential in two categories of case: those where there is 
no consensus among contracting states on the rights accruing to individuals, the idea being 
that the less consensus there is, the better placed national authorities are to decide; and those 
where the national authority is better placed to decide on politically sensitive issues.142 In the 
context of morals, for example, the ECtHR has stated that ‘it is not possible to find in the 
domestic law of the various Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals’, 
meaning that ‘State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge’ 
to determine the content of measures in that sphere.143 A wide margin of appreciation has also 
been allowed in the context of national security.144 In Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979), 
the ECtHR drew a comparison between Handyside and ‘the far more objective notion of the 
“authority” of the judiciary’, in respect of which there is a ‘fairly substantial measure of common 
ground’ between contracting states.145 Accordingly, ‘a more extensive European supervision’ 
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In domestic public law, proportionality is to be applied ‘with considerable flexibility dependent 
on the nature of the case’.147 Where the measure under review implements EU law into domestic 
law, the domestic courts must apply the level of intensity that would be applied by the ECJ, 
‘neither more nor less, and not the level which [they] would prefer to apply if free to do so’.148 
Where human rights are concerned, the court will conduct a ‘rigorous and intensive’ review.149 
Lord Bingham in R v Shayler (2002) stated that ‘in any application for judicial review alleging 
an alleged violation of a convention right the court will now conduct a much more rigorous 
and intrusive review than was once thought to be permissible’.150 Lord Hope, in the same case, 
noted that ‘[a] close and penetrating examination of the factual justification for the restriction 
is needed if the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention are to remain practical and 
effective’.151 
 
As under EU and European human rights law, proportionality in domestic public law is 
indivisible from the relationship between the court and the body whose decision is under 
review. The language of deference, however, is something to which English judges have 
expressed strong antipathy. It has been said to have overtones of ‘servility’152 and ‘of cringing 
abstention in the face of a superior status.’153 English judges prefer to ‘give weight’ to a public 
body’s decision. In Carlile (2014), Lords Sumption and Neuberger expressed deference in terms 
of ascribing weight to the decision-maker’s judgments.154 The House of Lords in Huang v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (2007) had previously stated that where a court 
exercises restraint, it is not ‘apt’ to say that it is ‘deferring’ to the decision-maker, rather it is 
performing ‘the ordinary judicial task of weighing up the competing considerations on each 
side and according appropriate weight to the judgment of a person with responsibility for a 
given subject matter and access to special sources of knowledge and advice’.155 Lord Sumption 
stated in Carlile that beyond an elementary principle that ‘deference’ is no more than a 
recognition that a review court does not usurp the function of the decision-maker, ‘the 
assignment of weight to the decision-maker’s judgment has nothing to do with deference in the 
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ordinary sense of the term’.156  The precise approach to the review of a particular action or 
decision will depend on the facts, as highlighted by Lord Neuberger’s comment in Carlile that 
there is: 
 
a spectrum of types of decision, ranging from those based on factors on which 
judges have the evidence, the experience, the knowledge, and the institutional 
legitimacy to be able to form their own view with confidence, to those based on 
facts in respect of which judges cannot claim any such competence, and where only 
exceptional circumstances would justify judicial interference.157  
 
Lord Donaldson stated in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind (1991) 
that judicial review is a supervisory, rather than appellate, jurisdiction and that:  
 
acceptance of ‘proportionality’ as a separate ground for seeking judicial review 
rather than a facet of ‘irrationality’ could easily and speedily lead to courts 
forgetting the supervisory nature of their jurisdiction and substituting their view of 
what was appropriate for that of the authority whose duty it was to reach that 
decision.158  
 
This highlights an important point in the domestic context regarding the relationship between 
courts and decision-makers: the difference between the irrationality head of judicial review, 
with its associated notion of ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’, and proportionality. Wednesbury 
unreasonableness, as originally articulated, states that an administrative decision that satisfies 
both the illegality and procedural impropriety heads of judicial review may be struck down by 
the court if it is ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it’.159 A 
‘heightened scrutiny’ Wednesbury test in a human rights context was endorsed by Lord Bingham 
in R v Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith (1996).160 That test stated that, while the court may 
only interfere with administrative discretion where it is satisfied that the decision is 
‘unreasonable in the sense that it is beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable 
decision-maker … the more substantial the interference with human rights, the more the court 
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[would] require by way of justification before it [was] satisfied that the decision [was] 
reasonable’.161  
 
It has been said that there is no bright line between proportionality and reasonableness, with 
the question being context dependent.162 Judicial views differ as to how the two standards 
relate to each other. They have been described as ‘different models – one looser, one tighter – 
of the same juridical concept, which is the imposition of compulsory standards on decision-
makers so as to secure the repudiation of arbitrary power’.163 Unreasonableness is the ‘looser’ 
model, exemplified by the ECtHR’s determination that even the heightened scrutiny 
Wednesbury test was insufficient to protect human rights: 
 
the threshold at which the High Court and the Court of Appeal could find the 
Ministry of Defence policy irrational was placed so high that it effectively excluded 
any consideration by the domestic courts of the question of whether the interference 
with the applicants’ rights answered a pressing social need or was proportionate to 
the national security and public order aims pursued, principles which lie at the heart 
of the Court’s analysis of complaints under Article 8 of the Convention.164 
 
Lord Mance, in Kennedy v Information Commissioner (2014), stated that while both standards 
involve considerations of weight and balance, with weight and intensity of scrutiny depending 
on context, the advantage of the terminology of proportionality is that it ‘introduces an element 
of structure into the exercise, by directing attention to factors such as suitability or 
appropriateness, necessity and the balance or imbalance or benefits and disadvantages’.165 This 
suggests that proportionality offers a more systematic way of analysing issues that at their core 
are essentially the same. Lord Steyn, in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(2001), noted that there is some overlap between the two, in that ‘most cases would be decided 
in the same way whichever approach is adopted’, but the intensity of review is ‘somewhat 
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greater’ under proportionality.166 The differences between the principles that Lord Steyn set out 
give an insight into what ‘intensity of review’ means. Proportionality may require the reviewing 
court to assess the balance struck by the decision-maker, not merely whether it is within the 
range of reasonable or rational decisions, and it may go further than traditional grounds of 
review inasmuch as it may require attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded to 
interests and considerations.167 The former point was highlighted by Lord Neuberger in R 
(Keyu) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2015), in the context of 
commenting that the move from rationality to proportionality ‘would appear to have potentially 
profound and far reaching consequences’168 as it would involve the court considering the merits 
of the decision at issue, suggesting a more substantial distinction between the two standards.  
 
The relationships between courts and the parties to cases before them are not identical in the 
areas of law considered above. In each area, however, the focus of the relevant court’s role is 
the setting and maintaining of boundaries. The ECtHR and ECJ exercise supervisory jurisdiction 
within different contexts. The ECHR does not create a distinct legal order, and the ECtHR is 
separate from the constitutional orders of the ECHR contracting states. The latter have a 
substantial degree of autonomy as to how they give effect to their ECHR obligations, but the 
ECtHR ensures that they do not disproportionately infringe an ECHR right by overstepping the 
bounds of that autonomy. The EU treaties, on the other hand, have been treated by the ECJ as 
creating a distinct legal order embracing the EU institutions, Member States and their 
citizens.169 The ECJ maintains the balance of power within the EU by ensuring that all acts of 
EU law, whether by EU institutions or Member States, are lawful. It also maintains appropriate 
boundaries between national and EU law such that the former does not disproportionately 
impinge on the latter. In the domestic context, the courts and the authorities whose decisions 
they review are both internal to the UK constitutional structure. The relevant standard of review 
is applied within the context of the separation of powers. The courts’ desire not to overstep 
their bounds may lie behind the cautious development of proportionality as a standard of 
review in domestic law, given that it is more intrusive than Wednesbury unreasonableness, even 
in the latter’s heightened form. This is reflected in, for example, Lord Neuberger’s judgment in 
Keyu170 and Lord Lowry’s judgment in Brind. The latter referred, disapprovingly, to 
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proportionality moving the focus of a judicial review discussion ‘into an area in which the court 
will feel more at liberty to interfere’.171 This aspect of proportionality is of most interest for 
present purposes because it embodies the greatest difference between the principle in these 
contexts, and in the procedural case management context.172  
 
III. ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW 
 
The language of proportionality has become prominent in some areas of private law. Two clear 
examples are contractual damages, specifically liquidated damages and assessment in a cost of 
cure context, and proprietary estoppel. The law on liquidated damages was fundamentally 
rewritten173 in Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings BV (2015).174 Lords Sumption and 
Neuberger stated that: 
 
the true test [for whether a liquidated damages clause should be invalidated as a 
penalty clause] is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which 
imposes a detriment on the contract breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate 
interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation.175  
 
Here we see the language of interests and detriments that is ubiquitous in discussions of 
proportionality. Lord Hodge, similarly, used the term ‘wholly disproportionate to the loss 
suffered.’176 The language used in Makdessi reflects an extreme form of proportionality, present 
in phrases such as ‘out of all proportion’,177 ‘wholly disproportionate’178 and ‘extravagant 
disproportion’ [emphasis added].179 This suggests that proportionality forms a spectrum at the 
far end of which, in a liquidated damages context, disproportionality becomes indefensible. 
Similar language was used in Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth (1996), in which 
Lord Lloyd stated that the cost of reinstatement of defective work is not the appropriate 
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measure of damages if ‘the expenditure would be out of all proportion to the benefit 
obtained’.180  
 
In the context of proprietary estoppel, the authorities were reviewed in Jennings v Rice 
(2002).181 The Court of Appeal noted that ‘the most essential requirement’ to doing justice 
where an equity arises after the elements of proprietary estoppel are established ‘is that there 
must be proportionality between the expectation and the detriment’.182 The more recent case 
of Davies v Davies (2016)183 highlighted a consideration akin to the ‘least restrictive means’ 
aspect of proportionality. While there must be proportionality between the remedy and the 
detriment which its purpose is to avoid, ‘[t]his does not mean that the court should abandon 
expectations and seek only to compensate detrimental reliance, but if the expectation is 
disproportionate to the detriment, the court should satisfy the equity in a more limited way’.184 
 
The terminology is less prominent, but some of the same principles can be discerned, in codified 
schemes for assigning liability. In the context of contribution claims, s.2(1) Civil Liability 
(Contribution) Act 1987 states that ‘the amount of the contribution recoverable from any 
person shall be such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the 
extent of that person’s responsibility for the damage in question’. When considering whether 
to make an unequal apportionment, the court will consider three rules:185 whether the actions 
of one party were more causatively potent,186 whether one party was more morally 
blameworthy,187 and the rule on retention of gains, embodied in the maxim that ‘he who takes 
the benefit must bear the burden’.188 No party should bear a greater burden than necessary in 
respect of damage for which they are partially responsible. The same is true of contributory 
negligence, in respect of which s.1(1) Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 states 
that where a party that suffered damage was at fault, ‘the damages recoverable in respect 
thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to 
the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage’. Again, each party should only bear 
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an appropriate burden having had their responsibility for the damage assessed. The principle 
at the heart of the law on contributions, that no party should have to bear excessive 
responsibility for damage caused, recalls the idea central to proportionality that no party should 
suffer a greater detriment than necessary.  
 
There is no structured principle of proportionality in these contexts that is directly comparable 
to the principle established in European and domestic public law. Some fundamental 
differences stem from the nature of the relationships between interested parties and the court. 
Assessment of damages and the penalty doctrine are facets of the law of contract. The rule on 
penalty clauses is a major qualification upon the operation of the principle of freedom of 
contract.189 By entering into a contract, parties define the relationship between them, as 
opposed to one party being subject to measures imposed by the other, the content of which 
they are unable to control. In some cases the parties will not have equal bargaining power, but 
this is not decisive when deciding whether a clause is a penalty, although it may affect the 
application of the test, particularly in determining what amounts to ‘unconscionable’ or 
‘extravagant’ in the circumstances.190 Considerations of proportionality are, therefore, applied 
in a context in which ‘the court has to be careful not to set too stringent a standard and bear in 
mind that what the parties have agreed to should normally be upheld’.191  
 
Different interests are involved in these private law contexts, where the court gives effect to 
rights under the substantive law of obligations. The court enforces rights and obligations that 
exist between parties in their private capacity, rather than protecting the rights of one private 
party from unlawful interference by a party acting in its capacity as a public or governmental 
authority. This difference feeds into the relationship between the parties and the court, and the 
role of the latter. The court is not reviewing the actions of one party as a check on potential 
abuses of power. It does not have to defer to, or give weight to, the decisions of non-judicial 
bodies. The court is the adjudicator of a dispute, rather than part of a review mechanism aimed 
at maintaining an appropriate balance of administrative powers. One manifestation of these 
differences may be in the approach to the distinction between proportionality and 
reasonableness. In a public law context, courts have taken a cautious approach to the 
relationship between these principles.192 In Ruxley, however, unreasonableness was equated to 
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being ‘wholly disproportionate’193 or ‘out of all proportion’.194 The boundaries of the separation 
of powers may mean that principles develop differently in public and private law contexts.  
 
There are, however, some fundamental similarities between these private law contexts and 
proportionality as applied in European and domestic public law. There must be an appropriate 
relationship between means and ends, incorporating an aspect of necessity. The central 
question of the Makdessi test is whether, in protecting one party’s legitimate interests, the clause 
in question imposes no greater detriment than necessary on the other contracting party. That 
case evidences a shift towards the language and concept of proportionality, in terms of both 
the necessity of any detriment imposed and the legitimacy of the aim to which the means 
imposing that detriment are connected. The statutory law examples use the language of justice 
and equity rather than aims, benefits and detriments, but similarities remain. The payment of 
a contribution or a reduction in damages due to contributory negligence is a financial detriment 
to the party who pays or receives less than they claimed. The ‘just and equitable’ standard 
requires the detriment to be no greater than necessary to accurately reflect that party’s 
responsibility. Again, there must be an appropriate relationship between means and ends, with 
the end being compensation for damage suffered and the means being apportionment of that 
compensation between those responsible. The thought patterns at the heart of the 
proportionality analysis are clearly familiar to English judges, even if they do not always bear 
the ‘proportionality’ label. This may reflect the fact that proportionality, in a broad sense, 
expresses fundamental notions of justice and fairness. Cases such as Makdessi and Jennings 
illustrate an articulation of those general intuitions in the language of proportionality. 
 
IV. COMMON THEMES 
 
Some common themes can be identified which shape the kind of analysis proportionality 
requires. An important initial point is that proportionality is not a rule, rather it provides an 
analytical framework. It has been described as a ‘reasoning framework’,195 an ‘argumentation’196 
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and ‘balancing’ framework,197 an ‘analytical structure’198 and an ‘analogical concept’.199 Other 
than in a general sense (‘X must be proportionate to Y’), there is no ‘proportionality rule’. There 
is no rule that specifies precisely how factors relevant to X and Y, and indeed X and Y 
themselves, are to be weighed against each other. There is no formula that when applied to a 
given situation will guarantee a proportionate result. The statement ‘X must be proportionate 
to Y’ opens the door to an analytical framework which allows relevant factors to be balanced 
as required by the situation at hand. The proportionality tests give shape to that framework by 
identifying core concepts within which case-specific factors can be considered. 
 
The proportionality tests considered above are general in tone and content. There is no attempt 
to be prescriptive, for example as to how concepts such as suitability and necessity might be 
defined. This is due to another fundamental feature of the proportionality analysis: it needs to 
be flexible and applicable to the widest range of factual situations. Lord Toulson in Makdessi 
stated that it was ‘impossible to lay down abstract rules about what may or may not be 
“extravagant and unconscionable”, because it depends on the particular facts and 
circumstances in the individual case’.200 This applies beyond the context of liquidated damages 
and penalty clauses. It is impossible, for example, to set down precise rules as to what is 
‘necessary’, because the content of that requirement will always be tied to the facts of a case. 
The necessity requirement in each case binds together a unique combination of objective, the 
means of achieving it, and any detriment imposed by those means. The ECtHR has equated 
necessity with a ‘pressing social need’, which gives some additional definition through a broad 
indication of the strength of the case that needs to be made out, but it is still an addition to the 
analytical framework rather than a precise rule. The same can be said of the phrases ‘out of all 
proportion’ and ‘wholly disproportionate’ used in Makdessi. Guidance may be drawn from case 
law on the sub-factors to take into account when considering suitability and necessity, and how 
courts have weighed those factors in previous cases, but the analysis must always be fact 
specific. Not only is it impossible to lay down prescriptive rules, it is in some respects 
undesirable. The flexibility of the proportionality analysis is one of its greatest strengths. It 
would be lost, or at best eroded, by imposing rules on issues such as meaning and how relevant 
factors are to be weighed against each other. On the other hand, a lack of clear rules can lead 
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to inconsistency of decision-making. The provision of sufficiently detailed reasoning could, 
however, minimise any loss of consistency. 
 
A less beneficial feature of the proportionality analysis is incommensurability, which states that 
the factors relevant to a determination of proportionality cannot be properly balanced.201 One 
way in which incommensurability is used to criticise proportionality stems from the view that 
rights hold a special normative force that lends them an absolute or near-absolute priority over 
competing considerations, such as conflicting interests, and makes talk of balancing 
misleading.202 Endicott articulates the ‘incommensurability problem’ as being that ‘if there is no 
rational basis for deciding one way rather than the other, then the result seems to represent a 
departure from the rule of law, in favour or arbitrary rule by judges’.203 Lord Reed commented 
on the problem in the context of contributory negligence in Jackson v Murray (2015): 
 
It is not possible for a court to arrive at an apportionment which is demonstrably 
correct. The problem is not merely that the factors which the court is required to 
consider are incapable of precise measurement. More fundamentally, the 
blameworthiness of the pursuer and the defender are incommensurable. The 
defender has acted in breach of a duty … which was owed to the pursuer; the 
pursuer, on the other hand, has acted for want of regard for her own interests. … 
The court is not comparing like with like.204 
 
This issue can be identified in other areas of law, taking as examples some of the cases cited 
above. In Fedesa, the ECJ considered the benefits to consumers of harmonising conditions of 
supply and administration to farm animals of hormonal substances as against the disadvantages 
of those measures, including considerable financial loss, to certain traders.205 In Handyside, the 
ECtHR balanced the Article 10 right to freedom of expression with the aim of the UK’s Obscene 
Publications Acts 1959 and 1964 to ‘wage war’ on obscene publications defined by a tendency 
to ‘deprave and corrupt’. The effect of measures taken under those Acts on the Article 10 right, 
which was both an individual right that accrued to Mr Handyside and an ‘essential foundation’ 
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of a democratic society,206 had to be taken into account alongside the effects that the 
publication in question would be likely to have on its target audience. In Daly, the applicant 
challenged a requirement that a prisoner may not be present when legally privileged 
correspondence was examined by prison officers. The House of Lords considered on the one 
hand the aim of security, preventing crime and maintaining order and discipline, and on the 
other hand prisoners’ right to communicate confidentially with a legal adviser under the seal 
of legal professional privilege, and the relationship of the challenged measure to both of those 
factors.207 In none of those cases was the court ‘comparing like with like’.  
 
Two related aspects of incommensurability have been identified: first, that it is impossible to 
assign precise values to rights and interests, and secondly that the rights and interests in 
question cannot be weighed using the same common scale.208 This means that a determination 
of proportionality will ultimately be a question of intuitive, although informed, judgment on 
the part of the court. This is not unfamiliar to English judges. Many areas of substantive law 
present decisions which require the weighing of incommensurable values. Determining 
quantum of damages, for example, may require different forms of damage and different 
measures of value to be weighed against each other. Neither Endicott nor Lord Reed see 
incommensurability as an insurmountable problem. The former argues that the rule of law 
demands a system in which independent tribunals can reconcile incommensurable values, and 
that judicial decision-making does not become arbitrary in the sense relevant to the rule of law 
where judges undertake this exercise.209 Lord Reed notes that while incommensurability does 
make the apportionment of responsibility in contributory negligence cases a ‘somewhat rough 
and ready exercise’, this is consistent with the broad ‘just and equitable’ apportionment 
requirement.210 It follows that judges’ differing views should be respected, within the limits of 
reasonable disagreement.211 This is analogous to the approach taken to case management 
decisions on appeal.212  
 
Incommensurability highlights the importance of how the proportionality analysis is carried 
out and the way that judges articulate the process and results of the analysis. It can compound 
 
206 Handyside (n 107) [49]. 
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problems caused by lack of transparency. Although the absence of clear reasoning is always 
undesirable, it is particularly problematic where it is not obvious how factors relevant to a 
decision can be weighed against each other. In that situation, explanation by the decision-
maker is required in order to fully understand the decision. Simply saying that a particular 
outcome is ‘proportionate’ gives no insight into the underlying reasoning. Incommensurability 
and lack of transparency also make consistency of decision-making more difficult. Even if there 
is clarity as to the reasoning underlying a decision, if the factors to be considered are 
incommensurable then it will be difficult to provide any useful, concrete guidance that may be 
followed in subsequent cases. This is also a consequence of the fact-specific nature of the 
proportionality analysis. These issues are central to the proposals set out in Chapter Six, as they 




This chapter has shown that proportionality is not unique to English civil procedural law. It is 
a fundamental principle in EU law and European human rights law, and is familiar to English 
judges in those contexts. Some of its constituent parts can also be identified in areas of domestic 
private law. There is no single test by which proportionality is applied, but the structure of an 
analytical framework has been identified. It incorporates a relationship between means and 
ends, specifically that the means of achieving a legitimate end must be suitable and necessary, 
and a cost-benefit analysis which balances the rights and interests, and the value and burdens, 
accruing to relevant parties. In EU law, European human rights law and domestic public law, 
the courts apply proportionality as part of a review jurisdiction. The principle is tied to the role 
of the court, to the relationship between the court and the parties to the dispute before it, and 
to the subject matter of the dispute. These factors affect the intensity with which the analysis 
is applied, and the latitude afforded to those making decisions under the powers that are being 
reviewed. In domestic private law, proportionality has not developed as a structured principle, 
but core elements of the analysis have been identified, notably the balancing of rights and 
interests and the need to ensure that any burden imposed is no greater than required to achieve 
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This broader perspective is important. If one were to ignore the fact that proportionality has 
history, meaning and application outside the procedural context, is might misleadingly suggest 
that this principle is unique to procedural law. This limits our ability to understand the 
procedural principle, because it excludes a body of established comparators that can be used 
to give that principle definition. Each constituent part of the proportionality analysis identified 
in this chapter can be analysed in the context of procedural proportionality. Exploration of 
similarities and differences allows us to go beyond the general terms ‘proportionate’ and 
‘disproportionate’ to determine what those terms mean in a case management context. Those 
comparisons will be carried out in the next chapter. It will be seen that all the constituent parts 
of the analysis identified in this chapter are present in case management proportionality, but 
that there is greater divergence in the role of the court and its relationship to the parties before 
it. First, however, we must review the development of proportionality and case management 































This chapter will consider the meaning and nature of procedural proportionality and active 
judicial case management, the reasons for their introduction and their importance in the 
ongoing development of the CPR. Case management proportionality will be compared with the 
general principle explored in the previous chapter with the aim of defining the principle as 
precisely as possible. First, however, consideration must be given to certain fundamental 
concepts of justice. 
 
I. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 
 
In the civil justice system governed by the CPR, ‘procedural justice is as important as substantive 
justice’.214 An understanding of the meaning of substantive law and justice on the one hand, 
and procedural law and justice on the other, is crucial to analysing any part of the CPR.   
 
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAW 
 
The substantive law is that which is applied by the court to findings of fact in order to determine 
parties’ rights and liabilities. Procedural law, on the other hand, sets out the mechanics of how 
parties enforce their rights and the formal structure within which they do so. It operates on 
multiple levels. At an elevated level, procedural law embraces overarching concepts that shape 
a litigation system as a whole, such as the right to an impartial tribunal, to a public hearing, 
and to equality of arms. At a case-specific level, it embraces the rules and decisions which 
determine how, on a step-by-step basis, litigation is conducted. Those case-specific aspects of 
procedural law must comply with the higher-level overarching procedural concepts. Lord Woolf 
referred to ‘procedural tools for conducting litigation’,215 emphasising the role of procedure in 
the logistics of how a case proceeds through the court system.  
 
214 Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the civil justice system in 
England and Wales (HMSO 1995) ch 26, para 29. 
215 ibid ch 3, para 8. 
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These two bodies of law are linked. Procedure exists to serve a particular aim and has no 
meaning in isolation.216 On a basic level, procedural law dictates the means by which parties 
enforce rights accorded to them under the substantive law. This apparently simple connection 
poses more complex questions as to the kind of substantive outcomes that procedural law 
should support, and the extent to which the nature of procedure itself should form part of the 
‘justice’ provided by the court. It is here that the concepts of ‘substantive justice’ and ‘procedural 
justice’ come into play.  
  
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
 
Substantive justice is achieved when a right or duty is vindicated in accordance with the 
relevant substantive law. The term imports a notion of strict and precise enforcement, 
embodying the idea that the relevant legal norm has been accurately identified and precisely 
applied. This requires a scrupulous and unerring quest to ascertain the facts. If it is necessary 
to apply the correct substantive law to accurately identified facts, both law and fact must be 
determined without any allowance for error. However, this conception represents an ideal of 
substantive justice which, for two reasons, fails to provide a true picture of the civil justice 
system. First, many cases do not proceed through the system to trial. A court can make different 
types of judgment, not all of which involve an attempt at a definitive ascertainment of fact. 
Summary judgment, for example, is a final disposition based on a truncated assessment of the 
evidence. Decisions to grant interim injunctions are similarly based on a preliminary assessment 
of the evidence, although rather than being a final disposition they reflect an acknowledgement 
that a full investigation may be warranted in future, with the decisive question being where 
the balance of convenience lies.217 Default judgments involve no attempt by the court to get to 
the root of a case. The quest to achieve the perfect result is not embarked on in every case; at 
most, it represents an ideal that must in reality be subordinated to the practical needs of 
managing the civil justice system.  
 
Secondly, it is arguable that the very concept of objective truth has no place in civil litigation.218 
As a general proposition, it is impossible to ignore the ‘human factor’: all participants in the 
 
216 D.J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (Clarendon 
1996) 8, 55. Galligan was writing in an administrative law context, but the comment has broad 
applicability. 
217 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, 406 (Lord Diplock). 
218 The importance of the establishment of truth was expounded by, for example, Franz Klein. 
(Susanne Frodl, ‘The heritage of the Franz Klein reform of Austrian civil procedure in 1895-1896’ 
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administration of civil justice are fallible, and systems are imperfect. There is also a more 
particular consideration with respect to litigation conducted within an adversarial system, 
which reflects the state’s interest in the resolution of civil disputes. The court has no 
independent function to determine the ‘truth’ of a matter, rather it determines which of the 
cases presented to it is the more truthful. As Lord Wilberforce noted in the pre-CPR case of Air 
Canada v Secretary of State for Trade (No.2) (1983): 
 
[t]here is no higher or additional duty to ascertain some independent truth. It often 
happens … that an adjudication has to be made which is not, and is known not to 
be, the whole truth of the matter: yet if the decision has been in accordance with 
the available evidence and with the law, justice will have been fairly done.219 
 
It has been said that the provision of substantive justice requires the application of right law to 
true fact.220 In the context of judicial decision-making under English law, it is more precise to 
say that right law is applied to a tolerably accurate finding of fact. This is reflected in the civil 
burden of proof: ‘on the balance of probabilities’ does not express precision and accuracy in 
fact finding. That is the context in which parties put their cases and evidence to the court and 
to their opponents. Parties also are unlikely to be concerned with an objective truth, rather they 
will want the dispute to be resolved as advantageously as possible. The presentation of their 
case is governed by procedural rules. The principles of substantive law and the findings of fact 
to which they are applied are therefore based on the pleadings and evidence that are permitted 
by those rules. This raises two questions.  If, realistically, the court can only try to get as close 
to the truth as the relevant procedure allows, how close should that be? Is there a point at 
which greater proximity to the truth must be sacrificed in favour of other interests? It is here 
that procedural justice becomes relevant. 
 
 
(2012) 31(1) CJQ 2012 43, 59-60.) His concept of ‘utmost truth’ exists in the context of a system that 
attaches importance to procedural economy. There are similarities between Klein’s thesis and Woolf’s 
approach, although a central difference between Klein and Woolf is that the former’s thesis was 
grounded in a concept of the social welfare state. The search for truth is considered by inter alia 
Finkelstein and Hurter. Finkelstein asserts that lawyers will mold their clients’ versions of events into 
the narrative most likely to win the case (Ray Finkelstein, ‘The Adversarial System and the Search for 
Truth’, (2011) 37 Monash UK Rev. 135, 136). Hurter sees it as ‘unfortunate’ that practitioners are 
painted as ‘players in the system’ who will obscure the truth in their lust for winning (Estelle Hurter, 
‘Seeking Truth or Seeking Justice: Reflections on the Changing Face of the Adversarial Process in Civil 
Litigation’, (2007) J. S. Afr L 240, 246). 
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Procedural justice does not connote a search for unattainable standards. It involves the more 
attainable concept that procedures themselves should be fair in light of all the circumstances 
(although deciding whether a procedure is fair is not necessarily a simple task, as a delicate 
balance may need to be struck between different interests and principles). Just as procedural 
law operates at multiple levels, so does procedural justice. The focus in this work will be on 
justice as delivered at the level of specific procedural decisions in individual cases, as opposed 
to the higher, overarching level of, for example, delivering justice by providing impartial judges 
or public hearings. Assessment of a procedure as fair and just depends first on the aim of the 
justice system and the role of procedure in facilitating that aim. Secondly, it depends on 
whether the assessment is directed at the rights of the parties in the specific case, or at the 
operation of the civil justice system as a whole. This means that there are two types of 
procedural justice, which can be termed respectively ‘inter partes’ and ‘systemic’ procedural 
justice. 
 
Inter partes procedural justice is case specific. If the primary aim is to get a case to trial so that 
substantive justice can be done, the role of procedure is to facilitate that aim. Inter partes 
procedural justice in the context of this aim includes, for example, the right to frame one’s case 
in the precise manner of one’s choosing and to present all chosen supporting evidence, 
including a lenient approach by the courts to the amendment of pleadings and applications to 
adduce evidence. If, however, the aim is to provide a broader concept of justice in which 
expenditure of time, cost and resources must be kept at a proportionate level, then procedures 
must promote that aim. Inter partes procedural justice in that context may include, for example, 
refusing to allow an amendment or evidence where the benefit to the parties and the case does 
not justify the consequential expenditure that would be incurred. In service to both of these 
aims, procedural justice defines the scope of the inquiry to be made in the search for substantive 
justice. The latter aim requires that some proximity to the truth be sacrificed because the 
proportionate nature of the process itself is of equal importance.  
 
Systemic procedural justice, by contrast, broadens the perspective. It involves assessment of 
not only the present dispute, but its place within the litigation system as a whole. If the aim is 
to ensure that the system runs efficiently and economically, and that finite resources are used 
for the benefit of all litigants, then a just procedure is one that uses no more than a fair share 
of those resources. This requires a stricter approach to, for example, amendment of pleadings 
and breaches of rules and court orders. Courts must consider how the time and resources used 
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as a result of a procedural decision in one case impact on other cases (although the extent to 
which this is an assessment that a judge can accurately make is questionable). Systemic 
procedural justice may, for example, require refusing an amendment or additional evidence 
because allowing it would require adjourning a hearing, thereby wasting limited court 
resources. Once again, the attainment of substantive justice and proximity to the truth of a 
matter is restricted, this time by giving weight to the interests of all litigants in having access 
to a fair share of court resources. The system governed by the CPR gives equal importance to 
substantive and procedural justice, and to the inter partes and systemic aspects of the latter. 
This reflects a change in the nature of the justice provided by the civil litigation system.221  
 
Procedural justice determines the scope of the inquiry to be made in the search for substantive 
justice. This means that at the level of practical application it is not always easy, or indeed 
possible, to draw a clear distinction between questions of substance and procedure. There is 
likely to be an interplay between the two in every case, the extent of which will depend on the 
circumstances. The provision of substantive justice through determination of rights does not 
occur in a vacuum: a process is required to get to that determination, and to put before the 
court the necessary information and evidence. The rules and decisions that form part of the 
process can affect the substantive justice that is delivered, for example those that limit the 
evidence before the court, or that provide for a timescale that does not permit exhaustive 
investigation. In limiting the evidence on which the court is able to base a substantive decision, 
procedural decisions may reduce the accuracy of that decision. Conversely, some procedural 
decisions cannot be made without some evaluation of substance. Considering whether to strike 
out where there are no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending a claim,222 for example, 
involves clear questions of substance. The same is true of a decision on whether to permit an 
amendment to a statement of case, which requires consideration of the amendments’ prospects 
of success. In both cases, procedural decisions can affect substantive rights, sometimes by 
depriving a party altogether of the adjudication of some or all of their rights. The court’s powers 
to strike out and to allow or refuse amendments do, nevertheless, remain procedural tools, 
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There is potential for conflict in this interplay between substance and procedure. In a system 
with finite resources, securing procedural justice may require acceptance that ideal substantive 
justice is unattainable. Providing procedural justice to parties with unequal resources, for 
example, may mean limiting disclosure or expert evidence that would be justified by an 
exhaustive search for substantive justice. Pursuing any stage of litigation in a manner aimed at 
that exhaustive search might consume such a proportion of court time and resources, through 
interlocutory disputes and applications, as to deprive other users of access to the system. In a 
system where substantive justice takes precedence over both forms of procedural justice, there 
is a clear basis for resolution of such conflicts. They may prove more difficult to resolve where 
substantive and procedural justice have equal importance. A more useful way to approach this 
issue is to see the relationship between substantive and procedural justice not as a conflict to 
be resolved, but as a balance to be struck between subsets of an overarching concept of justice. 
In taking that approach there is no ‘correct answer’ that will ‘solve’ the problem of competing 
interests. Instead, there must be some compromise between them. This approach formed the 
basis of Lord Woolf’s review and the resulting CPR. ‘Justice’ as a concept in the civil litigation 
system now requires an appropriate balance between the substantive and the procedural. This 
is a balance that must be struck by judges when making case management decisions. 
 
II. THE CPR AND PROPORTIONALITY 
 
THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE 
 
When the CPR came into force, the ‘Overriding Objective’ of the rules was to enable the court 
to ‘deal with cases justly’.223 The Overriding Objective governs the operation of the CPR and the 
court’s interpretation of them in making management decisions.224 Reference to the Overriding 
Objective is the means to resolve issues of meaning or application.225 The term ‘objective’ 
elevates CPR 1.1 beyond a mere tool of interpretation: it ties that rule to the aims of the civil 
justice system and to the purpose of the courts. This was the first time that the procedural rules 
had contained an explicit provision of this kind, although it has been argued that the Rules of 
 
223 CPR 1.1 in force on 26 April 1999. 
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the Supreme Court (‘RSC’) contained an implicit Overriding Objective aimed at the provision 
of inter partes substantive justice.226  
 
To ‘deal’ with a case encompasses more than providing a final judicial adjudication by applying 
substantive law to findings of fact (in other words, more than the provision of substantive 
justice). Lord Woolf stated that dealing with cases justly includes ‘handling the case in ways 
which are proportionate’ and ‘ensuring that the case is handled and completed expeditiously’.227 
‘Handling’ refers to management of procedural and pre-trial matters, and the phrase ‘handled 
and completed’ draws a distinction between that management and final disposal of the case. 
The terminology changed in the Final Report and the CPR, with ‘handling’ and ‘handled and 
completed’ replaced with ‘dealing’ and ‘dealt’ respectively.228 Some clarity of meaning was lost 
as a result, but there is nothing to suggest that the Final Report’s updated objective should be 
given a different meaning. The word ‘deal’ places process at the heart of the Overriding 
Objective. It is a broad term that encompasses not only all matters preceding trial229 and 
adjudication at trial itself, but also disposal of a case by any other means. 
 
To understand the word ‘justly’ in the context of the Overriding Objective, consideration must 
be given to Lord Woolf’s approach to reform and the new concept of justice which it embodied. 
Rather than concentrating ‘exclusively on the final product’ as it had in the past,230 the system 
had to balance achievement of the ‘right result’ against the expenditure of time and money 
needed to achieve that result. The recommended working objectives were aimed at a wider set 
of goals.231 Lord Woolf’s approach to reform manifested in two interrelated ways that embodied 
this change in the concept of justice, with emphasis on the mode and focus of dispute 
resolution. The first is that the objectives of the system were broadened such that aiming to 
achieve ideal substantive justice in each case, regardless of cost, was no longer the overriding 
consideration. The system governed by the RSC had given primacy to the provision of 
substantive justice at trial. In Tildesley v Harper (1878), Thesiger LJ stated that the ‘object of 
[the rules of Court as to pleading was] to obtain a correct issue between the parties’,232 while 
in Cropper v Smith (1884), Bowen LJ stated that ‘it is a well established principle that the object 
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of the Courts is to decide the rights of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they 
make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights’.233 
This focus on providing substantive justice at trial was referred to by Jenkins LJ in GL Baker Ltd 
v Medway Building and Supplies Ltd (1958) as a ‘guiding principle of cardinal importance’.234 A 
brake was only placed on its pursuit if it would cause injustice to one or other of the parties, 
particularly an injustice that could not be compensated in costs.235 The subordinate role of 
procedure and its place external to the concept of justice applied by the courts were 
summarised by Lord Collins MR’s comment that ‘the relation of rules of practice to the work of 
justice is intended to be that of handmaid rather than mistress’.236 
 
Lord Woolf broadened the civil justice system’s objectives to create ‘a system … substantively 
just in the results it delivers as well as in the way in which it does so’.237 In doing so, he redefined 
the nature of the justice to be provided by the system. Substantive and procedural justice would 
have equal importance. Procedural justice was not unknown in the pre-CPR system: it was 
embodied, for example, in the right to submit evidence, the right to contest a case and the right 
to adjudication by an impartial judge. Procedure at the level of the logistical steps required to 
take a case through the litigation system, however, was viewed as an adjunct to and facilitative 
of achieving inter partes substantive justice. Lord Woolf reformulated procedural justice at that 
granular level and gave it a central role within the procedural rules. He identified four 
principles of procedural justice ‘fundamental to an effective contemporary system of justice’: 
equality, economy, proportionality and expedition.238 He did not explicitly state what those 
four principles mean, but some detail can be drawn from the reports. Equality requires that 
procedures do not benefit wealthy or powerful litigants and disadvantage poorer ones.239 
Economy requires litigation to be conducted at the minimum cost necessary, in light of Lord 
Woolf’s conclusion that litigation is too expensive.240 The conclusion that delay is endemic241 
underpins the principle of expedition. Proportionality, as articulated in Lord Woolf’s reports, 
requires procedures to be ‘appropriate’ to the amount and importance, in financial and non-
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financial terms, of the issues in dispute.242 It would no longer be the case that prejudice imposed 
on a party as a result of a procedural decision, such as delay or additional work, would be 
acceptable if it could be compensated in costs. Waller LJ, in Worldwide Corporation Ltd v GPT 
Ltd, GPT Middle East Ltd (1998) (handed down between publication of Lord Woolf’s final report 
and the introduction of the CPR), drew a distinction between the approach of ‘previous eras’, 
when it was assumed that payment of costs was sufficient compensation, and the ‘modern era’, 
when it was recognised that payment of costs may be inadequate to compensate a party for 
prejudice suffered.243 As will be seen in Chapter Four, prejudice relevant to case management 
decisions takes many forms, not all of which can be assigned a monetary value. 
 
Lord Woolf’s four principles of procedural justice are the focus of CPR 1.1(2), which sets out 
guidance on what it means to deal with a case ‘justly’. Certain sub-rules relate to certain 
principles, but they cannot be entirely separated. Lord Woolf’s ‘procedural justice’, embodied 
in those four principles, encompasses both inter partes and systemic procedural justice. On the 
inter partes level, his approach to civil litigation in general was one that would ensure ‘fairness 
of procedure and reasonable equality between the parties involved’ in litigation.244 From a 
systemic perspective, one of his working objectives was that in considering whether to depart 
from pre-determined trial dates or to extend a trial, courts should ‘take into account the effect 
of doing so not only upon the parties involved in the proceedings but also on other proceedings 
awaiting a hearing and the resources of the court’.245 The inclusion of systemic procedural 
justice is one of the main ways in which Lord Woolf departed from previous reform attempts. 
It was driven by a need to deploy ‘limited’ court resources ‘in the most effective manner for the 
benefit of everyone involved in civil litigation’.246 Judges can only do so much with the time 
available to them. 
 
The second manifestation of Lord Woolf’s approach to reform was a change in litigation culture 
to one that encouraged co-operation, alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) and settlement. An 
‘unrestrained adversarial culture’ was identified as underlying the system’s failure to conform 
with and support the principles of a functioning civil justice system.247 Not only were settlement 
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and the use of ADR to be encouraged, but litigation was to be seen as a last resort.248 Lord 
Woolf’s ‘new landscape’249 sought to create a culture where litigation would be avoided 
wherever possible.250 Settlement offers were identified as a ‘procedural tool’251 on the basis that 
increased flexibility with regard to written offers would reduce cost, complexity and delay. 
Under the new CPR 36, a settlement offer that would previously have been made outside the 
ambit of the procedural rules became a tool by which court proceedings could be controlled.252  
Encouraging and facilitating settlement formed a central part of the court’s management 
duties.253 This change in litigation culture is one of the clearest manifestations of Lord Woolf’s 
move away from the pursuit of substantive justice as the system’s primary aim. To bring 
methods of dispute resolution other than judicial determination at trial within the system 
governed by the procedural rules was to fundamentally change the aims of that system. 
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
 
It has been said that the notion of proportionality in the CPR is ‘not easy to define with 
precision’.254 It is true that no precise definition is provided in either of Lord Woolf’s reports or 
the CPR itself. However, a close look at those reports, the CPR and subsequent reforms provides 
some detail. Proportionality is a pervasive concept relevant to all aspects of dispute resolution. 
One of Lord Woolf’s objectives was to provide ‘appropriate and proportionate means of 
resolving disputes’,255 and his approach to civil litigation in general was that ‘it should provide 
a means of resolving disputes which is proportionate to the amount or importance of the matter 
at issue, which is achieved within an appropriate timescale and which ensures fairness of 
procedure and reasonable equality between the parties involved’.256 The principle is also 
referred to in more specific contexts. Procedures and cost should be ‘proportionate to the nature 
of the issues involved’,257 the approach to a case must be ‘proportionate to [its] weight’,258 
timescales must be proportionate to litigants’ needs,259 and sanctions must be proportionate 
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and ‘tailored to fit the seriousness of the breach’.260 When the CPR first came into force, there 
was only one explicit reference to proportionality in the Overriding Objective. Dealing with a 
case justly included, ‘so far as … practicable’, dealing with the case in ways which were 
proportionate to the amount of money involved, the importance of the case, the complexity of 
the issues and the financial position of each party.261 The breadth of the comments in Lord 
Woolf’s reports, and the case law analysis in the next chapter, indicate that the principle is in 
reality far more pervasive. Those comments and CPR 1.1 itself make clear that proportionality 
defines the relationship between two or more factors. In a procedural context, that relationship 
is between how a case progresses through the litigation system and the nature and needs of 
the case, the parties and the system as a whole.  
 
Proportionality has remained central to post-Woolf amendments to the CPR. Sir Rupert Jackson 
was appointed in November 2008 to undertake a review of civil litigation costs262 because 
‘[d]espite the general success of the Woolf reforms, the cost of civil litigation continued to 
rise’.263 The Woolf reforms themselves were identified as a partial cause: pre-action protocols 
(‘PAPs’) and the CPR led to a front-loading of costs; the requirements of the CPR and case 
management orders caused parties to incur costs that would not previously have been incurred; 
and where cases settled between issue and trial, the costs of achieving settlement were 
sometimes higher than before.264 Jackson’s objective was ‘[t]o carry out an independent review 
of the rules and principles governing the costs of civil litigation and to make recommendations 
in order to promote access to justice at proportionate cost’.265 This included establishing ‘the 
effect case management procedures have on costs and consider[ing] whether changes in 
process and/or procedure could bring about more proportionate costs’.266 There was a 
continued focus on some of the same problems Lord Woolf had tried to tackle, and an 
acknowledgement that this most recent attempt to solve them had not been entirely successful. 
Jackson did not examine the fundamental basis on which litigation was carried out, but 
accepted that the proper approach was that which underpinned the CPR and embodied a 
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commitment to proportionality.267 He examined the issue of costs on the assumption that 
litigation was to be conducted consistently with that approach.268 Jackson did not take a 
philosophically or fundamentally different approach. His recommendations, informed by a 
decade of seeing how the CPR worked in practice, built on the changes introduced as a result 
of Lord Woolf’s review. One way in which they did so was to clarify and make more explicit 
certain of those changes. The Overriding Objective was amended to require courts to deal with 
cases justly ‘and at proportionate cost’,269 an amendment that was not recommended by 
Jackson, but which echoes language that recurs throughout his reports. This made ‘explicit 
what [was] already implicit’.270 Jackson himself noted that from the moment the CPR came 
into force, courts were ‘obliged to have regard to costs when seeking to give effect to the 
overriding objective’.271 The focus on proportionate cost was not new, rather it was an express 
reference to an existing requirement.  
 
Jackson was more specific than Lord Woolf in considering the meaning of proportionality, 
noting that: 
 
[p]roportionality is an open-textured concept. It now pervades many areas of the 
law, both substantive and adjectival. The essence of proportionality is that the ends 
do not necessarily justify the means. The law facilitates the pursuit of lawful 
objectives, but only to the extent that those objectives warrant the burdens thereby 
being imposed upon others. 
 
Here we see central aspects of the principle that were identified in the previous chapter, notably 
the means-end analysis and the requirement that burdens imposed in pursuit of an objective 
should be no greater than necessary. Jackson also recommended the introduction of a new rule 
to include a definition of proportionate costs,272 which was adopted in substantially the same 
form as CPR 44.3(5): 
 
[c]osts incurred are proportionate if they bear a reasonable relationship to – (a) the 
sums in issue in the proceedings; (b) the value of any non-monetary relief in issue 
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in the proceedings; (c) the complexity of the litigation; (d) any additional work 
generated by the conduct of the paying party; and (e) any wider factors involved in 
the proceedings, such as reputation or public importance. 
 
Once again, the core of proportionality is a relationship between two or more factors. In that 
regard, it is notable that Jackson and the rule-makers drew an explicit connection between 
proportionality and reasonableness. The latter is itself a concept that cannot be precisely 
defined, and its relationship with proportionality in a procedural context is not entirely clear. 
Sometimes, the two terms appear to be interchangeable, for example in the context of 
disclosure. Standard disclosure requires a ‘reasonable’ search,273 an approach ‘justified by 
considerations of proportionality’.274 The ‘reasonable search’ requirement has been cited as an 
example of making do with ‘a lesser procedure even though it may result in the justice being 
rougher’.275 This articulates the fundamental requirement of procedural proportionality that 
process be matched to the needs of the case. At other times, proportionality and reasonableness 
are treated as distinct concepts, notably in the context of costs. Reasonable costs are not the 
same as proportionate costs, as evidenced by the distinction between the standard and 
indemnity bases of assessment. This is despite the fact that the definition of proportionality 
introduced post-Jackson explicitly ties the two concepts together. Use of these nebulous terms 
is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it allows questions of case management and costs 
to be tailored to the needs of a case, but on the other hand, lack of clarity can breed 
inconsistency. That in turn can be a barrier to the full implementation of reforms such as the 
Overriding Objective and principles such as proportionality. 
 
A few years after Jackson’s final report, Lord Justice Briggs was commissioned to undertake 
two separate reviews: the Chancery Modernisation Review (‘CMR’), reports of which were 
published in 2013,276 and the Civil Courts Structure Review (‘CCSR’), reports of which were 
published in 2015277 and 2016.278 Both took as their starting point the civil justice system 
created by the Woolf reforms and the CPR, and enhanced by Jackson. This was explicitly stated 
in the final CMR report: ‘the requirement in my terms of reference to take into account (and 
 
273 CPR 31.7. 
274 Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc [2008] EWHC 2522 (Ch) [46]. 
275 Nichia Corporation v Argos Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 741 [51] (Jacob LJ). 
276 Lord Justice Briggs, Chancery Modernisation Review: Provisional Report, July 2013; Lord Justice 
Briggs, Chancery Modernisation Review: Final Report, December 2013. 
277 Lord Justice Briggs, Civil Courts Structure Review: Interim Report, December 2015. 
278 Lord Justice Briggs, Civil Courts Structure Review: Final Report, July 2016. 
 63 
therefore to assume the implementation of) the Jackson reforms means that it is the Overriding 
Objective as modified by the recent rule changes that I must treat as lying at the heart of any 
process of chancery modernisation’.279 Briggs identified a continuing debate over whether 
courts’ attempts to grapple with proportionality had been a ‘more time-consuming and 
expensive cure than the malady sought to be treated’.280 The cost of front-loading was thought 
by many to be greater than the savings sought to be achieved, a criticism that had been levelled 
at the Woolf reforms and the CPR in general.281 Briggs identified similar issues underlying 
criticisms of Jackson and the consequent rule changes.282 He advocated a culture change which 
embodied an ‘unhesitating acceptance’ that the court is entitled and required to ration parties’ 
use of court resources.283 This should be done by reference not to what parties think they 
require, but to what the court regards as a fair share of its limited resources, proportionate to 
the value at risk and to the importance and complexity of the dispute.284 In other words, a 
culture that fully embraced systemic procedural justice and proportionality. This was the 
culture that should have been adopted after both Woolf and Jackson, and the fact that it needed 
reiterating yet again indicates that it was not taking root.  
 
Briggs’ CCSR built on the foundation that the procedure for every case must be proportionate. 
Issues that had been at the heart of previous procedural reforms surfaced again, in the form of 
the ‘inevitable need to focus on efficiency and economy in a time of austerity’.285 There was a 
particular focus on structural proportionality, with one of the guiding principles of the review 
being to ensure a ‘system which is proportionate and segmented – with the “majesty of the 
court” when needed and lower cost, lower burden (mostly digital) channels where not’.286 One 
of CCSR’s major recommendations was the Online Court, the intention behind which was to 
‘design from scratch and build from its foundations a wholly new court’287 that would allow 
smaller and less complex cases to be dealt with electronically, with a simplified procedure and 
little or no input from legal representatives. Briggs’ focus was on ending the accumulation of 
disproportionate inter partes costs in such cases,288 however there are clear systemic advantages 
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to a functional online dispute resolution system. Briggs emphasised that the Online Court 
process would not ‘in any way be second class’.289 The development of this court further embeds 
the principle of proportionality into the structure of the civil justice system and reflects an 
understanding that applying a simpler process where appropriate is not a denial of justice. The 
centrality of structural proportionality continued with a further review by Sir Rupert Jackson 
published in July 2017,290 which developed proposals for extending the fixed recoverable costs 
regime on the fast track. He proposed a new ‘intermediate track’ for fixed costs cases, to lie 
between the fast and multi-tracks,291 with statements of case, disclosure and evidence to be 
limited and the court taking firm control of the action from the start.  
 
There are two other notable recent initiatives: the Disclosure Pilot for the Business and Property 
Courts (‘Disclosure Pilot’) and the Shorter and Flexible Trials Scheme (‘SFTS’). Both embody 
an ongoing commitment to proportionality and an acceptance that the provision of 
proportionate justice has not yet been optimised. The Disclosure Pilot commenced on 1 January 
2019. It aims to address concerns that reforms to CPR 31 had failed to introduce a more 
proportionate, economical and efficient approach to disclosure.292 There was concern that the 
full range of disclosure options in CPR 31.5 were not being used, that standard disclosure too 
often remained the default, and that CPR 31 was insufficiently able to deal with e-disclosure.293 
The Disclosure Pilot aims to ensure that disclosure is directed to the issues with a scope no 
wider than was reasonable and proportionate.294 Vos C in UTB LLC v Sheffield United (2019) 
stated that the Disclosure Pilot is ‘not simply a rewrite of CPR Part 31. It operates along different 
lines driven by reasonableness and proportionality … with disclosure being directed specifically 
to defined issues arising in the proceedings’.295 This suggests that the Disclosure Pilot takes a 
radically different approach, but the underlying principles are those that have always formed 
the foundation of the CPR. Everything that can be done within the Disclosure Pilot could have 
been done before it came into force. The scheme does, however, provide a detailed structure 
within the rules as to how disclosure may proceed, which can then be tailored as required. That 
level of detail is more likely to steer litigants, lawyers and judges to a more proportionate 
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approach as it removes, or at least lowers, the risk that all involved will simply revert to what 
they know (in this instance, standard disclosure).  
 
The SFTS, operating since 1 October 2018 in the Business and Property Courts, provides a 
procedural framework for shorter and flexible trials. The Shorter Trials Scheme (‘STS’) applies 
where a trial will be no longer than four days.296 The provisions impose inter alia pre-action 
requirements,297 length and content limits for statements of case and witness statements,298 
compulsory matters for consideration at CMCs,299 and limits on post-CMC applications.300 The 
Flexible Trials Scheme (‘FTS’) enables parties to adapt pre-trial and trial procedures to the 
needs of their case.301 A standard procedure, aimed at focusing and limiting disclosure, 
evidence and cross-examination at trial,302 may be varied by agreement303 (although it is not 
specified how this should be done and the standard procedure will apply ‘unless otherwise 
ordered’304). The STS and FTS seek to ensure that cases are dealt with by way of a procedure 
proportionate to their needs. Although there is no mention of systemic considerations in 
Practice Direction 57AB, one result of tailoring procedure in this way is a proportionate 
allocation of court resources. As with the Disclosure Pilot, there is nothing within the SFTS that 
could not have been done before it came into force. The court can, for example, limit the length 
of statements of case and witness statements, or impose content requirements, under its general 
case management powers. Once again, however, specificity is likely to steer all involved 
towards a more proportionate approach. 
 
Proportionality may have been central to the CPR since they came into force, but a concept 
cannot stand alone. It must be implemented if it is to have any effect, and the means of 
implementation are as relevant as the concept itself. Active judicial case management provides 
the means by which procedural proportionality is implemented and the practical context within 
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III. ACTIVE JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT 
 
The context for a discussion of active case management is the adversarial principle, central to 
which is party control of litigation. Under the RSC, responsibility for the initiation, conduct, 
preparation and presentation of civil proceedings lay with the parties.305 This bred adversarial 
attitudes and opportunistic behaviour. Lord Denning MR in Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Governor and 
Company of the Bank of England (1979) likened litigation to war: ‘[i]f one side makes a mistake, 
the other side can take advantage of it. No holds are barred.’306 This combative culture was not 
discouraged, with Mustill LJ in Wright v Morris (1997) stating that ‘no word of criticism [could] 
be addressed to the defendants or their advisers for exploiting the present rules to the 
maximum advantage’.307 Echoing Denning’s metaphor, Lord Woolf identified this entrenched 
adversarial culture as the source of the civil justice system’s woes308 which, if uncontrolled, 
would cause the system to ‘degenerate into an environment in which the litigation process is 
seen as a battlefield where no rules apply’.309 The judge’s role in such a system was to adjudicate 
on issues selected by the parties when they chose to present them to the court. In such an 
environment, questions of expense, delay, compromise and fairness may have a low priority, 
resulting in excessive, disproportionate and unpredictable expense, and unreasonable delay.310 
Effective implementation of Lord Woolf’s Overriding Objective required the combative culture 
to change, and this required effective judicial control of litigation. There was ‘now no 
alternative to a fundamental shift in the responsibility for the management of civil litigation 
from litigants and their legal advisers to the courts’.311 The introduction of judicial case 
management was ‘crucial to the programme of change’ and the means by which Lord Woolf 
intended to achieve many of his objectives.312 
 
Judicial management was not unknown prior to Lord Woolf’s review, however it existed within 
the context of the traditional adversarial principle, the concept of party control, and the 
primacy of inter partes substantive justice at trial. This can be seen in reform efforts, rule 
changes and judicial commentary. The Summons for Directions, introduced in 1883, allowed 
the court to limit the issues to be tried and evidence to be called at trial, powers that the 
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Evershed Committee recommended be strengthened in 1953.313 The resulting Order 25 of the 
RSC provided the court with significant flexibility as to how it dealt with a matter once a 
Summons came to be heard. However, the robust tool envisaged did not materialise,314 because 
the Summons operated within a system where control of litigation lay with the parties.315 The 
Civil Justice Review (‘CJR’)316 and the Heilbron/Hodge report317 both made management 
recommendations, but in the context of a focus on adjudication at trial. The CJR noted that the 
disadvantages of adversarial conduct should be checked by court control.318 Nevertheless, the 
focus on substantive justice is clear in recommendations such as issues, evidence and argument 
being presented in ‘as economical a manner as justice permits’,319 where no consideration has 
been given to changing the concept of justice that underpins the procedural rules. 
Heilbron/Hodge gave case management a prominent role in its basic principles of reform,320 
with judges required to be ‘active’321 and judicial intervention ‘forceful’.322 These 
recommendations, however, were still made in the context of reaching adjudication at trial, in 
that they were ‘designed to make more efficient the stages leading up to trial’.323 An issue with 
both the CJR and Heilbron/Hodge was that no system-wide case management measures were 
introduced as a result of their recommendations. In respect of the former, Lord Woolf noted 
that ‘a significant opportunity for reform was lost’.324 
 
An important precursor to the CPR’s active case management was the Practice Direction (HC: 
Civil Litigation: Case Management) (1995), which stated that ‘[t]he paramount importance of 
reducing the cost and delay of civil litigation makes it necessary for judges sitting at first 
instance to assert greater control over the preparation for and conduct of hearings than has 
hitherto been customary’.325 Despite this, the onus remained with the parties, who were made 
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subject to additional duties, for example applying for a pre-trial review326 and lodging a pre-
trial checklist,327 while the language setting out the court’s management actions was non-
compulsory. In Worldwide Corporation,328 Waller LJ noted that the checklists required by the 
Practice Direction followed the format used for some time in the Commercial Court,329 where 
judges had ‘for many years been particularly pro-active in managing litigation brought before 
it for the benefit of all users’.330 Nevertheless, this was still management within the framework 
of the RSC’s focus on inter partes substantive justice. Waller LJ cited the Guide to Commercial 
Court Practice, stressing that it recognised the ‘well-established principle’ that amendments to 
pleadings would normally be allowed so as to reflect the true issues between the parties by 
encouraging consent orders.331 The limited nature of judicial management under the RSC is 
highlighted by Charles v Osman (1997).332 Henry LJ noted that the Summons for Directions 
empowered judges ‘actively to case manage’ and gave them an ‘early opportunity to do so’.333 
However, the Summons left much of the initiative with the parties. ‘Actively’ as used in this 
case did not have the same meaning as it would under the CPR. The judgment makes clear that 
the RSC provisions were not compatible with truly proactive case management, with Henry LJ 
stating that ‘under the Rules in their present form effective judicial case management will be 
difficult to enforce without much greater use of the peremptory order’.334 The court did not 
have the necessary weight to bring to bear in order to manage cases effectively. Under the RSC, 
judges could only be ‘active’ to the extent permitted by the adversarial principle. Lord Woolf 
did not, however, remove this principle, rather he modified it. The question then is what, 
precisely, did Lord Woolf mean by ‘case management’? 
 
The Interim Report sets out his conception of case management: 
 
[c]ase management for the purposes of this report involves the court taking the 
ultimate responsibility for progressing litigation along a chosen track for a pre-
determined period during which it is subjected to selected procedures which 
culminate in an appropriate form of dispute resolution before a suitably experienced 
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judge. Its overall purpose is to encourage settlement of disputes at the earliest 
appropriate stage; and, where trial is unavoidable, to ensure that cases proceed as 
quickly as possible to a final hearing which is itself of strictly limited duration’335 
 
Five objectives underpinned this general conception.336 Early settlement was to be achieved 
where practical, cases were to be diverted to ADR where this was likely to be beneficial, co-
operation between parties was to be encouraged and unnecessary combativeness avoided.337 
Issues in dispute were to be identified and reduced as a basis for appropriate case 
preparation.338 Where a case did progress to trial, this was to be done as speedily and at as little 
cost as appropriate.339 Two main features of Lord Woolf’s case management are visible here: 
first, the encouragement of disposal by methods other than trial, in particular ADR and 
settlement; and secondly, management of the progress of cases through the system to trial. 
These can also be found in the CPR which, for example, requires the court to encourage ADR 
if appropriate,340 help parties settle all or part of a case,341 decide promptly which issues need 
full investigation and trial,342 and consider whether the likely benefits of a particular step justify 
the cost of taking it.343 Many of the actions listed in CPR 1.4(2) are incompatible with an 
adversarial, party-controlled approach to litigation.344 The court must actively intervene in how 
parties present their cases and it may take action of its own initiative.345 Case management 
under the CPR is not reactive, and there is no requirement that a party must make an 
application before a particular step can be taken. 
 
CASE MANAGEMENT AFTER WOOLF 
 
Case management is central to post-Woolf amendments to the CPR. Jackson identified a 
general theme that the court could and should do more to actively manage cases and to exert 
greater control over the conduct, and therefore costs, of proceedings.346 Several submissions to 
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Phase 1 of his review suggested that the appropriate framework for this control existed within 
the CPR, but that it was not being implemented properly or consistently.347 The court tended 
to shy away from using the weapons in its armoury.348 Many submissions pointed to a failure 
to impose strict enough sanctions for delay and non-compliance.349 Jackson’s view was that 
greater weight needed to be given to ‘the prejudice to the judicial system as a whole suffered 
as a consequence of widespread delays and disregards for procedural deadlines and the 
resulting inflation of costs as well as the impact on judicial resources’.350 Courts were not 
striking the required balance between inter partes and systemic considerations, despite Lord 
Woolf’s exhortation that they be given equal importance. 
 
Post-Jackson amendments to the CPR, implemented in 2013, reinforced the requirement that 
courts must take a less lenient approach to compliance. ‘Dealing with a case justly and at 
proportionate cost’ now explicitly included ‘enforcing compliance with rules, practice directions 
and orders’.351 The list in CPR 3.9 of nine non-exhaustive factors relevant to relief from 
sanctions was replaced with wording that created an explicit link to the Overriding Objective 
and emphasised the need to enforce compliance. These amendments were not merely in line 
with Lord Woolf’s review, they expressed the same position. Lord Woolf had noted that ‘the 
existing rules of court were being flouted on a vast scale’352 and ‘[t]here was overwhelming 
support from all sides for effective, appropriate and fair sanctions’,353 with the right to apply 
for relief being ‘limited’.354 Crucially, he had determined that the effectiveness of sanctions 
would ‘to a large extent … revolve around judicial attitudes’355 and judges would ‘need to 
develop a more robust approach to the task of managing cases and ensuring that their orders 
are not flouted’.356 If judges and practitioners had fully bought into and applied the principles 
underlying Lord Woolf’s reports and the CPR as originally enacted, there should have been no 
need for Jackson to emphasise compliance nor for the CPR to be amended in that regard. The 
post-Jackson amendments spelt out explicitly requirements that were already contained within 
the CPR. 
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The same is true in respect of disclosure and costs management. Jackson noted a tendency to 
order standard disclosure rather than consider whether a ‘bespoke’ order might be appropriate. 
The CPR as adopted after Lord Woolf’s review supported such an approach, in that CPR 31 
provided ‘a strong steer towards standard disclosure in every case. Rule 31.5 provide[d] that 
standard disclosure [was] the default position’.357 The courts were not, however, required to 
order standard disclosure, rather they simply tended in that direction. Jackson noted that the 
court ‘has the power to limit standard disclosure and such power should be exercised in 
accordance with the overriding objective. Currently, it seems that the utilisation of this power 
to restrict disclosure is not often given serious consideration’.358 This is in line with Lord Woolf’s 
statement that as ‘part of the case management process, the judiciary will have both the means 
and the responsibility to ensure that discovery is limited to what is really necessary’.359 Jackson’s 
introduction of a ‘menu option’ for disclosure orders360 did not provide any new powers, rather 
it set out in greater detail how the court should exercise its powers in line with the principle of 
proportionality. Costs management too was an extension and clarification of powers already 
embedded, although not spelt out in terms, in the CPR:361 
 
CPR rule 1.1 imports two essential Overriding Objectives which directly lend 
themselves to costs management: saving expense and dealing with cases in ways 
which are proportionate. Within these two Overriding Objectives underpinning the 
court’s case management powers, it is axiomatic that the court has the jurisdiction 
actively to costs manage.362  
 
Jackson added detail and structure to these powers, such as the development of a standard 
procedure,363 but the basis for them already existed. This reflects a theme running through 
Jackson’s reports: that the changes of attitude and approach underpinning Lord Woolf’s review 
and the CPR had not been implemented on a sufficiently fundamental basis. Clarification and 
more explicit statements in the rules were required. This is reminiscent of a statement in the 
Evershed report, that ‘exhortations will be likely to fail of their best effect without the impetus 
of some practical suggestion’.364 It is human nature to follow the path of least resistance and to 
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act in accordance with familiar practices unless presented with a clear requirement to act to 
the contrary. Lord Woolf’s exhortations and the resulting general requirements in the CPR were 
insufficient, and required the additional detail and clarity provided by Jackson. 
 
Briggs’ CMR stated that Jackson’s ‘confirmation’ of hands-on judicial management as the 
preferred means of achieving proportionality had to be ‘part of the bedrock’ of the review.365 
Case management was at the heart of the ‘new’ culture advocated by Briggs, and is present in 
all three of that culture’s central elements.366 First, the court should identify the main issues as 
early as possible, and they should be the basis for all case management that followed.367 
Secondly, proportionality should become ‘an invariable and important consideration in every 
case management decision’368 and should lead, where necessary, to the imposition of 
constraints (in terms of preparation) and rationing (in terms of trial time and use of judicial 
resources).369 Enforcement should be firm, and consequences for non-compliance serious.370 
Finally, there should be a single CMC in as many cases as possible.371 None of these elements 
would have been inapplicable under the CPR when it first came into force.  
 
Concerns that courts were still not taking a sufficiently robust approach to case management 
came to the fore once more in Sir Rupert Jackson’s 2017 supplementary review. In the context 
of the disclosure rules introduced after his initial review, the London Solicitors Litigation 
Association suggested that neither practitioners nor judges were making adequate use of the 
new disclosure rules in CPR 31.5: 
 
[t]he onus must be not only on the parties and their advisers to explore and agree 
a proportionate approach to disclosure in advance of the case management 
conference … but also on the courts proactively to challenge parties where they 
have failed to do so. A more robust and challenging case management approach to 
disclosure by the courts would be welcomed by many’372 
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This is one of the most recent iterations of a theme running through the post-Woolf 
development of judicial case management: that it is not as consistently active as it could or 
should be. This is supported by the case law review in Chapter Four. One aim of the proposals 
in Chapter Six is to increase the consistency with which cases are actively managed. 
 
IV. THE PARTIES: COMPLIANCE AND CO-OPERATION 
 
Despite the shift of control from parties to the court, the former retain a crucial role in ensuring 
that judicial management effectively implements the Overriding Objective. Lord Woolf 
highlighted the importance of parties co-operating with the court and with each other. In the 
context of the multi-track, he stated that ‘whatever the type of management, the parties must 
co-operate with it’.373 The court is an outsider to a dispute, while the parties possess the relevant 
information, meaning that ‘[u]nless the parties themselves are willing to co-operate, there is 
no functional means in practice for the court to determine at an early stage what the issues 
are’.374 Where parties do not co-operate, ‘not only are they likely to incur costs which are 
unnecessary, but the litigation process is likely to be drawn out and the court’s task more 
difficult’.375 The importance of parties’ behaviour is reflected in CPR 1.3, which requires them 
‘to help the court to further the overriding objective’. Active case management includes 
‘encouraging the parties to co-operate with each other in the conduct of the proceedings’.376 
This may reflect an acknowledgement that, despite CPR 1.3, if left to their own devices parties 
are unlikely to co-operate. Their behaviour, and the extent to which they co-operate with each 
other and the court, will (or at least should) affect how the court manages a case. 
 
Party co-operation has retained its importance as the CPR has developed. Briggs noted that, 
when considering questions of judicial allocation or choice of management track, much will 
depend on the Master or judge’s ‘feel for the extent to which particular parties and their legal 
teams are likely to be economical and co-operative in preparation for trial. Even the largest 
cases, conducted between and by such persons, may need minimal management’.377 The 
Disclosure Pilot requires co-operation between parties, and between parties and the court.378 
Where Extended Disclosure is likely to be requested parties are required, before the first CMC, 
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to try to agree a list of Issues for Disclosure.379 They may seek guidance from the court 
concerning the scope or implementation of Extended Disclosure, but only where real efforts 
have been made to resolve disputes, and where the absence of guidance is likely to have a 
material effect either on the court’s ability to hold an effective CMC or on parties’ ability to 
carry out the court’s management directions effectively.380 This additional detail on the 
requirements of co-operation is one way in which the Disclosure Pilot differs from the rest of 
the CPR. 
 
The content of the CPR 1.3 duty has not been precisely defined, and that which has been 
defined is derived from case law. Parties must progress cases efficiently, with unacceptably 
slow progress being ‘contrary to the underlying principles of the CPR’.381 They must not take 
steps that will cause unnecessary delay.382 Procedural points must be taken promptly, 
particularly if they will, if correct, mean that costs are wasted by the other side.383 Delay and 
related uncertainty regarding trial dates affect not only the parties to a given case but all users 
of the court system, meaning that practices involving a disproportionate allocation of the court’s 
resources to a single case comply with neither the Overriding Objective nor parties’ duties and 
are ‘unacceptable’.384 Co-operation between opponents is essential, as without it ‘litigation 
cannot be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost’.385 This includes, for example, giving 
serious consideration to ADR,386 engaging constructively with correspondence,387 and agreeing 
reasonable extensions of time where necessary.388 A tactical approach to litigation, which is a 
manifestation of the aggressive approach eschewed by the architects of the CPR, is likely to run 
counter to CPR 1.3. In the context of an error known to both parties, it is ‘wholly inappropriate’ 
for parties to take advantage of opponents’ mistakes in the hope that relief from sanctions will 
be denied and they will gain a windfall strike out or other advantage.389 Where only one party 
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is aware of the mistake, there is no general duty to point out an opponent’s procedural error,390 
however genuine misunderstandings must be cleared up. Parties must take reasonable steps to 
ensure, as far as possible, that there is a clear common understanding between them as to inter 
alia the identity of the issues in dispute and procedural arrangements.391 Any breakdown in 
that misunderstanding is likely to increase expenditure of time, costs and resources and hamper 
the efficient progress of the case.392  
 
The crucial point for present purposes is that parties must take active steps to litigate 
proportionately, in both an inter partes and systemic sense. In order to do so they, and their 
legal representatives, need to be able to determine what will be ‘proportionate’ in any given 
situation. A clear, consistent approach to case management by the court will make those 
judgment calls easier. Parties’ actions will then tie into how the court manages a case, for 
example in terms of how ‘hands on’ management needs to be and the extent to which sanctions 
are required. A robust approach by the court to breaches of CPR 1.3 should encourage more 
compliant, co-operative behaviour. There is a clear interplay between how the court and the 
parties conduct litigation, with the actions of one affecting those of the other. The importance 
of this interplay will be explored further in the case law analysis in Chapter Four, and the 
proposals for reform in Chapter Six.  
 
V. CASE MANAGEMENT PROPORTIONALITY IN CONTEXT 
 
In the previous chapter, proportionality as a general principle of law was broken down and its 
role, meaning and constituent parts analysed. By applying each of those points to procedural 
proportionality, we can give it more definition than the general language of the reform reports 
and the CPR allows.  
 
THE ROLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
 
On a general level, the role of proportionality in case management is the same as in other areas 
of law. It provides a framework within which an analysis can be undertaken that balances 
means, ends, costs, benefits and competing interests in pursuit of a specific aim. Beyond that, 
however, the roles diverge. In a case management context, proportionality is a tool that assists 
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a judge in making management decisions that comply with the Overriding Objective. It is not 
used as a standard by which the court reviews powers exercised by external decision-making 
authorities, rather the court itself is the primary decision-maker and its decisions are internal 
to the litigation process. Proportionality in a case management context is also not so firmly 
fixed as an ex post analysis. The court will apply proportionality in reviewing litigants’ actions, 
for example when considering the effect of conduct on costs or when considering whether to 
grant relief from sanctions, but this is a different kind of review.393 Equally, the court must 
apply proportionality ex ante in making management decisions about the future conduct of a 
matter. 
 
Application of proportionality in a case management context also serves the educative function 
identified in Chapter Two,394 both within the context of individual cases and across the system 
as a whole. Within the bounds of a given case, the court’s approach to management informs 
parties and lawyers as to how the matter is likely to progress and steers their behaviour 
accordingly. A robust approach to a missed deadline, for example, may mean that parties work 
harder to ensure that future deadlines are met. Practitioners may then take what they learn in 
one case, in terms of how the court responds to a particular situation, and apply it to other 
cases. The court’s application of proportionality can educate parties and practitioners on 
acceptable litigation conduct, which can in turn shape future behaviour. The more frequently 
courts take a robust approach to parties’ failure to comply with CPR 1.3, for example, the more 
likely it is that such an approach will continue to be adopted, and the greater the effect it will 
have on curbing parties’ disproportionate conduct. This educative function is particularly 
important in a case management context. Management decisions are made within a single 
system that has identifiable objectives and, at least in theory, a cohesive culture. The number 
of decisions made and the number of actors participating in the making of those decisions is 
vast. Discretion is broad and oversight is limited.395 In this context, the educative function of 
proportionality creates a virtuous circle. Its application in line with the system’s objectives and 
culture spreads through the system, by informing lawyers and judges as to how it is applied in 
different circumstances. They then take that knowledge forward into future cases. It is, 
however, important to remember that proportionality, as with all legal principles, needs to be 
applied. Human agency is required, from judges, parties and lawyers. This function can only 
be properly served if there is sufficient consistent application to give momentum to the virtuous 
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circle. The encouragement of consistency lies at the heart of the proposals for improvement set 
out in Chapter Six.   
 
PROPORTIONALITY TESTS: MEANS VS ENDS AND COSTS VS BENEFITS 
 
Certain core aspects can be identified in the proportionality tests considered in Chapter Two: 
a legitimate aim; suitable or appropriate means for achieving that aim; that no greater 
detriment than necessary is imposed in enacting those means, and there is no less burdensome 
means available; and a cost-benefit analysis. This framework can be applied to case 




The ‘legitimate aim’ to which case management measures must be connected is the aim of 
active case management, that is to say dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost. This 
incorporates the objectives of case management identified by Lord Woolf.396 Each management 
decision also has an objective specific to the circumstances in which it is made, such as 
determining a dispute about the scope of disclosure or deciding whether late evidence should 
be admitted. These focused objectives are subsumed within the more general one, as each 
individual management decision must be made in accordance with the Overriding Objective. 
Neither the identification nor the legitimacy of the aim will form a major part of the 
proportionality analysis in a case management context, as they are specified in the CPR.  
 
In this context, proportionality forms part of both the aim and the means for achieving it. This 
could theoretically raise an issue of lack of clarity. If the same terminology, without definition, 
is used to identify both an aim and the means of achieving it, each feeds into the other and 
provides no concrete value in terms of understanding either the aim or the means. At the level 
of practical case management decision-making, however, this is less problematic. On a general 
level, the aim and means are closely related and can be compounded into a single requirement: 
proportionate case management. In the context of a single decision, it should be possible to be 
sufficiently precise as to the available means of complying with the Overriding Objective that 
context-specific clarity is provided. 
 
 




There is no statement in any of the reform reports or the CPR that connects suitability, 
alternatively appropriateness, and proportionality. Nevertheless, this connection can be 
deduced. Lord Woolf stated that the purpose of pleadings was inter alia to ‘illuminate the nature 
of disputed matters, so that the most suitable method of disposal can be chosen’397 and 
recommended that ‘the courts should have the final responsibility for determining what 
procedures were suitable for each case’ [emphasis added].398 In both instances, the term 
‘suitable’ connects the objective of dealing with a case, i.e. disposing of it or taking it through 
the court system in accordance with the Overriding Objective, and the means by which it is 
done. A particularly clear example is the track allocation system, the aim of which is to match 
cases with procedures that are suitable to the needs of both the case and the justice system as 
a whole. The relationship between those needs and procedures underpins every management 
decision. In a case with a potentially vast number of disclosable documents, for example, a 
staged approach to disclosure may be more suitable to minimising costs and keeping the 
exercise focused on the issues in dispute than a single, unstructured, exercise. Where 
determination of a discrete issue may resolve a case or encourage settlement, a preliminary 
issue trial may be more suitable to minimising expenditure of time, costs and resources than a 




This is the most difficult facet of case management proportionality to pin down. ‘Necessity’ is a 
concept that comes with a certain amount of baggage in a procedural context. The relationship 
between proportionality and necessity came to the fore in the context of assessment of 
recoverable costs during Jackson’s costs review. The Court of Appeal, in Lownds v Home Office 
(2002),399 had made necessity ‘a crucial part of the exegesis of proportionality’400 in terms of 
assessment of costs. The second stage of the Lownds approach to assessment required the court, 
if costs as a whole appeared disproportionate, to satisfy itself as to whether the work in respect 
of each item was necessary and, if so, that the cost of that item was reasonable.401 This harked 
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back to the test for recoverable costs that had applied under the RSC until 1986, which allowed 
recovery of costs that were ‘necessary and proper for the attainment of justice’.402 Jackson 
recommended that Lownds be reversed.403 That recommendation was subsequently 
implemented by the introduction of CPR 44.3(2). He stated that the necessity of incurring 
certain costs is relevant to, but not decisive of, the question of whether those costs were 
proportionate.404 Disproportionate costs do not become proportionate because they were 
necessary.405 CPR 44.3(2) states in relevant part that ‘[w]here the amount of costs is to be 
assessed on the standard basis, the court will – (a) only allow costs which are proportionate to 
the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced 
even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred.’ The role of necessity was downgraded, 
with the main touchstones for assessment of costs being reasonableness and proportionality. 
This is made clear by the costs management rules, which refer to the determination of 
‘reasonable and proportionate costs’406 but make no mention of necessity. 
 
No precise meaning was given to necessity either in Lownds or by Jackson in his report. In 
Lownds, the Court of Appeal seemed to take the approach that its meaning was obvious, stating 
that ‘in assessing costs judges should have no difficulty in deciding whether, in order to conduct 
the litigation successfully, it was necessary to incur each item of costs’.407 The concept was tied 
to ‘conducting the litigation successfully’, which itself is a nebulous phrase that could bear more 
than one meaning. Lord Neuberger, in one of the Jackson implementation lectures, tied 
necessity to the RSC aim of achieving substantive justice.408 In his view, the most appropriate 
approach to assessment of costs was to remove necessity and have work done by reference to 
reasonableness and then to proportionality itself.409 This would not carry with it the potential 
to mislead the parties and the court into thinking that costs incurred in work done which is 
necessary to secure the right result is capable of trumping proportionality.410 
 
 
402 Lownds (n 399) [28] (Lord Woolf CJ). 
403 Jackson, Final Report (n 262) 38. 
404 ibid 37. 
405 ibid. 
406 Practice Direction 3E para 5, para 12. 
407 Lownds (n 399) [29]. 
408 Lord Neuberger, ‘Proportionate Costs: Fifteenth Lecture in the Implementation Programme’, 29 May 
2012 3 <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/proportionate-




Despite this somewhat troublesome history in the context of costs, the ‘necessity’ facet of 
proportionality is applicable and useful in a case management context, provided we are clear 
about its meaning. The term has a general meaning, i.e. something without which a particular 
aim cannot be achieved. In the context of proportionality as discussed in the previous chapter, 
however, ‘necessity’ is a term of art: it means that there is no less burdensome or detrimental 
way to achieve the aim in question. This particular meaning of necessity can be identified in 
Lord Woolf’s reports. Frequent references are made to the unnecessary complexity, expense 
and delay inherent in the RSC system. Complexity, expense and delay are burdens imposed on 
parties and the system in general, and at the heart of Lord Woolf’s reforms was an attempt to 
find the least burdensome way to provide justice. There are some less clear uses, for example 
statements that judges must give ‘the necessary directions for the future conduct of the case’411 
and that any additional disclosure must be ‘necessary to do justice’.412 Applying the ‘least 
burdensome means’ interpretation would not, however, be inappropriate in either case. If a 
direction is to be proportionate, it should arguably be the least burdensome way of achieving 
the aim of that direction. Given that some burden on at least one party is inherent in ordering 
extra disclosure, the requirement that it is ‘necessary to do justice’ is a justification for that 
burden. A clear statement that the CPR does indeed embody this ‘least burdensome means’ 
requirement is that of Lord Woolf himself in Biguzzi v Rank Leisure Plc (1999).413 In the context 
of strike out, he stated that that ‘[t]he advantage of the CPR over the previous rules is that the 
court’s powers are much broader than they were. In many cases there will be alternatives which 
enable a case to be dealt with justly without taking the draconian step of striking out’.414  
 
Considering whether a particular decision is ‘necessary’, in other words that there is no less 
burdensome means to achieve the same objective, is an entirely appropriate part of the case 
management proportionality analysis. Indeed, it is already carried out in many cases. The 
burdens imposed on parties to a specific case, the system and its users (who are parties to their 
own cases) are important factors to be taken into account in case management decisions.415 
The points raised by Lord Neuberger are not problematic if we are clear about the concept of 
necessity that is being applied and the aim which it serves. Necessity does not have to be tied 
to the achievement of substantive justice simply because that was the case under the RSC. If 
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we are clear that the aim is implementation of the Overriding Objective, and that the Overriding 
Objective incorporates substantive and procedural justice in equal measure, then necessity can 
be tied to that aim and form an integral, although not decisive, part of the case management 
proportionality analysis. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis: proportionality ‘in the strict sense’  
 
This limb embodies the balancing and cost-benefit analysis which, from a common sense 
perspective, are most closely associated with the term ‘proportionality’. This is the 
proportionality that Jackson referred to when he said that the law ‘facilitates the pursuit of 
lawful objectives, but only to the extent that those objectives warrant the burdens thereby being 
imposed upon others’.416 It was noted in Chapter Two that this limb is not always applied in 
the proportionality analysis.417 This begs the question as to whether has any value in a case 
management context.  
 
First, however, we must be clear about what is being balanced, and whether balancing is even 
appropriate in a case management context. It has been argued that balancing is not appropriate 
where the proportionality analysis encompasses both rights and interests, as the two cannot 
properly be balanced against each other.418 In a case management context, the relevant factors 
are facets of the ECHR Article 6 right to fair trial, and of the express and implied rights within 
that Article. One of those implied rights is the right of access to the courts, limitations to which 
‘are permitted by implication since the right of access by its very nature calls for regulation by 
the State’.419 The CPR regulates that right of access. Other rights within Article 6 come into play 
in a case management context, for example the rights to a fair hearing, to a hearing within a 
reasonable time, to equality of arms, and to the fair presentation of evidence. Case management 
decisions balance factors relevant to those rights. The connection between Article 6 and the 
CPR was highlighted by Arden LJ in CIBC Mellon Trust Co v Stolzenberg (Sanctions: Non-
compliance) (2004), in which she stated that proportionality in the context of restrictions on 
the right of access to court ‘will be satisfied if the Overriding Objective is met’.420 Various factors 
are balanced in a case management decision in order to give effect to the right to fair trial, as 
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given permitted structure by the CPR. There is no issue of some factors being more 
fundamentally important than others, as they are all in service of that ultimate right. On that 
basis, the language of balancing can be appropriately applied. 
 
Balancing lies at the heart of case management proportionality, on both a conceptual and 
practical level. At both levels, there is a cost-benefit aspect to the exercise. Conceptually, the 
type of justice that the courts provide and that is embodied in the Overriding Objective reflects 
a balance between substantive and procedural justice. The former cannot be achieved at any 
cost: citizens are entitled ‘to seek a remedy from the civil courts’,421 but the ‘achievement of the 
right result needs to be balanced against the expenditure of time and money needed to achieve 
that result’.422 The cost and benefit to delivering justice on the merits, which is still a relevant 
consideration, must be weighed against the cost and benefit to the parties and the system of a 
reduction in expenditure of time, money and resources. This also incorporates a balance 
between inter partes and systemic procedural justice. The cost and benefit to parties to a given 
case of any case management decision must be weighed against the cost and benefit to other 
users of the system. These concepts need to be applied in individual cases and to specific 
management decisions. The court will conduct those balancing exercises in the practical 
context of a case provided by, for example, the financial position of the litigants, the importance 
of the case, the progress of the case to date and the timetable to trial. 
 
One issue with balancing in a case management context, as in other areas, is 
incommensurability. It is impossible to identify a standard of comparison common to all 
potentially relevant factors in the proportionality analysis. This will be considered in more 
detail in Chapter Six, as it impacts on the nature of any guidance that can be given on the 
application of case management proportionality.423 For the time being, suffice to say that while 
it might not be an issue that can be solved, it can be ameliorated through the use of a 
transparent, consistent approach which takes into account as much information as possible. 
 
DISCRETION AND DEFERENCE 
 
It is here that case management proportionality diverges more sharply from the general 
principle considered in Chapter Two. The concepts of the margin of appreciation and judicial 
 
421 Woolf, Interim Report (n 214) ch 18, para 4. 
422 ibid ch 4, para 6. 
423 See ch 6 at 211-212. 
 83 
deference are not relevant in a case management context. Proportionality in that context is not 
a means by which the powers of decision-making authorities are kept in check by a court with 
supervisory jurisdiction, nor is it a feature of the separation of powers between branches of 
government. It is both part of the CPR’s Overriding Objective and a tool for ensuring that cases 
are dealt with in accordance with that objective. In applying proportionality in that context, 
the court manages relationships that are internal to the civil justice system, namely those 
between parties, and between each case and the system as a whole. The court, as primary 
decision-maker, is not an external party. 
 
This is not, however, to say that discretion and deference as general concepts are irrelevant. 
Discretion is central to the court’s case management powers, as management judges have a 
broad discretion to make any orders they think appropriate. This is discretion exercised by the 
court itself, rather than afforded to another party by the court. A management judge is the 
primary decision-maker, and they conduct the balancing exercise themselves rather than 
reviewing another body’s conduct. There are no limits imposed on the exercise of the discretion 
by the nature of the court’s relationship with any external body. In terms of deference, courts 
must work co-operatively with parties and take into account the fact that they and their lawyers 
may be more knowledgeable about many aspects of the case, but there is no question of 
deference by judges to parties. Indeed, the culture change underlying the CPR requires the 
opposite: it is the courts that must control the management and progress of cases. The standard 
of appeal from case management decisions is high, with decisions only being overturned if they 
are ‘plainly wrong’.424 This does not reflect ‘deference’ in the manner considered in the previous 
chapter. It is a standard of internal appellate review that incorporates the importance of the 
broad discretion afforded to management judges and policy reasons for a robust approach to 
upholding first instant case management decisions.  
 
These differences do not render inappropriate to case management the entire proportionality 
framework applied in other areas. The concepts of the margin of appreciation and judicial 
deference affect how the framework is applied, in particular the intensity of the analysis 
undertaken, rather than the structure of the framework itself. The core features of that 
framework can be applied to case management proportionality without either the margin of 
appreciation or deference aspects.  
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Lord Woolf’s review and the CPR changed the nature of the justice provided by the civil system. 
The meaning of procedural justice was broadened, and a new relationship of equality and 
balance between substantive and procedural justice was introduced. Proportionality lies at the 
heart of this new concept of justice. It is a central aspect of the Overriding Objective, which is 
implemented through active judicial case management. Proportionality in that context provides 
a framework through which factors relevant to a management decision are analysed and 
balanced. Each must be given no more than appropriate importance, and the final decision 
must reflect a fair balance of all relevant factors.  
 
This chapter has shown that proportionality in a case management context bears strong 
similarities to the principle as established and applied in other areas of law. Core aspects of 
that general principle, namely the need for a legitimate aim, the suitability of the means chosen 
to achieve that aim, and the requirement that those means impose no greater burden than 
necessary, can be readily identified in case management proportionality. The cost-benefit 
analysis is also present. The major differences between case management proportionality and 
the principle as discussed in the previous chapter lie in the areas of discretion and deference. 
Those differences stem from the nature of the court’s role in making management decisions, 
the relationship between the court and the parties affected by those decisions, and the 
institutional context within which the decisions are made. These comparisons have enabled 
definition and content to be given to an otherwise vague principle. The practical value of this 
will become clear in Chapter Six. It will be proposed that the four core aspects of the 
proportionality analysis should be incorporated into guidance aimed at improving consistency 
of management decision-making. The definition given to that principle through the analysis 
and comparisons in this and the previous chapter provides crucial detail. The vaguer the 
guidance, the less use it is likely to have in improving consistency. 
 
That definition alone, however, is insufficient. To fully understand proportionality in a case 
management context, we must investigate how it is applied on a practical, case-by-case basis. 
A close analysis of relevant case law allows us to determine the extent to which proportionality 
is being applied in accordance with its aims and underlying principles. It also enables us to 
identify specific ways in which proportionality and active judicial management are being used 
successfully, and to pinpoint precisely where there is scope for improvement. That information 
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can then be used to ensure that any improvement measures are as detailed and targeted as 




















































THE CASE LAW: PROPORTIONALITY AND JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT IN ACTION  
 
 
The preceding chapters provide the background against which to review the post-Woolf case 
law. This chapter focuses on the practicalities of case management and party behaviour. A 
broad range of cases are covered, from general commercial matters to more specialist cases 
dealing with issues such as patent disputes and defamation. The entire litigation process is 
covered, from pre-action through to pre-trial reviews and even applications made at the start 
of trial, reflecting the fact that proportionality and case management are relevant at every 
stage. It is impossible to draw direct comparisons between, for example, an application for 
specific disclosure and an application for relief from sanctions where a witness statement has 
not been filed, or between an application to amend a statement of case and an application for 
a preliminary issue trial. However, all such decisions are made by balancing relevant factors in 
order to comply with the Overriding Objective. Identification of those factors can span different 
types of dispute and decision because, at their heart, issues such as value, complexity, prejudice 
and expenditure of resources are universal. In their most general sense, they can be relevant to 
any type of case. There will be divergences in detail and application depending on context, but 
the aim is to identify those universal factors, rather than to dictate how they should be applied. 
The cases reviewed do not represent the entirety of case management decisions made under 
the CPR. Many such decisions will not appear in a case report. However, the reported cases 
cover a sufficiently broad range of issues and scenarios to provide a representative sample. 
 
Four themes have been identified:  
 
I. Fundamentals: commentary on and understanding of the Overriding Objective and the 
role of the court. 
 
Courts have been inconsistent in their understanding of the changes introduced by the CPR, 
and in their application of those changes. In some cases, Lord Woolf’s new conception of justice 
is applied and judges take the required active role in its implementation. In others, precedence 
is still given to substantive justice, thus either ignoring or misunderstanding the change in the 
nature of ‘justice’ embodied in the Overriding Objective. Some judges have maintained the pre-
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CPR approach of leaving the progress of a matter in the parties’ hands, rather than taking on a 
sufficiently active management role.  
 
II. Active case management: application of the case management regime to the facts of a 
case.  
 
There are many examples of courts taking active control, for example by imposing controlled 
timetables and tailoring decisions to the needs of a case. There are also examples of courts 
taking insufficient control. In some cases, problems might have been avoided had the court 
taken a stronger hold of the case at an earlier stage. There is scope for courts to take a more 
consistent and controlled approach to case management.  
 
III. Judicial proportionality: incorporation of inter partes and systemic proportionality into 
case management decisions. 
 
Guidance can be drawn from the case law as to factors that judges consider when applying 
proportionality on an inter partes basis. This includes, for example, the relevance and 
importance of evidence, the centrality of issues and the need to incentivise parties to engage in 
settlement discussions or mediation. In terms of systemic proportionality, there are three sub-
sets of cases: those that take systemic issues into account, those that do not, and those that fall 
on a spectrum between the two. There is a lack of consistency in the courts’ approach, 
particularly to systemic proportionality.  
 
IV. Party proportionality: compliance with CPR 1.3. 
 
There are many examples of parties litigating in a disproportionate manner that does not 
comply with their duty to assist the court in furthering the Overriding Objective. Proportionality 
can only truly work as a case management tool if both court and parties are fully invested in 
its application. There are also inconsistencies in the court’s attitude and responses to 
disproportionate party behaviour. 
 
These four themes overlap. The nature of litigation and case management necessitates interplay 
between court and parties, principles and practicalities. However, considering the cases in this 
thematic way allows for as precise an identification as possible of both problems and solutions. 
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I. FUNDAMENTALS: THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT  
 
The case law reveals general points about judges’ understanding of the Overriding Objective, 
the purpose of litigation, and the role of the courts. In many cases, courts have applied the 
Overriding Objective in accordance with Lord Woolf’s new conception of justice. The 
importance of both substantive and procedural justice, and the inter partes and systemic aspects 
of the latter, have been understood425 and there are many examples of courts taking the 
required robust approach to case management.426 Judges have shown that they understand the 
compromise at the heart of proportionality. ‘Imperfect’ solutions can fall within the ambit of a 
judge’s case management discretion.427 Decisions may involve finding ‘the least worst 
solution’428 because there is no ‘single, perfect, obviously right solution’.429 Such a decision may 
be ‘uncomfortable’,430 highlighting a persistent difficulty with the concepts underlying the 
Overriding Objective. Getting as close as possible to ‘perfect’ substantive justice in a given case 
may instinctively feel like a more ‘correct’ approach to justice, but that is not the justice that 
underpins the CPR. The compromise embodied in the Overriding Objective seeks to achieve 
‘better justice … by risking a little bit of injustice’.431 This might more accurately be phrased as 
achieving better justice by risking a little bit of substantive injustice. 
 
Courts have not, however, consistently interpreted the Overriding Objective in this way. In 
making management decisions judges do not always consider systemic issues,432 nor do they 
always take a sufficiently active management role.433 Some judges have made specific 
pronouncements that run counter to the meaning of the Overriding Objective. The court in 
Allen v Jones (2004), for example, gave undue precedence to substantive justice in saying that 
the notion of the judge ‘getting the right answer’ cannot have ceased to be ‘a highly important 
part, if not the most important part, of the overriding objective of a court in a civilised 
society’.434 The judge went on to say that it would be ‘quite incorrect if the notion were to get 
about that the CPR had failed to secure the overriding objective whenever a case got to trial on 
 
425 See below at 137ff. 
426 See below at 95ff. 
427 Kranidiotes v Paschali [2001] EWCA Civ 357 [22] (Aldous LJ) confirming Tanfern Ltd v Cameron 
MacDonald [2000] EWCA Civ 3023 [32]-[33] (Brooke LJ). 
428 Broughton (n 424) [51] (Lewison LJ). 
429 Berezovsky v Abramovich [2010] EWHC 2044 (Ch) [13]. 
430 ibid. 
431 Nichia (n 275) [51] (Jacob LJ). 
432 See below at 146ff. 
433 See below at 111ff. 
434 [2004] EWHC 1189 (QB) [20]. 
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the merits before a judge’.435 This is framed as an exaggeration, and it certainly cannot be said 
that whenever a case gets to trial on the merits, the Overriding Objective has not been complied 
with. This could happen, however, if for example a low value, low complexity claim with no 
special importance reached trial by way of expenditure of large amounts of cost, time and 
resources. In the more recent case of JW Spear & Sons Ltd v Zynga Inc (2013), the judge stated 
that ‘the overriding objective is still to provide a just result’ and that ‘the overriding objective 
… requires the Courts to dispose of cases justly’.436 Such language is not in accordance with the 
Overriding Objective or its underlying concepts. This merits-based inter partes focus persists in 
subsequent articulations of the Overriding Objective.437 In Hicks v Rostas (2017), for example, 
the judge noted that he must ‘have regard to the overriding objectives in the Civil Procedure 
Rules, but ultimately seek to do justice between the parties’.438 This phrasing subordinates the 
Overriding Objective to inter partes substantive justice. The statement in Otuo v The Watch 
Tower Bible and Tract Society of Britain (2019) that ‘[i]t is often said that … the Court will 
ordinarily allow an amendment if the opposite party can be compensated in costs’439 suggests 
that the pre-CPR approach that prioritised inter partes substantive justice440 remains prevalent. 
The centrality of compensation in costs was identified by the Court of Appeal as recently as 
2016, in the context of amendments to pleadings.441 As noted in Otuo, this position is a 
‘misconception’.442  
 
The persistence of outdated principles and apparent difficulties in laying them to rest is 
exemplified by the line of authority commencing with Cobbold v Greenwich LBC (1999),443 a 
case which dealt with an application to amend a statement of case. Peter Gibson LJ stated that:  
 
amendments in general ought to be allowed so that the real dispute between the 
parties can be adjudicated upon provided that any prejudice to the other party or 
 
435 ibid. 
436 [2013] EWHC 1640 (Ch) [68]. 
437 Baxmann v Etok [2016] EWHC 2075 (QB) [6]; Hicks v Rostas [2017] EWHC 1344 (QB) [32]; 
Pedriks v Grimaux [2019] EWHC 2165 (QB) 5; Delta Kanaris Special Maritime Enterprise v Elemento Ltd 
[2019] EWHC 2617 (Comm) [10]. 
438 Hicks (n 437) [32]. 
439 [2019] EWHC 350 (QB) [15]. 
440 See ch 3 at 56-57. 
441 Deutsche Bank AG v Unitech Global Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 119 [14] (Longmore LJ). 
442 Otuo (n 439) [15]. 
443 Unreported, 9 August 1999. 
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parties caused by the amendment can be compensated for in costs, and the public 
interest in the efficient administration of justice is not significantly harmed.444  
 
This approach was determined in Swain-Mason v Mills & Reeve (2011) to have been ‘superseded 
in favour of one which is a good deal less relaxed about allowing late amendments’.445 
Nevertheless, the Cobbold approach persisted. Cobbold was cited sufficiently frequently post-
Swain-Mason as the only authority for amendments446 that the judge in Abbas v Shah (2014) 
identified two separate strands of authority.447 The discrepancy persisted as recently as 2019. 
In Hewson v Times Newspapers Ltd (2019), the court noted that the general principles regarding 
amendment applications were derived from Cobbold and were ‘very familiar’.448 In Rose v 
Creativityetc Ltd (2019) counsel cited Cobbold as the starting point for an amendment 
application,449 giving the lie to a judicial comment made two years earlier that it was 
‘recognised … by all’ that it was no longer the appropriate starting point.450 Conversely, in both 
Dinglis v Dinglis (2019)451 and Djurberg v Richmond LBC (2019),452 the court stated that Cobbold 
was no longer the correct starting point.453  
 
Discussions of the Jackson reforms provide useful examples of how the original Overriding 
Objective had been misunderstood. In JW Spear, the judge stated that ‘[f]rom 1st April 2013 a 
proportionality requirement was introduced’ to the Overriding Objective,454 while in Co-
Operative Group Ltd v Birse Developments Ltd (2013), in the context of amendments, it was 
 
444 ibid 5. 
445 [2011] EWCA Civ 14 [78] (Lloyd LJ). 
446 Berezovsky v Abramovich [2011] EWHC 1143 (Comm); The Nottinghamshire and City of Nottingham 
Fire Authority v Gladman Commercial Properties [2011] EWHC 1918 (Ch); Eaton Square Properties Ltd v 
Shaw [2011] EWHC 2115 (QB); Francis v F. Berndes Ltd [2011] EWHC 3377 (Ch); Morrison v 
Buckinghamshire County Council [2011] EWHC 3444 (QB); Isis Investments Ltd v Oscatello Investments 
Ltd [2012] EWHC 745 (Ch); Elafonissos Fishing and Shipping Company v Aigaion Insurance Company SA 
[2012] EWHC 892 (Comm); San Vicente v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government 
[2012] EWHC 3585 (Admin); Phaestos v Ho [2012] EWHC 1996 (TCC); Cruddas v Calvert [2013] 
EWHC 1096 (QB); Groarke v Fontaine [2014] EWHC 1676 (QB); Gladstar Ltd v Layzells [2014] EWHC 
1449 (Ch); Philips Pension Trustees Ltd v Aon Hewitt Ltd [2015] EWHC 1768 (Ch); Pyrrho Investments 
Ltd v MWB Property Ltd [2015] EWHC 3903 (Ch); Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Merit Merrell 
Technology Ltd [2018] EWHC 1577 (TCC). 
447 [2014] EWHC 4493 (QB) [34]-[36]. 
448 [2019] EWHC 1000 (QB) [15]. 
449 [2019] EWHC 1043 (Ch) [36]. 
450 Apache Beryl Ltd v Marathon Oil UK LLC [2017] EWHC 2462 (Comm) [6]. 
451 [2019] EWHC 738 (Ch). 
452 [2019] EWHC 3342 (Ch). 
453 Dinglis (n 451) [14]; Djurberg (n 452) [37]. 
454 JW Spear (n 436) [49]. 
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stated that ‘now’ the court must have regard to proportionality.455 The Overriding Objective 
incorporated proportionality from its inception, and the post-Jackson amendments simply 
made explicit what had been implicit.456 Although not going so far as to say that proportionality 
was introduced in 2013, other judges noted that the Jackson amendments required them to 
give more emphasis to proportionality.457 In Woolley v UP Global Sourcing UK Ltd (2014), the 
judge stated that ‘[t]he landscape against which civil litigation is now conducted changed 
radically’ on 1st April 2013.458 It is questionable how ‘radical’ the post-Jackson amendments 
were in that regard, when they took Lord Woolf’s position as their starting point.459 These 
judgments were handed down soon after the Jackson reforms came into force, and so could 
point to a ‘bedding in’ period during which the nature of those reforms was not fully 
understood. However, a concerted effort was made to educate all involved on the details of the 
Jackson reforms through a series of lectures.460 In the context of the misinterpretations 
identified above, this may instead exemplify a more fundamental inconsistency in 
understanding the Overriding Objective. 
 
There are also inconsistent views on the proper role of the court. On the one hand, there is 
widespread recognition of the importance and nature of the court’s management role, both 
through the act of case management itself461 and through explicit statements. Parties no longer 
have ultimate control of the pace and progress of litigation, and cannot by agreement ‘deprive 
the judge of his overall discretion to conduct the case fairly and to control carefully … how it 
should develop.’462 As stated in Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc (2005), ‘[i]t is no longer the role 
of the court simply to provide a level playing field and to referee whatever game the parties 
choose to play upon it’,463 an idea that was echoed in similar language in Guerrero v Monterrico 
Metals Plc (2010).464 On the other hand, there are examples of the court apparently failing to 
implement the level of management required by this more active role.465  
 
455 [2013] EWHC 3145 (TCC) [14]. 
456 See ch 3 at 61. 
457 Aherne v Cape Intermediate Holdings Plc (unreported, 4 June 2013); Woolley v UP Global Sourcing UK 
Ltd [2014] EWHC 388 (Ch); Admans v Two Saints Ltd (unreported, 24 June 2016). 
458 Woolley (n 457) [5]. 
459 See ch 3 at 61. 
460 There were 18 so-called implementation lectures, and several other lectures and speeches. They 
have all been published on the judiciary website and as such are freely available: 
<https://www.judiciary.uk/publications/review-of-civil-litigation-costs-lectures/>. 
461 See below at 95ff. 
462 Parkin v Bromley Hospitals NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 478 [38]. 
463 [2005] EWCA Civ 75 [54] (Phillips LJ). 
464 [2010] EWHC 3228 (QB) [97]. 
465 See below at 111ff. 
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Conceptions of the court’s role that tie into misunderstandings of the Overriding Objective 
persist, in that they focus on the court’s primary function being to determine the dispute before 
it on the merits. An example is another judgment in the Otuo v Watch Tower Bible and Tract 
Society of Britain (2019) litigation.466 In the context of stating that dismissal of a claim on 
grounds of triviality or disproportionate cost is a serious step which the court should not take 
lightly, the judge stated that ‘the main function of the court is to decide cases, not to refuse to 
do so and to dismiss them because the process is too costly or burdensome’.467 He said that the 
Court of Appeal had ‘pointed [this] out’468 in Sullivan v Bristol Film Studios Ltd (2012), in which 
Lewison LJ said that ‘[t]he real question … is whether in any particular case there is a 
proportionate procedure by which the merits of a claim can be investigated. In my judgment it 
is only if there is no proportionate procedure by which a claim can be adjudicated that it would 
be right to strike it out as an abuse of process.’469 Reference was made to Jameel, in which 
Phillips LJ said that ‘[t]he court is concerned to ensure that judicial and court resources are 
appropriately and proportionately used in accordance with the requirements of justice’470 and 
‘[i]t would be an abuse of process to continue to commit the resources of the English court … 
to an action where so little is now seen to be at stake’.471 The statement in Otuo about the main 
function of the court is not in line with the cases which that statement is said to follow. The 
main function of the court under the CPR is not to decide cases but to deal with them in 
accordance with the Overriding Objective. This includes management with the aim of ensuring 
that each case is dealt with by a procedure that is not too costly or burdensome. If there is no 
such proportionate procedure, then it is open to the court to dismiss the claim. That a court in 
2019 prioritised a decision on the merits over procedural proportionality and misunderstood 
the nature of the court’s role makes clear that there is still work to be done in fully incorporating 
the changes embodied in the CPR. 
 
Courts have made general points about the application of proportionality. It is a difficult subject 
to pin down, on which there is ‘no precise and correct answer. Arguments as to proportionality 
involve choosing a cut-off point in a range of possibilities and there is no simple right answer 
as to where a cut-off point should be.’472 Proportionality has been called an ‘elusive objective’,473 
 
466 [2019] EWHC 571 (QB). 
467 ibid [12]. 
468 ibid. 
469 [2012] EWCA Civ 570 [29]. 
470 Jameel (n 463) [54]. 
471 ibid [70]. 
472 Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc [2008] EWHC 2522 (Ch) [82]. 
473 Sharp v Leeds City Council [2017] EWCA Civ 33 [31] (Briggs LJ). 
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echoing Lord Neuberger in Coventry v Lawrence (2014) where he noted that achieving a 
proportionate relationship between the costs and benefits of litigation had ‘not merely proved 
elusive, but … [was] often missed by a very large margin indeed’.474 A prominent reason for 
this elusiveness is that cases are fact specific, indeed they have been described as ‘infinitely 
variable’.475 Different judges may come to different but equally legitimate decisions on 
procedural matters, and what amounts to a ‘good reason’ in one case ‘may prove quite 
inadequate’ in another.476 Judicial discretion must be exercised in light of the facts, meaning 
that ‘there cannot always be one correct answer to the problems posed’.477 Focusing on the 
reasoning in other cases, ‘however authoritative’, can be ‘distracting’ where the facts are not 
truly comparable.478 Even where facts may appear to be similar, relevant factors may 
legitimately be balanced in different ways.479  
 
Caution must also be exercised as to how previous judgments are treated, and courts must not 
be too strict in laying down guidelines as to how cases should be managed. Where a rule was 
deliberately drafted in general terms, they should be reluctant to lay down hard and fast rules 
on application.480 Guidelines ‘tend to be treated as something more’,481 and previous judgments 
should not be treated ‘as if they were statutes’.482 Such an approach is contrary to the flexibility 
inherent in the CPR. The statutory analogy was also used in Bulic v Harwoods (2012), where 
argument had been diverted into a detailed analysis of various ‘tests’ as though some phrases 
were of statutory significance.483 The judge thought that Lord Woolf would be ‘surprised’ to 
find that such a legalistic approach was being adopted to the application of the CPR, as ‘no 
straitjackets were intended’.484 The Court of Appeal has ‘on many occasions deplored the use 
of judge-made checklists to supplement the rules’, meaning that when relevant factors are 
identified they should not be applied ‘mechanically’ in subsequent cases.485 When considering 
earlier authorities, the nature of the particular statement relied on must be identified. 
Statements of principle or terms of general guidance must be distinguished from their 
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481 Bermuda International Securities Ltd v KPMG [2001] EWCA Civ 269 8 (Waller LJ). 
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application to the facts.486 Courts have on more than one occasion limited the usefulness of 
earlier cases to statements of principle and general guidance.487 Such statements aside, previous 
decisions ‘are essentially illustrations of the exercise of the court’s discretion in the particular 
circumstances of the relevant case.’488 In one judgment in the Vilca v Xstrata Ltd litigation 
(2016), the judge specifically stated that his conclusions should not be cited in any other case, 
as ‘they [were] intended to resolve the issues placed before [him] in the context of the 
particular circumstances of the case as they have presented themselves.’489 
 
Related to this fact-specific exercise of flexible discretion is the fact that appeal courts should 
be slow to interfere with case management decisions. Lord Neuberger in HRH Prince Abdulaziz 
Bin Mishal Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud v Apex Global Management Ltd (2014) stated that it would be 
‘inappropriate for an appellate court to reverse or otherwise interfere’ with a case management 
decision unless it was ‘plainly wrong in the sense of being outside the generous ambit where 
reasonable decision makers may disagree’.490 An appeal court should:  
 
only interfere when they consider that the judge of first instance has not merely 
preferred an imperfect solution which is different from an alternative imperfect 
solution which the Court of Appeal might or would have adopted, but has exceeded 
the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible….491  
 
First instance decisions may be both imperfect and unappealable. Disagreement with the first 
instance judge is not a sufficient basis on which to allow an appeal: ‘[t]he fact that different 
judges might give different weight to the various factors does not make the decision one which 
can be overturned’492. Appeal courts play a crucial role in encouraging a consistent culture of 
active management, and it is ‘vital’ that the Court of Appeal uphold robust first instance case 
management decisions.493 The high threshold for overturning case management decisions on 
appeal means that upholding a first instance decision cannot be taken as an endorsement of 
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 95 
the first instance approach, merely as a determination that it was within the first instance 
judge’s discretion. Courts at the same level should also be slow to depart from previous case 
management decisions. A court should not too readily ‘case manage in a way that is inconsistent 
with earlier decisions which have been acted upon and which were expected to be the 
governing decisions’.494  
 
The fact-specific and discretionary nature of case management decisions means that citation of 
a case herein does not mean that the approach in that case will be appropriate in all cases 
dealing with the same issue. Both proportionality and active judicial management are flexible, 
and the intention is not to impose any ‘straitjackets’. However, fact-specific decisions can be of 
more general use. They exemplify patterns of thinking and practical solutions which can form 
the basis of flexible guidance as to how cases may be managed proportionately and 
consistently.495  
 
II. ACTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT 
 
Courts have taken an inconsistent approach to case management. There are many cases in 
which judges have taken control and applied a robust approach, but there is also a significant 
number in which this has not been done.  
 
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF CASES 
 
Cases where judges take active control not only exemplify the fact that they have taken on 
board the importance of case management in a general sense, but can also be used to identify 
practical details as to how cases are managed. 
 
Controlling the scope of a case 
 
One of the main ways in which a case can be managed to ensure proportionate use of time, 
money and resources is by controlling its scope. This is no longer ‘just a matter for the parties’ 
choice’.496 Control can be applied at any stage, but is particularly important when dealing with 
statements of case and defining the issues in dispute. Judges must identify the issues at an early 
 
494 Gill v Anami Holdings Ltd [2018] EWHC 1585 (Ch) [6]. 
495 See ch 6 at 210-211. 
496 Lokhova v Longmuir [2016] EWHC 2579 (QB) [57]. 
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stage,497 and decide promptly which need full investigation and which can be disposed of 
summarily.498 They can decide the order in which issues will be tried499 and can exclude issues 
from consideration.500 A controlled approach at this stage is likely to have a positive knock-on 
effect in terms of disclosure, evidence and use of court time for hearings and trials. Conversely, 
lack of precision in pleading can make a case difficult ‘if not impossible’ to manage by, for 
example, preventing an informed approach to disclosure and making it difficult to identify 
witnesses and the requirements of expert evidence.501 Statements of case should sharpen 
identification of the issues for the court to decide. This will be hampered by vague or 
superfluous pleading.502 Issues should be confined to those which are ‘reasonably necessary and 
proportionate’503 and ‘essential’ to a party’s case.504  
 
To ensure compliance with this purpose, the court can strike out parts of statements of case 
and refuse or allow amendments. Such actions have both inter partes and systemic benefits. 
Inclusion of unnecessary material may, for no useful purpose, increase disclosure obligations, 
risk the introduction of satellite issues and increase expenditure of time and costs.505 Widening 
the scope of a case may prolong the trial, make management more costly and difficult,506 and 
be counterproductive to concentrating on the primary issues.507 Parties may think that the more 
issues that are before the court, the greater the likelihood of a ‘just’ outcome, but this will not 
always be the case. The ‘generation of a host of satellite issues’ may ‘create the risk of an unjust 
outcome resulting from a lack of focus’.508 Expanding the scope of a party’s allegations may risk 
costs consequences that would cancel out any other benefits.509 Some amendments, on the 
other hand, may provide greater particularity510 or reduce the disclosure burden and the risk 
of the trial being distorted by matters of little or no importance.511 On a systemic level, 
controlling the scope of a case enables the court to control the resources devoted to that case.512  
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Decisions to strike out claims or defences relating to proposed amendments of statements of 
case are not the only techniques available for controlling the scope of a case. Where a party’s 
case cannot be discerned from its statement of case, the court may require re-pleading from 
scratch.513 This may increase costs and delay in the instant proceedings, but it may still be 
appropriate where if the statement of case were struck out, the party in question could 
commence new proceedings.514 Permission to amend may be granted subject to conditions, for 
example that the amended case is set out in more detail, in order to provide certainty and 
clarity and facilitate the smooth conduct of the trial.515 In MSI- Defence Systems Ltd v The 
Secretary of State for Defence (2020), the claimant was ordered to serve a separate document 
with its re-amended Particulars of Claim which complied with the proper principles of pleading, 
if it was unable to amend to comply with those principles.516  
 
Approaches to controlling the scope of a case often acknowledge the importance of timing. This 
relates to when issues are brought within the scope of a case, and the importance of ensuring 
that including those issues does not affect the efficient progress of the proceedings. The court 
may, for example, require some disclosure to take place before amendment.517 It may order 
stays to ensure either that additional claims are not brought in unnecessarily early518 or that 
the case does not move forward before the claim has been properly pleaded.519 A short timescale 
may be set for repleading, to ensure efficient progress despite the need for amendments.520 If 
future amendments are anticipated, the court may set a longstop date for applications.521 The 
court is not required to take a ‘now or never’ approach. In Spin Master Ltd v PMS International 
Group (2017),522 the claimant sought to make amendments which, if allowed, would bring in 
several complex issues. The issue central to those amendments would only arise if the claimant 
succeeded in the infringement aspect of its claim. The amendments were not permitted, but 
neither were they shut out. A further application could be made if and when the infringement 
claim succeeded, thereby keeping the scope focused while retaining flexibility.523  
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Courts can take a tailored approach to the content of statements of case, including imposing 
page limits,524 specifying the claims and matters that amended versions should contain525 and 
identifying parts that cannot stand, down to paragraphs, sentences and words that must be 
deleted.526  In K/S Lincoln v CB Richard Ellis Hotels Ltd (2009), the claimant applied to strike 
out an allegation in the defence.527 It was determined that the allegation could not be struck 
out while the part of the claim that lay at its heart remained in the claimant’s statement of 
case.528 The claimant was given a choice whether to retain that part of their claim, with 
determination of the strike out action dependent on their decision.529 The judge was sufficiently 
familiar with the interplay between the parties’ respective cases that he was able to make an 
order tailored to their precise requirements. In both K/S Lincoln530 and Haydon-Baillie v Bank 
Julius Baer & Co Ltd (2007),531 the approach taken was described as ‘slightly unusual’, 
suggesting that this tailored approach was seen as being outside the case management norm. 
This approach can be applied to any case where appropriate. However, the extent to which a 
judge is willing to delve into the specifics of how a statement of case should be improved may 
depend on how badly it is pleaded and the status of the amending party’s legal representation. 
In Haydon-Baillie532 and Ukoumunne v The University of Birmingham (2020),533 the amending 
parties were unrepresented. This may have prompted the court to take a more interventionist 
approach. Conversely, in Bruce v TTA Management Ltd (2018), where the claimant was 
represented by leading and junior counsel and experienced solicitors, the court determined that 
it was not its role to ‘edit a poor quality, prolix and diffuse statement of case’.534 It could have 
suggested minor changes, but the statement of case was so poor that it was impossible to know 
where to start.535  
 
It is particularly important to apply controlled management to statements of case. Control of 
the issues in dispute will influence the entire litigation. At the disclosure stage, for example, a 
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‘great advantage in terms of time and cost may be achieved by seeking to narrow down 
issues’.536 This in turn can narrow the ‘borders’ for parties’ disclosure searches.537 Conversely, 
enlarging allegations may enlarge the scope of disclosure and, as a result, extend or distort the 
eventual trial.538 Where issues have been narrowed, future management orders should reflect 
that confined scope in order to prevent the time and resources of parties and the court from 
being directed away from the real issues.539 This highlights the importance of dealing with one 
stage of litigation with an eye on how it will affect future stages. 
 
Disclosure can be one of the most costly and time-consuming aspects of litigation. Sensible case 
management at this stage may ‘avoid putting the parties to an expensive application for specific 
disclosure of other documents, at a later stage of the proceedings.’540 There are many examples 
of judges taking a controlled and tailored approach to disclosure. This can require them to go 
into detail as to what disclosure is appropriate in particular circumstances, for example by 
giving specific directions about the content of requests to be made to the disclosing party, the 
information to be provided, and the timescale for the exercise.541 Where necessary, judges have 
been as specific as identifying the email addresses that are to be the subject of a search542 or 
the words that must be deleted to limit search categories.543 Judges can make orders of their 
own formulation, rather than simply allowing or disallowing the order for which a party has 
applied. They may, for example, order a search to cover a different time period than 
requested,544 or reformulate the range and content of categories.545 In order to progress the 
action this reformulation can be done in the course of oral argument, although the court must 
be satisfied that it can be done with sufficient particularity absent written evidence.546 In Keith 
v CPM Field Marketing Ltd (2001),547 having criticised the first instance judge for not taking a 
more active role in disclosure, the Court of Appeal detailed what that role should have looked 
like. The judge should have ‘enquired into the practicalities’548 of any outstanding items being 
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produced, then made an order limited to those items as far as he was properly satisfied that 
they could be produced. The matter could then be ‘restored to him for further directions’549 if 
there were any difficulties. The Court of Appeal endorsed an investigative approach by the case 
management judge and was clear that disclosure orders must be capable of being complied 
with, and limited to what is necessary. A focused approach will reduce the risk of disclosure 
orders that result in ‘the opening of a substantial can of worms’, i.e. orders that lack direct 
relevance to the matters in issue and that risk satellite litigation or argument.550 However, as 
with statements of case, timing is important: where there is still work to be done on defining 
the issues, it may be preferable to frame an initial disclosure order more broadly.551 
 
In Merck Sharp and Dohme Ltd v Wyeth LLC (2019),552 a case conducted under the Disclosure 
Pilot, the judge made an order that not only reflected neither of the parties’ requests, but which 
embodied a staged approach to disclosure. It required disclosure of specific documents, with 
the door being left ‘open to a further application for disclosure … if warranted’.553 A staged 
approach was not introduced with the Disclosure Pilot. It can be seen in earlier cases in the 
context of both pre-action554 and post-issue disclosure.555 Searches are to be as limited as 
reasonably possible, with further searches being carried out only if necessary after the material 
disclosed has been analysed. The judge in Goodale v The Ministry of Justice (2009)556 made a 
practical point about staging disclosure in the context of searching for documents in the 
possession of various individuals. The starting point should be ‘the most important people at 
the top of the pyramid’ because ‘[v]ery often an opposing party will get everything they want 
from that without having to go down the pyramid any further, often into duplicate material.’557 
A similar point was made in SL Claimants v Tesco Plc (2019), where the judge noted that if no 
evidential light is thrown by individuals at a certain level of the hierarchy, it is unlikely that 
those further down would be able to materially assist.558 This practical point may also be 
relevant where various storage systems are to be searched. Some may be more important than 
others, and some may be more likely to turn up less relevant or duplicate documents. A staged 
 
549 ibid. 
550 Morley v Royal Bank of Scotland (unreported, 31 January 2019) [17]. 
551 Barclays Bank Plc v Taberna Europe CDO I Plc [2016] EWHC 1958 (Ch) [9]. 
552 [2019] EWHC 1692 (Pat). 
553 ibid [15]. 
554 Ensign Highways Ltd v Portsmouth City Council [2014] EWHC 3438 (TCC) [19]. 
555 Tip Communications LLC v Motorola Ltd [2009] EWHC 1486 (Pat) [45]-[46]; Goodale (n 540) [13]. 
556 Goodale (n 540). 
557 ibid [22]. 
558 [2019] EWHC 3315 (Ch) [13]. 
 101 
approach can also be taken to the type of disclosure orders made, for example initially ordering 
limited disclosure, then moving to standard disclosure, with enhanced or specific disclosure to 
be considered if that is unsatisfactory.559  
 
The aim of a staged approach is to ensure that costs and resources are not spent on locating 
and disclosing documents that are of little or no relevance. It allows parties and the court to 
take stock before deciding whether further disclosure is required. A staged approach must, 
however, be undertaken in a sensible and logical way. If it is too limited, this may lead to 
avoidable applications for specific disclosure and thus be counterproductive. Judges may take 
the initiative and request information from the parties that will enable them to deal fully with 
disclosure issues. In Vodafone Group Services Ltd v Infineon Technologies AG (2017), where the 
parties had not addressed the scale of the proceedings in their evidence or skeletons for the 
CMC, the judge thought it ‘legitimate to probe a little further’ and asked them to provide details 
of costs incurred and estimates to the end of trial prior to the CMC.560 Similarly, in BES 
Commercial Electricity Ltd v Cheshire West and Chester Borough Council (2020), the judge 
required the defendant to serve clarification documents and provide a time and cost estimate 
for applying search terms in order to satisfy himself as to the full range of potential material in 
dispute and the extent of efforts required to search for it.561  
 
Courts have emphasised the relevance of ‘downstream costs’ in the context of disclosure. These 
are the costs not of the search itself, but of future activities to which it will lead. The 
downstream costs caused by over-disclosure ‘so often are so substantial and so pointless’.562 The 
judge in Tip Communications LLC v Motorola Ltd (2009) gave practical content to this point, 
stating that it is not only a search that is time consuming and expensive, it is what has to be 
done with the documents once they are identified: ‘someone has to read them, someone has to 
decide what to do with them and to decide whether they are relevant and then to disclose 
them’.563 The concept at the heart of these points, that a decision or action in litigation does 
not stand alone but has a tangible effect on the expenditure of time, costs and resources going 
forward, is not limited to disclosure. It can also be seen, for example, in decisions where courts 
factor in the additional work that an amendment or new evidence might require.564 These cases 
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that focus on disclosure highlight a broader point that each management decision must be seen 
as an integral part of the case as a whole. 
 
Controlling the scope of proceedings does not stop at disclosure. Evidence can and should, 
where appropriate, be controlled from the earliest possible stage. The court can direct the issues 
on which witness evidence is required, the nature of the evidence required and how it is to be 
placed before the court.565 The correlation between witness evidence and keeping the scope of 
a case proportionate is evidenced by the STS which requires the court to consider at the CMC 
whether to limit witness evidence to specific issues or topics.566 In Cathay Pacific Airlines Ltd v 
Lufthansa Technik AG (2019), a case within the STS, the parties were ordered to identify in 
their statements of case which allegations they proposed to prove by means of oral witness 
evidence and to identify each witness.567 The order was made pursuant to CPR 3.1(2)(m) with 
a view to assisting the court in considering witness evidence at the CMC,568 indicating that this 
management power is not limited to the STS. Indeed, the court noted that Jackson had 
endorsed the practice of requiring parties to identify in statements of case the facts that they 
intended to prove by witness evidence.569 Implicit in that endorsement was his view that the 
court already had the power to require parties to do this, the most obvious sources being CPR 
3.1(2)(m) and CPR 32.1(1).570 Controlling witness evidence in this way will assist the court at 
the CMC in making directions for trial and will provide a helpful structure for any witness 
statements subsequently served.571 This is not, however, the only stage at which the court can 
limit and control witness evidence. It may, for example limit the number of witnesses that a 
party may call at trial, with a view to ensuring an efficient and fair trial.572 It is never too late 
for the court to take control of a matter, although regulation of witness evidence at an early 
stage, before costs are incurred and when it may be possible for parties to identify matters that 
might be made the subject of admissions,573 will often be preferable. 
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The court can also restrict expert evidence574 and no party may call an expert or submit 
evidence in an expert’s report without the court’s permission.575 Parties ‘do not have carte 
blanche to do whatever they like to put before the court potentially relevant evidence’.576 Courts 
have found tailored ways of ensuring that expert evidence remains proportionate. In 
Kranidiotes v Paschali (2001),577 the first instance judge had ordered evidence from a joint 
expert, with the order including terms of instruction and an upper fee limit. This level of control 
goes beyond limiting the number of experts or the issues on which they will give evidence. It 
was approved by the Court of Appeal, as it showed that ‘the judge clearly had in view the need 
to adopt a proportionate attitude to the trial’.578 In Teva UK Ltd v Boehringer Ingelheim 
International GmbH (2014), the defendant was ordered to serve its expert evidence first.579 The 
claimant could then either serve none if it agreed with the defendant’s evidence, or it could 
serve limited evidence focused on specific matters.580 Sequential exchange will not be relevant 
in every case, and it may delay the proceedings if there is little likelihood of any substantial 
agreement prior to all evidence being served. Courts are also able to tailor the expert evidence 
process to the needs of a case. In Art & Antiques Ltd v Magwell Solicitors (2015), for example, 
relief for late service of expert evidence was granted on very strict terms, with an exceptionally 
short timetable ordered for completion of the expert process through to service of the joint 
statement.581  
 
Joinder and common management frameworks 
 
Courts will consider whether separate cases should be managed together.582 This can save 
parties time, costs and resources by eliminating duplicate or overlapping work. It may also 
mean that the same court time can be used to deal with multiple cases. Hearing applications 
on closely related cases which cross-refer to each other together can be ‘cost effective’ for parties 
and can mean that all matters ‘go more quickly and take less time to prepare’ because the court 
will be familiar with all of them.583 The solution to dealing with common issues sits on a 
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spectrum, with managing and trying everything in all cases together at one end and letting 
each set of proceedings take its course with no joint management or trial at the other.584  
Sometimes a more nuanced approach is required. The court may order partial joinder, where 
some issues in multiple cases are sufficiently discrete, important and common that they should 
only be tried once.585 In Walsh v Greystone Financial Services Ltd (2018),586 common issues of 
law arose in three cases within the same factual matrix, involving different claimants but the 
same defendant. A single trial would therefore be cheaper and quicker for the defendant but 
longer and more expensive for the claimants, causing them ‘serious and material 
disadvantages’.587 The parties in all three cases were ordered to attend the pre-trial review in 
the first case to go to trial, in order to identify common legal issues to be resolved as preliminary 
issues alongside the trial of that first case.  
 
This exemplifies the balancing act inherent in all case management decisions. Aligning 
timetables and managing cases together may instinctively seem a good idea from a 
proportionality perspective. However, aligning the management of related proceedings will not 
always be proportionate. If cases are proceeding on different paths, for example if there are 
more urgent issues in one or aligning timetables would mean unnecessary delay, managing 
them together will not be appropriate.588 In any event, however the decision is made, and 
however strong the proposition for joint management may be, it must be supported by 
evidence.589  
 
Split and preliminary issue trials 
 
In Walsh,590 common legal issues were to be resolved as preliminary issues in two of the three 
cases. Trying a matter other than at a single trial of all issues, for example ordering a split or 
preliminary issue trial, is another way in which courts can manage cases.591 Relevant factors 
may include the potential cost savings if liability is tried first and not established, meaning that 
no quantum trial is required,592 or whether a split would encourage or discourage mediation or 
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settlement.593 Some issues may be sufficiently discrete for ‘an early decision to be capable of 
resolution in a form that will have a significant impact on the litigation as a whole’ in terms of 
saving costs and resources.594 If there is a satisfactory and fair way of deciding a relatively 
simple part of a case, without shutting out the possibility of dealing with more complex and 
detailed matters, then splitting the trial will provide a focused, cost-effective and fair approach, 
taking into account both inter partes and systemic interests.595 Duplication of work and 
witnesses must be weighed against the savings that could result from splitting the trial.596 There 
may not be a perfect or risk-free solution, but the practical management issue is to arrange 
resolution of the issues in such a way as to maximise the chances of an orderly and fair 
resolution and minimise the risk of prejudice to either side or to the administration of justice.597  
 
No application is required: the court can order such trials on its own initiative and without the 
parties’ agreement.598 In Stocker v Stocker (2015), while features of the case appeared to suggest 
that it would be suitable for a preliminary issue trial, after discussion at the hearing the judge 
decided that he should not force this on the parties ‘at this stage’.599 He did, however, emphasise 
the importance of the parties and the court keeping under review the question of whether a 
full trial of all issues was avoidable.600 It seems that the judge would have imposed a 
preliminary issue trial had he considered it appropriate. Control lies with the court, not the 
parties. The latter may voice their opinions, but the court can go against their wishes. It is, 
however, important that such trials are only ordered in appropriate cases. Courts have on 
occasion taken an over-zealous approach on the basis of an erroneous belief that ordering a 
split or preliminary issue trial would be proportionate.601 
 
Settlement and ADR 
 
Splitting a trial may encourage mediation or settlement,602 meaning that the remainder of the 
case would not need to be tried. Ordering a preliminary issue trial can ‘concentrate the minds 
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of all wonderfully’ on the real issues and ‘get them talking’.603 On the other hand, the possibility 
of settlement may be maximised if all issues are prepared and tried together.604 This highlights 
another facet of case management: the role of settlement and ADR and the extent to which 
they are factored into management decisions. Courts must encourage and facilitate the use of 
ADR where appropriate and help parties settle all or part of their case.605  
 
A case management timetable can be created which allows time for ADR to take place. This 
was done in CIP Properties (AIPT) Ltd v Galliford Try Infrastructure Ltd (2014),606 where the 
court commented on the importance of striking a balance between getting the case to trial and 
allowing time for settlement. Various options were considered, including building in a ‘window’ 
for ADR and staying the proceedings to allow for ADR or mediation. The former was 
inappropriate, because the fixing of any lengthy window for purposes unconnected with trial 
preparation is ‘bad case management’.607 The latter was ‘even worse’, as it could create 
‘uncertainties and the potential for tactical games-playing’.608 The court referred in that regard 
to Roundstone Nurseries Ltd v Stephenson Holdings Ltd (2009), in which very little progress was 
made towards mediation during two stays and the parties omitted to extend the stay further, 
after which the claimant entered judgment in default to which it was technically entitled, but 
which was ‘contrary to the entire basis’ of the CPR.609 The appropriate way forward in CIP 
Properties was to allow a reasonable period between each step to trial, so the parties had time 
to take that step and to consider their position before incurring the next tranche of costs.610 
This was noted to be standard procedure in large TCC cases,611 however there is no reason why 
it could not be extended to other appropriate cases. Another TCC case which could have 
benefited from this approach is McLennan Architects Ltd v Jones (2014), in which the trial was 
put back because over two months had been lost from the timetable due to efforts to mediate 
through the Court Settlement Process.612 If the directions had included time to mediate, the 
trial date may not have been lost. 
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In Fitzroy Robinson Ltd v Mentmore Towers Ltd (2009),613 the court stated that settlement 
negotiations are not a good reason for failing to comply with orders. Directions are given in the 
knowledge, or at least expectation, that parties should try to resolve their differences as they 
prepare for trial.614 This is in line with the fact that giving serious consideration to ADR falls 
within CPR 1.3. It is arguable that factoring time for ADR into a timetable is unnecessary, 
because parties should be taking such steps anyway. The reality, however, is that if ADR is not 
factored into a timetable, the situation could end up as it did in McLennan, with parties coming 
before the court because the timetable has not been adhered to, thereby expending time, costs 
and resources that could have been avoided. In some cases, as in McLennan, the trial date may 
be lost. Parties may be required to pursue ADR alongside the timetable to trial, but directions 
must be practical and realistic. One way to ensure that parties comply with the timetable and 
pursue ADR is to explicitly deal with ADR at the CMC and to factor it into the timetable as 
appropriate. In doing so, it is important to bear in mind the court’s comments in CIP Properties 
that the requirements of ADR and sensible case management leading up to a prompt trial date 
can sometimes be at odds. What is appropriate for one process may not be appropriate for the 
other. Sensible case management must take precedence.615 The balance will be different in 
every case, and in some cases factoring ADR into a timetable will not be appropriate. 
Nevertheless, explicit consideration of this option in every case may lead overall to savings of 
time, costs and resources. 
 
The court can take a more robust approach to settlement and ADR than simply factoring it into 
the timetable to trial where appropriate. In Lomax v Lomax (2019),616 the Court of Appeal 
determined that a court can order Early Neutral Evaluation (‘ENE’) under CPR 3.1(2)(m) even 
if both parties do not consent. Limiting the court’s power to order ENE to situations where that 
consent is forthcoming ‘would be inconsistent with elements of the overriding objective, in 
particular the saving of expense and allotting to cases an appropriate share of the court’s 
resources and would, therefore, be contrary to rule 1.2(b)’.617 A distinction was drawn between 
ENE, which is part of the court process, and mediation, which is outside that process.618 In 
Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust (2004), the Court of Appeal had stated that ‘to oblige 
truly unwilling parties to refer their disputes to mediation would be to impose an unacceptable 
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obstruction on their right of access to the court.’619 The court’s engagement with mediation has 
‘progressed significantly’ since Halsey,620 and it has been noted that Lomax ‘inevitably’ raises 
the question of whether, despite Halsey, the court might require parties to engage in 
mediation.621 Several judges have commented, extra-judicially, on Halsey, court powers 
regarding ADR and their relationship to the right of access to justice. Some take the view that, 
contrary to Dyson LJ’s obiter comments in Halsey, courts already possess the power to require 
non-consenting parties to refer their dispute to mediation or some other form of ADR.622 The 
case law suggests, however, that while courts are willing to make robust orders regarding ADR, 
they stop short of mandating it.  
 
In AB v Ministry of Defence (2009), the judge was referred to a ‘standard order’ in the 
Commercial Court requiring parties to take ‘such serious steps as they may be advised to resolve 
their disputes by ADR procedures’,623 although the order was determined to be inappropriate 
in that case because the parties had ‘already received the encouragement’ to mediate.624 In 
Honda Giken Kogyo Kaisha v Neesam (2009), the parties were directed to ‘use their best 
endeavours’625 to ensure that mediation took place, while in Uren v Corporate Leisure (UK) Ltd 
(2011), they were directed to ‘attempt’ mediation.626 In Garritt-Critchley v Ronnan (2014), an 
order stated that ‘the court considers the overriding objective would be served by the parties 
seeking to resolve the claim by mediation’,627 while in BXB v Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society 
of Pennsylvania (2020) a directions order stated that the parties ‘must consider’ ADR ‘at all 
stages’.628 In both cases, the orders were given teeth by requiring witness statements to be filed 
explaining why a party did not engage in ADR, to be relevant when considering costs.629 A 
similar order was made in SM v DAM (2014), in which the court stated that while it could not 
impose a mandatory order, it could ‘robustly encourage and coerce participation in ADR, 
specifically by making clear that costs sanctions might await parties who unreasonably refuse 
to do so’.630 In neither Garritt-Critchley nor BXB was the order complied with. On the other 
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hand, in Al Hamadani v Al Khafaf (2015), an order requiring the parties to ‘give consideration 
to resolving [the] dispute by means of ADR’ by a specified date was successful in respect of 
three of the defendants.631 In some cases, encouragement or requirements to consider ADR may 
be sufficient, while in others they may not. The relationship between ADR and case 
management is still evolving, as exemplified by the rule relied on in Lomax itself, CPR 
3.1(2)(m), to which express reference to ENE was added in 2015.  
 
How management decisions are expressed 
 
Management decisions must be expressed in an appropriate way. This in itself is a case 
management tool. Case management is a means of controlling parties’ future conduct and 
courts need to be able to tailor the way they do this to the circumstances of each case. The most 
common method is an order, whether this be a standard order, an order subject to conditions, 
or an unless order. A standard order states what parties must do and by when they must do it. 
Although no sanction is specified for non-compliance, parties cannot assume that there will be 
no consequences if they fail to comply, particularly in light of the post-Jackson emphasis on 
enforcing compliance. At the same time, a standard order may be more open to amendment, if 
for example it is the first order made on a particular issue and has not been made against a 
background of procedural difficulties or non-compliance. Orders subject to conditions allow 
the court to control future conduct by requiring parties to show tangible commitment to, or 
take on quantifiable risk in, the ongoing litigation. This can be done by, for example, requiring 
a party to pay money into court or escrow, or to provide security to their opponent. The court’s 
power to make orders subject to conditions632 is wide-ranging. There is no limit placed on either 
the circumstances in which the power may be invoked or the nature of the conditions that may 
be imposed.633 Conditions may, for example, include payment of outstanding costs orders,634 
compliance with further pre-trial directions635 or limiting claims to those that may be 
substantiated by specified evidence.636   
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A condition alone, however, may not be a sufficient control. Such orders may also contain 
specified sanctions for non-compliance. Sanctions are also an integral part of an unless order, 
as without the threat of adverse consequences the order has no more strength than a standard 
order. If there is a history of non-compliance then a party must be given an added incentive to 
comply. The most effective incentive is likely to be the risk of a party’s case or their ability to 
pursue it being negatively affected. The court’s powers when it comes to sanctions are 
flexible.637 However, they should not be too quick to prescribe sanctions: not every breach will 
require one.638 The post-Jackson emphasis on rule compliance and a corresponding greater 
reluctance to grant relief, rather than requiring stronger and more frequent sanctions to 
incentivise compliance, means that more care should be taken when prescribing sanctions to 
ensure that this is only done in appropriate cases.639 Sanctions must also be proportionate to 
both the breach in the event of non-compliance and to the circumstances of the case. The CPR 
gives the courts ‘the powers and the opportunities to make the sanction fit the breach’.640 In an 
application for relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9, the starting point is that the sanction was 
properly imposed641 and proportionate.642 The application of disproportionate sanctions may 
lead not only to inter partes injustice, for example by depriving a party of particular evidence 
or even of its ability to pursue its claim or defence, but also to systemic injustice by devoting 
too great a proportion of the court’s resources to applications for relief and related appeals. 
 
Courts also manage cases in more subtle ways. Judges may express views on how a case should 
proceed, or steps parties should take, without going so far as to make an order. A judge may, 
for example, encourage parties to think about how they wish to proceed by flagging the risks 
of a certain course.643 They may warn that the court will not look kindly on an approach that 
would interfere with the smooth running of the trial644 or use resources that would be better 
spent on other aspects of the case.645 A particular decision may be made to force parties to focus 
on whether certain future steps are necessary,646 or on the need to ensure that a trial is 
completed within a certain timeframe.647 This is a useful approach where it is not appropriate 
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638 Harrison v Laidlaw [2014] EWHC 35 (Ch) [43]-[44]. 
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640 Aktas v Adepta [2010] EWCA Civ 1170 [92] (Rix LJ). 
641 Mitchell (n 26) [44] (Lord Dyson MR). 
642 Walsham Chalet Park Ltd v Tallington Lakes Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1607 [32], [50] (Richards LJ). 
643 K/S Lincoln (n 527); Gamatronic (n 513). 
644 Art & Antiques (n 581) [14]-[15]. 
645 R (LXD) v The Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2019] EWHC 1264 (Admin) [24]. 
646 Teva (n 579) [26]. 
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 111 
to make a definitive order, but where the judge still wishes to control how parties act going 
forward. In R (LXD) v The Chief Constable of Merseyside Police (2019), for example, the court 
heard inter alia the claimant’s application to debar the defendant from adducing further 
evidence.648 The defendant was required to make a supported application, because there was 
not enough information before the court to definitively bar it from adducing the evidence in 
question.649 The court encouraged the defendant to formulate its application appropriately by 
stating that ‘the narrower and more focused its evidence, the more likely that it will be 
admitted’.650 In K/S Lincoln, the claimant applied to strike out part of the defendant’s case. The 
court decided that while strike out was not appropriate or possible at that time, it might be in 
future, stating in the course of that decision that the defendant should be aware of the 
associated costs risks of proceeding.651 In Spin Master Ltd, while it was not appropriate to make 
orders regarding ADR before evidence had been exchanged, the judge noted that once 
exchange had taken place, if either party refused to mediate, ‘it may need to explain why at the 
end of the trial’.652  Sometimes, it is not possible or appropriate to make a definitive decision 
on a particular point, but experienced judges will have a feel for where a matter is and should 
be going. These types of comments are a more flexible way of controlling the future progress 
of the case. If parties act contrary to such comments without a good explanation, they may in 
future face adverse costs consequences or other consequences detrimental to their case as a 
result, even though no order to that effect has been made. 
 
INSUFFICIENT CASE MANAGEMENT 
 
Many judges have accepted the need for active judicial case management, but this is not 
universally the case. Appeal courts have commented on first instance judges’ failure to control 
and manage cases. The Supreme Court emphasised the need for judges to use their case 
management powers, in the context of the issue of appropriate forum, in VTB Capital plc v 
Nutritek International Corp (2013).653 Lord Neuberger stated that ‘the judiciary is now 
encouraged to exercise far greater case management powers than 25 years ago. Accordingly, 
judges should invoke those powers to ensure that the evidence and argument on service out 
 
648 R (LXD) (n 645). 
649 ibid [26]. 
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651 K/S Lincoln (n 527) [38]. 
652 Spin Master (n 522) [22]. 
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and stay applications are kept within proportionate bounds and do not get out of hand.’654 The 
25-year reference is to the time since Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd (The Spiliada) 
(1981), in which Lord Templeman expressed the hope that jurisdiction disputes would in future 
be dealt with more economically and ‘submissions [would] be measured in hours and not 
days’.655 VTB Capital was litigated neither economically nor proportionately. That the Supreme 
Court saw fit to make the above comment in 2013, when the CPR had been in force for 14 
years, indicates that Lord Templeman’s comments had little impact, and that courts had not 
been using their case management powers in a sufficiently robust manner.  
 
The same issues arose in more recent cases. In Tugushev v Orlov (2019), a jurisdiction 
application generated ‘a depressingly vast amount of material’ and costs in the millions,656 with 
no apparent attempt by the court to control the scope of the proceedings. The Supreme Court 
dealt with the issue again in Vedanta Resources Plc v Lungowe (2019).657 The focus in that case 
was on the parties’ failure to litigate proportionately, rather than lack of court management, 
however the two do not exist separately from each other. Proportionate litigation requires co-
operation and appropriate action from both parties and the court. Nevertheless, as was made 
clear in VTB Capital, the court is to use its case management powers to keep ‘the understandable 
desire of lawyers to do, and to be seen by their clients to be doing, everything they can to 
advance their clients’ case’ in check.658 
 
Jurisdiction disputes are not the only context in which first instance judges have been criticised 
for not taking sufficient control. In DHL Air Ltd v Wells (2003), the judge did not take into 
account the proportionality of what was in issue, did not ‘take a proper grip’ of the case, and 
failed to identify the real issues and ensure the parties concentrated on them.659 Similar 
criticisms were made in Peakman v Linbrooke Services Ltd (2008), with the focus on trial 
management, where the trial took 12 months to complete and the judge ‘failed to exercise that 
degree of control over [the] proceedings which he should have.’660 The CPR gave him wide 
powers, which ‘unfortunately’ he did not use.661 First instance judges have been specifically 
criticised for not taking control of disclosure. The Court of Appeal in Keith not only said that 
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the first instance judge should have taken a more active role in disclosure requirements and 
the terms of disclosure orders, it also stated how he should have done it.662 In Edwards 
Lifesciences AG v Cook Biotech Incorporated (2009),663 the court and parties were criticised for 
not taking a sufficiently robust approach to disclosure. The defendant persisted in seeking 
disclosure of certain documents relating to a particular issue, but this was done in compliance 
with the judge’s directions, indicating that a disproportionate approach by parties can originate 
from a disproportionate approach by the court. The claimant produced a large number of 
documents, none of which the defendant deployed at trial. The answer to this issue was a ‘much 
more robust’ approach by the court and parties in not engaging in this sort of ‘futile exercise’ 
in the first place.664  
 
Apparent lack of case management is not confined to cases where there is explicit criticism in 
that regard by appeal courts. The CPR shifted responsibility for the progress and pace of 
litigation from the parties to the court,665 however in some cases courts continue to leave the 
majority of control in the former’s hands. This has manifested as, for example, emphasising 
that parties must take ‘all sensible steps’ to limit disclosure but imposing no requirements on 
the exercise,666 or stating that it ‘may well be’ that a claimant ‘will need to consider’ whether it 
should amend its case without imposing any deadlines where there is a tight timetable to 
trial.667 In Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc (2020), the court noted that it should not 
analyse the claimant’s evidence, indicate whether it was sufficient and, if necessary, give 
directions as to further evidence because it was ‘[c]learly … not for the court to advise a party 
on whether its evidence is good enough and, if not, how to plug any deficiency. The Claimant 
must decide for itself what evidence it wishes to produce.’668 The court may not be able to 
‘advise’ a party, but CPR 3 and CPR 32.1 allow the court to go further in controlling the issues 
on which witness evidence is submitted and the form of that evidence than suggested in that 
case.  
 
In Group Seven Ltd v Nasir (2016), in the context of costs management, the judge allowed 
contingencies in the claimant’s budget to reflect the possibility that there might be future 
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procedural difficulties attributable to a lack of co-operation from some defendants.669 The 
claimant argued that each defendant would raise every conceivable point and objection, and 
that there had already been procedural difficulties and delays due to a lack of co-operation.670 
On the one hand, this allowance for contingencies may be sensible, because the court cannot 
entirely control how parties conduct litigation. On the other hand, it suggests an overly relaxed 
approach, particularly where the defendants had already been unco-operative. No warnings 
were given to the defendants of the consequences of nonco-operation. Even where a court 
acknowledges the need for management, too much responsibility can be left with the parties. 
In McLaughlin v London Borough of Lambeth (2010), the judge noted that ‘the action calls for 
case management’, but ‘neither party … sought to address their concerns by inviting [the judge] 
to make limited case management decisions’.671 He said that he would ‘hear further argument 
from the parties, if they are so advised, as to the way by which the case should be managed so 
as to limit the issues to those which are relevant and proportionate’.672 The manner in which 
the case was to be managed, and indeed the extent to which it would be managed, was left in 
the parties’ hands rather than being controlled by the court. 
 
There are cases where time, money and resources may have been saved, or problems avoided, 
if the court had intervened at an early stage and taken a robust management approach. A fairly 
extreme example is where weak claims are pursued to trial,673 sometimes to the extent that 
pursuit of the claim contributes to an award of indemnity costs.674 The pursuit of such claims 
is a waste of both inter partes and systemic time and resources. This raises the question of 
whether the court can and should intervene earlier in order to bring these proceedings to a 
more proportionate conclusion. There are cases in which it is acknowledged that steps could 
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have been taken earlier to narrow the issues and statements of case.675 The question of 
narrowing issues and quantum has arisen several times in the context of indemnity costs,676 
with a significant contributing factor being the paying party’s persistence in pursuing a claim 
with the widest possible scope, for example taking every possible point and making 
unsubstantiated allegations.677 Through a focused approach and precise questioning at a CMC, 
based on comprehensive early information-gathering, it may be possible to identify these 
problems early on and make the orders necessary to narrow or remove issues. 
 
In the context of disclosure, in Re RBS Rights Issue Litigation (2015), the court noted that in an 
‘enormous disclosure process’, the defendant had placed too much emphasis on a ‘bottom up 
approach’,678 resulting in it being ‘beset and swamped’ with problems which might have been 
attenuated by bringing the disclosure exercise to the court.679 This case might have benefited 
from a controlled, top-down approach to disclosure being imposed by the court, rather than 
leaving application of the process to the parties. These comments were made after the eighth 
CMC, suggesting that there had been opportunities for the court to monitor and control 
disclosure, rather than waiting for the defendant to raise any problems. In a case much earlier 
in its progress, BMG (Mansfield) Ltd v Galliford Try Construction Ltd (2013), the court noted 
after allowing the claimant’s application to amend and to call evidence from a fresh expert that 
‘regrettably’ the case had not yet even been set down for its first CMC,680 yet imposed no 
requirements that this should be done.  
 
Underlying this approach that leaves control in the parties’ hands, there appears to be an 
acceptance that aggressive litigation is the norm. In Warner Retail Ltd v National Westminster 
Bank (2014) the timetable was ignored, ‘as happens all too frequently’.681 Only a short time 
before trial, the parties had been distracted by an interlocutory application, ‘as also still often 
happens’.682 The judge in Style Research Ltd v Factset Europe Ltd (2013) accepted that it would 
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be impossible for a preliminary issue or list of issues to be agreed, and that the case would last 
longer than the trial window, due to the ‘bitter and … wide-ranging’683 dispute, despite it being 
‘not beyond the wit of counsel to clarify the issues’.684 Comments by the Court of Appeal in the 
context of parties’ failure to attempt to settle or seriously pursue ADR give the impression that 
litigation is something of an uncontrollable force. Ward LJ in Egan v Motor Services (Bath) Ltd 
(2007) stated that it is ‘perfectly obvious’ what can happen if a matter that should be mediated 
is not: ‘[f]eelings are running high, early positions are taken, positions become entrenched, the 
litigation bandwagon will roll on…’.685 In Oliver v Symons (2012) Ward LJ, again, presented 
the two options of ‘a fair and sensible compromise’ and ‘an unseemly battle’ that would ‘blight’ 
the parties’ lives ‘for months and months to come’.686 In Assetco (2019), the parties fought the 
matter ‘uphill and down dale’ and took ‘every conceivable point that could possibly be taken’.687 
In an endorsement of parties’ entitlement to litigate as hard as they wish, the judge did not 
criticise this and gave it no ‘real weight’ in assessing costs because there was nothing in that 
approach that took the case out of the norm.688 In another recent case, Abramovich v Hoffmann 
(2019), the parties’ ‘tactical considerations’ were simply identified as existing, with no criticism 
made, because it was ‘not for the court to second-guess’ the parties’ motivations.689 It seems 
clear that the culture change underlying the introduction of the CPR has not entirely taken 
root.  
 
Several cases exemplify the dangers of leaving the progress of litigation to the parties. Agents’ 
Mutual Ltd v Gascoigne Halman Ltd (2019)690 and Centenary Homes Ltd v Liddell (2019)691 
indicate, in the context of disclosure, that parties may be unlikely to do something unless it is 
required by the court. In the former case, interlocutory applications arose from parties’ failure 
to engage with each other before implementing a search methodology, because the relevant 
order required no discussion or agreement in that regard.692 In the latter, the parties did 
collaborate to resolve outstanding issues, but only after court intervention. It was ‘unfortunate’ 
that this intervention was required: ‘the parties could realistically have found their own way to 
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the position that they are now in’.693 In Manchester Shipping Ltd v Balfour Shipping Ltd (2020), 
the parties agreed a nineteen-step pre-CMC timetable which did not deal with costs budgets.694 
This resulted in a lack of communication as to whether costs management would take place at 
the CMC and in the CMC being listed for too short a time.695 In Alibrahim v Asturion Fondation 
(2020),696 no order was made regarding agreed directions and no CMC was listed due to an 
oversight by the court. As a result, neither party was subject to any deadline for taking 
subsequent steps. The Court of Appeal identified this as a significant factor in the subsequent 
period of inaction, which was long enough to prompt an application to strike out for 
‘warehousing’.697 These cases highlight the risk that, if left to their own devices, parties will 
take neither the general approach nor specific steps required of them. This connects to the lack 
of compliance with CPR 1.3, considered below. The overlap between the cases considered in 
that section and those considered in this one is unlikely to be a coincidence. Lord Woolf 
recognised that active judicial management was required because party control of litigation 
caused excess cost, delay and complexity. The case law supports this and indicates that hope 
or exhortation that parties should co-operate or at least move the case forward efficiently will 
often be inadequate.    
 
III. JUDICIAL PROPORTIONALITY 
 
INTER PARTES PROPORTIONALITY 
 
Dealing with a case justly and at proportionate cost includes, so far as is practicable, dealing 
with it in ways which are proportionate ‘(i) to the amount of money involved; (ii) to the 
importance of the case; (iii) to the complexity of the issues; and (iv) to the financial position 
of each party’.698 The case law adds detail to these factors. It also reveals other inter partes 
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Relevant factors: CPR 1.1(2)(c)  
 
The monetary value of a claim699 is naturally a central factor in case management decision-
making. The fact that there are substantial sums at stake has been cited as a point in favour of 
allowing, for example, amendments to statements of case,700 evidence from more than one 
expert in a given field,701 expert evidence where a first instance court had determined that no 
such evidence was necessary702 or where a party had failed to comply with the deadline for 
service,703 and additional disclosure a week before trial.704 At the other end of the scale, low 
monetary value has been a relevant factor in, for example, refusing an application to vacate 
trial705 and refusing permission to amend a statement of case shortly before trial.706 The limited 
procedures of the small claims track will be appropriate for a low-value claim unless there is 
‘something other than value’ to justify reallocating it to a different track.707 Monetary value is 
identifiable and quantifiable, and as such is a convenient measure by which to assess 
proportionality, taking as a starting point that high value claims are more deserving of time, 
costs and resources. However, monetary value is not the only value assigned to disputes and 
parties do seek other remedies. Defamation claims, for example, are primarily about vindication 
of reputation and litigation in that context can leave a claimant out of pocket but still be 
worthwhile.708 In professional negligence claims, allowance must be made for non-quantifiable, 
but potentially serious, damage to professional reputation.709 Parties may also apply for 
remedies such as injunctions on which it may be difficult to place a monetary value. Even where 
a potential claim in damages or account is trivial, an action may be justified by the value of an 
injunction.710 Where a monetary value can be assigned, ‘it will be a rare case where it is not a 
significant factor’,711 but it is by no means the only relevant one.  
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The importance of a case712 is an aspect of value which cannot be quantified in monetary terms. 
Cases can be important to different people in different ways. Importance to the parties in itself 
has various aspects. If a party’s reputation turns on the result of a case, this may justify the 
expenditure of more costs and resources or the use of a more complex or time-consuming 
procedure. The potential for reputational damage may, for example, be a reason in favour of 
allowing in more expert evidence713 or a relevant factor in determining issues of timescale and 
imposition of sanctions relating to service of witness evidence.714 Where the underlying facts 
are particularly serious, this can also be relevant. The seriousness of the facts, or related distress 
to one or more of the parties, has been relevant in, for example, allowing in additional expert 
evidence,715 ordering specific disclosure,716 refusing additional evidence717 or dismissing an 
application to vacate trial718 because resolution must not be delayed. In Goodale, any damages 
awarded to individuals were likely to be small, but the claim involved a very serious allegation 
against a government department, making standard disclosure appropriate.719 Where the facts 
are particularly serious, they may justify a more substantial procedure even if the recoverable 
damages are ‘relatively modest’.720 This is not, however, always the case. In CXS v Chief 
Constable of Hampshire Police (2016)721 the underlying facts could hardly have been more 
serious, in that they related to alleged abuse. Nevertheless, the claimants were refused 
permission to amend their particulars of claim because by expanding the scope of their 
allegations, they put themselves at risk of costs consequences that would outweigh any benefit 
they might obtain.722 The seriousness of the factual context and the importance of a case to a 
particular party are simply factors to be weighed in the balance. CXS also raises the question 
as to whether parties are always able to see the most beneficial way forward, particularly where 
the underlying facts are serious, and whether the court is in such cases better placed to decide 
what would be in a party’s best interests. 
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Some cases are important to the public at large or the rule of law in general. The public interest 
in scrutinising the actions of police officers, for example, has been relevant to determining 
procedures for service of witness statements and sanctions for non-compliance,723 and has 
justified the employment of senior barristers and generally inform the proportionality of 
costs.724 In Komoka v The Security Service (2019), the importance of the case to the rule of law 
and holding the government to account was relevant to determining a proportionate resolution 
to disclosure disputes.725 Prosecuting claims for contempt of court can have a ‘salutary effect in 
bringing home … the importance of honesty in making witness statements and the significance 
of the statement of truth’.726 That a claim may have wider ramifications for the substantive law 
beyond its particular facts can provide a compelling reason for refusing an application or strike 
out or summary judgment and allowing the claim to proceed to trial.727 Benyatov v Credit Suisse 
Securities (Europe) Ltd (2020)728 cited AC Ward & Sons Ltd v Catlin (Five) Ltd (2009)729 on that 
point. In rejecting a submission that the claim had no prospect of success, the Court of Appeal 
had upheld a refusal to rule on a short point of construction of the terms of an insurance 
contract where those terms were standard and widely used in the insurance market.730 In some 
cases the lack of public interest will be relevant, for example Williams v Santander (2015) in 
which ‘something other’ than value was required for the case to be taken out of the small claims 
track.731 That ‘something’ was not importance: while the case was important to claimant, in 
that he wanted to get his money back, it had no overriding importance to the world at large.732  
 
The financial position of the parties733 can be closely tied to value and importance. Claims of 
the same monetary value may be of varying importance depending on how that value compares 
to a party’s financial resources. A particular result could have serious consequences for a party 
with relatively few resources. Whether a party may be unable to survive as a going concern734 
or forced into bankruptcy735 as a result of a particular decision, are factors to weigh in the 
balance. A relevant consideration in Priestley v Dunbar & Co (2015), in which an appeal against 
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dismissal of an application to set aside default judgment on liability was allowed, was that this 
was a substantial claim against a small company, such that the effect of a judgment on liability 
would be serious.736 In contrast, in Lacuna Edinburgh Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc (2017), one factor 
in not allowing the defendant to amend its statement of case to add another defence was that 
from the defendant’s point of view, the sum of money involved was not large.737  
 
The difference that a party’s financial resources can make was set out in Harrison v Pilkington 
(2019),738 in the context of the defendant’s adjournment application. If the claim had been 
worth a sum that would have had a significant impact on the defendant, or if the defendant 
had been of limited means, those points would have weighed in favour of granting an 
adjournment.739 As it was, the defendant was a corporate entity and the claimant an individual, 
factors which weighed in favour of refusing the adjournment.740 In Adelson v Associated 
Newspapers Ltd (2007),741 the well-resourced claimant applied for permission to add a claim 
for aggravated damages. Rich parties are as entitled to compensation as anyone, but the way 
the claimant had pursued the proceedings suggested that the financial outcome was not his 
primary consideration.742 The inference was that if the amendments were refused, any 
prejudice to the claimant in the form of lower compensation would not be significant to him. 
This was relevant to whether it would be proportionate to expend additional time and costs on 
investigating the new claim.743 Well-resourced parties may also be able to deal with time- and 
cost-intensive procedural orders which would be unmanageable for parties with more limited 
resources. In PCP Capital Partners LLP v Barclays Bank Plc (2020), the ‘extremely large legal 
resources’ on both sides meant that the expense of a disclosure order made a week before trial 
was not disproportionate.744 The position might well have been different had there been some 
resource inequality between the parties. 
 
The final factor listed in CPR 1.1(2)(c) is the complexity of the issues.745 Complex issues can 
require the expenditure of more time, costs, and both inter partes and systemic resources. 
 
736 [2015] EWHC 987 (Ch) [63]. 
737 Lacuna (n 706) [14]. 
738 Harrison v Pilkington (n 705) 
739 ibid [19]. 
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741 [2007] EWHC 997 (QB) 
742 ibid [85]. 
743 ibid [85]-[86]. 
744 PCP Capital (n 704) [118]. 
745 CPR 1.1(2)(c)(iii). 
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Complexity is not always in lockstep with value: a low value claim can be complex, and vice 
versa. An increase in value will not inevitably mean an increase in complexity, as exemplified 
by the court’s comments in CIP Properties (AIPT) Ltd v Galliford Try Infrastructure Ltd (2015).746 
While it might cost £300,000 or £30million to rectify defects, the expert evidence necessary to 
prove those defects and the reasonableness of any remedial scheme will be broadly the same.747 
The level of complexity is essentially the same, despite the difference in value. The complexity 
of the issues may rebut an indication that costs are disproportionate where a budget 
significantly exceeds half the value of the claim.748 Conversely, where a matter is 
straightforward, it will be more difficult to argue that high costs are proportionate.749  
 
Looking beyond costs to general case management, complexity can mean that additional 
evidence or time is required that may not be required in less complex cases. Some types of case 
may be more likely to have complex elements than others. Professional negligence claims, for 
example, will almost always require expert evidence, while commercial disputes may not.750 It 
is, however, important to consider the actual complexity of the case. Statements of case can be 
drafted in such a way as to make a simple case seem complex. The claim for negligence in 
Williams v Santander looked complex when ‘dressed up’, but ‘getting to the nitty gritty’ the 
central question was quite simple.751 The statements of case in Excel-Eucan Ltd v Source 
Vagabond System Ltd (2018) were lengthy, contrary to the requirement of the STS that they be 
simple and brief.752 The court had to look beyond that superficial complexity to identify the 
actual issues and whether they required extensive disclosure and evidence and a longer trial 
than permitted by the STS.753 Any eventual trial should be shaped to fit the issues, so that 
relatively simple issues are not dealt with at long and complex trials. The courts can, and indeed 
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Other relevant factors 
 
Additional factors relevant to inter partes proportionality, other than those listed in CPR 
1.1(2)(c), can also be identified. These can be divided into two categories: those related to the 




The court will consider whether the subject of a decision is relevant to the issues in dispute and 
the extent to which it will contribute to the resolution of the case. Amendments to statements 
of case may be allowed where they are closely related to the original pleaded case and do not 
materially extend the scope of the action or the issues to be investigated at trial.755 Conversely, 
lack of relevance may be a reason for refusing amendments. The inclusion of unnecessary 
material in a statement of case, which would increase disclosure obligations, risk the 
introduction of satellite issues and increase the expenditure of inter partes and systemic time 
and costs, to no useful purpose, is to be avoided.756 The same approach is taken to requests for 
further information.757 They can be refused where the information requested would neither 
affect the outcome of the case nor save time or narrow the issues in dispute.758 Relevance is 
not, however, a decisive factor. It may be that matters are relevant but that their inclusion is 
still disproportionate. In McLaughlin, the judge struck out parts of the claimant’s statements of 
case partly on the grounds of relevance.759 He stated that even assuming some of the matters 
pleaded were relevant, their inclusion would be disproportionate because the claim to which 
they related was not so large as to be proportionate to the likely cost of preparing and trying 
those issues.760  
 
Lack of relevance to pleaded issues can contribute to the court’s refusal to allow disclosure.761 
Irrelevant documents will not help the court resolve a dispute. Where standard disclosure has 
been given, and there is no basis for holding that there was any failure in that regard, this will 
support a determination that documents requested are not relevant because all relevant and 
 
755 Rothschild v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 3462 (QB) [61]. 
756 Tinkler (n 502). 
757 CPR 18. 
758 Hegglin v Person(s) Unknown [2014] EWHC 3973 (QB) [10]. 
759 McLaughlin (n 506) [108]. 
760 ibid [110]. 
761 Hegglin (n 758) [11]; Akebia Therapeutic Inc v Fibrogen Inc [2019] EWHC 1943 (Pat) [21]. 
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non-privileged documents should already have been disclosed.762 Disclosure can be a time-
consuming and costly exercise. The fact that a search is unlikely to reveal anything of relevance 
can contribute to determining that the expenditure of time and costs is disproportionate.763 On 
the other hand, the potential for discovering something of relevance can justify a complex, 
lengthy and expensive disclosure exercise. Even if that exercise involves looking for a needle in 
a haystack, it may be ‘a potentially very valuable needle’.764 Failure to comply with an unless 
order requiring disclosure of ‘probative’ documents that are ‘material to an important issue in 
the case’ can result in a party being debarred from defending the claim against it.765 The court 
must consider not only relevance, but to what a particular item of disclosure is relevant. In 
Tesco, it was noted that the central objective of the disclosure exercise was the disclosure of 
documents which went to the ‘real stuff of the case’.766 The additional disclosure requested was 
not necessary for the ‘fair disposal of the real issues’.767 Relevance will not, however, be 
considered in isolation. Even on the assumption that documents requested are relevant, specific 
disclosure may be refused where the circumstances of the case do not justify wide-ranging 
disclosure nor the time and work that it would require. and where there can be an ‘adequate’ 
investigation with the materials already available.768  
 
Relevance is a spectrum. There will be cases where particular disclosure is relevant to the issues 
in dispute, but, on balance, it would be inappropriate to commit time, costs and resources to 
its production and inspection. The court may consider whether documents sought will provide 
a significant amount of additional information beyond that which is already available.769 It may 
be disproportionate to order disclosure and inspection of documents which, in so far as they 
are relevant at all, largely duplicate what is already available.770 Documents may be relevant, 
and they may not entirely duplicate those already provided, but their relevance and originality 
may be insufficient to make disclosure proportionate. It may be unnecessary to search for 
documents of ‘marginal’771 and ‘peripheral’ relevance, particularly if the request is made late.772 
Where disclosure is provided, rather than requested, so close to trial that the receiving party 
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will not have a proper opportunity to investigate or respond, relevance needs to be of a 
‘compelling nature’ to justify admitting the new documents.773 When deciding whether a 
particular request or item is relevant, it is important to consider the purpose that the disclosure 
in issue will serve. Identifying illustrative evidence, for example, may require less data than 
estimating quantum.774 Even then, it may not always be worthwhile or proportionate to 
improve the accuracy of an estimate. Spending £30million to improve the accuracy of an 
estimate by plus or minus £5million is unlikely to be a ‘rational exercise’.775 
 
Relevance also comes into play when dealing with witness and expert evidence. A two-stage 
test for the admissibility of witness evidence was set down in JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell 
Navigation Corporation (2005),776 applying Lord Bingham’s principles in O’Brien v Chief 
Constable of South Wales Police (2005).777 The first stage requires consideration of whether the 
evidence is ‘potentially probative’ of one or more issues.778 If so, it is legally admissible, but can 
be refused under the second stage, in exercise of the court’s case management powers, if there 
are ‘good grounds’ to do so.779 Lord Bingham suggested three matters might affect this exercise 
of discretion, again summarised in JP Morgan v Springwell. The first is whether the new 
evidence will distort the trial and divert attention to collateral issues, the second the need to 
weigh potential probative value against the potential for causing unfair prejudice, and the third 
the need to consider the burden that admission would lay on the resisting party.780 Late witness 
evidence may be rejected where the court would not be ‘much if anything the wiser’ if it was 
allowed in, but it would require extra time and cost to be incurred.781 The court can allow in 
parts of witness statements relevant to specific issues while refusing others.782 It will consider 
whether the evidence in question will provide assistance in resolving the case which no other 
existing evidence can provide.783 If it is the only evidence on a particular point, the trial may 
be unfair if it is excluded.784 Duplication may mean that evidence is less likely to be allowed in, 
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however in some circumstances duplication may add ‘weight and gravity’ to a proposition, with 
the sum of duplicative evidence ‘exceeding the probative weight of the individual parts’.785 
  
Once again, relevance involves a spectrum. Evidence may not be allowed in where its relevance 
is ‘so limited and tangential’786 or ‘so marginal’787 that the benefit of admission would not 
outweigh the burden. Evidence may also be excluded where it raises issues different from those 
to be determined and, as a result, would distort rather than assist the court’s focus.788 As is clear 
from Lord Bingham’s suggestions, however, relevance is only one factor to be weighed in the 
balance. In Karbhari v Ahmed (2013), the defendant was refused permission to adduce a 
supplementary witness statement, despite the fact that the case could not continue without it 
and it would have been ‘pointless and absurd’ for him to present a case based only on his 
original statement.789 Other factors outweighed the importance of the supplementary 
statement, notably the defendant’s improper motives and the scale of his non-compliance 
regarding service of evidence. The proportionate response, rather than allowing in the 
evidence, was to strike out the defence, despite the seriousness of the allegations and the high 
value of the claim.790  
 
British Airways Plc v Spencer (2015)791 sets out a three stage test for the restriction of expert 
evidence to that which is ‘reasonably required to resolve the proceedings’.792 There is a sliding 
scale implicit in the assessment of what is ‘reasonably required’, from the essential to the 
useful.793 The court must first look at each issue and determine whether expert evidence is 
necessary, rather than merely helpful, for its resolution: if so, then it must be admitted.794 If the 
evidence is not necessary, but would be of assistance, then the court would be able to determine 
the issue without it.795 The third question is whether, in the context of the proceedings as a 
whole, expert evidence on the issue is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings.796 This 
third stage, as the court acknowledged, is a proportionality analysis which requires the court 
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to take into account factors such as the value of the claim, the effect of any eventual judgment 
on the parties and any delay that producing the evidence would entail.797 At this third stage, 
the court must consider not only relevance to a particular issue, but the importance of that 
issue to the case as a whole.798 Some issues may be central whereas others may be more 
peripheral. Some evidence may be admitted to resolve an issue if that issue stands alone, but 
it may not be reasonably required for the court to resolve all of the issues in the case.799 In 
Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd (2014), expert evidence was admitted that was helpful 
rather than necessary, but that evidence went to a central issue and might have been conclusive 
on that issue.800 A similar issue could arise in another case, but the issue could be peripheral 
rather than central,801 meaning that expert evidence was not reasonably required.  
 
Similar issues arose in Bulic,802 in which the claimant was permitted to adduce its own expert 
evidence rather than being compelled to accept the opinion of a single joint expert. The issue 
to which the expert evidence went was fundamental to the resolution of the main issue in 
dispute, and the saving of time and money inherent in using single joint experts is likely to 
assume greater significance in inverse proportion to the centrality of the issues.803 Where 
relatively peripheral issues are concerned, it is likely to be ‘only in unusual circumstances that 
the services of a single joint expert will be dispensed with’.804 In the context of survey evidence, 
the Court of Appeal stated in Interflora v Marks & Spencer (2012),805 and reiterated ‘more loudly’ 
in another judgment in the same action,806 that evidence of that kind should not be allowed 
unless it is likely to be of ‘real value’ and the likely value justifies the cost.807 In TJX UK v 
SportsDirect.com Retail Ltd (2019), after citing the Interflora cases, the court noted that the 
question of proportionality in this regard is not simply an arithmetic assessment of survey costs 
as a proportion of total costs: more important is the value to the court of the evidence in 
question.808 In both general and specific contexts, the main point is to determine whether the 
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evidence will be of sufficient value to the court to justify the burdens imposed by its production 
and admission. 
 
Case management decisions are procedural, but this does not mean that the substantive merits 
of a case are irrelevant. However, they are simply one more factor to weigh in the balance, 
rather than the primary consideration to which procedural factors are secondary. As 
highlighted by the Court of Appeal in Mann v Chetty & Patel (2000) in the context of an appeal 
against the refusal of permission to adduce expert evidence, it is not always easy to consider 
procedural issues without giving some thought to substance: 
 
It is no easy matter for a judge to assess proportionality without prejudging the 
claimant’s prospects of success. If the requirement in the Civil Procedure Rules is to 
have any effect at all, however, it seems to me that he cannot always take the 
claimant’s claim at face value and simply ask how the proposed costs relate to the 
claimant’s best case. The judge is entitled to take into account the broad ambit of 
the claimant’s likely recovery in the event that the claimant succeeds in his factual 
allegations. This is particularly so in a case such as this, where the trial judge will 
have to ask himself what the appellant would have been likely to achieve had his 
case been properly prepared and presented.809 
 
Where a party wishes to amend or add a new claim to its statement of case, that claim must 
have some prospect of success and not be based on ‘invention or mere speculation’.810 To allow 
in a claim that does not cross the arguability threshold would be ‘wasteful of the parties’ and 
the Court’s time and resources’.811 The attention paid to the strength and merits of the proposed 
amended case changes the later a party seeks permission to amend,812 in that the later 
permission is sought, the stronger the prospect of success must be. In the context of setting 
aside default judgments, the Court of Appeal has noted that the merits of a defence are ‘a factor 
which can be taken into account’.813 The more serious the length and character of any delay, 
the stronger the defence and the more convincing the supporting evidence must be to justify 
setting aside.814 In the context of security for costs, courts will have regard to a party’s prospects 
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of success, but should not go into the merits in detail unless it can clearly be demonstrated that 
there is a high degree of probability of success or failure.815  
 
The relevance of the merits to procedural decisions is not, however, something on which there 
is total agreement. In Abdulaziz, members of the Supreme Court disagreed on the extent to 
which the merits were relevant to whether the defence should be struck out due to non-
compliance with an unless order. Lord Neuberger, expressing the views of the majority, stated 
that:  
 
the strength of a party’s case on the ultimate merits of the proceedings is generally 
irrelevant when it comes to case management of the issues of the sort which were 
the subject matter of the decisions … in these proceedings. The only possible 
exception could be where a party has a case whose strength would entitle him to 
summary judgment.816 
 
Lord Clarke, on the other hand, said that ‘each case depends on its own facts and … it is almost 
always wrong in principle to disregard the underlying merits altogether as irrelevant’.817 He 
agreed with Lord Neuberger that the court should not conduct a trial of the issues when making 
case management decisions, but did not think that the relevance of the merits should be limited 
to cases where a party would be entitled to summary judgment.818  
 
In order to determine whether a party would be entitled to summary judgment, or whether 
they have a high possibility of success or failure, the court must spend some time considering 
the merits. Time and resources must be expended before the extent to which the merits are 
relevant can be determined. This may be a quicker process where a party has a particularly 
strong or weak case, in that the strength or weakness may be more obvious on the face of the 
statements of case or evidence. A more detailed investigation may be necessary where the 
relative strengths of the parties’ cases are more finely balanced. It could be argued that the 
more serious the consequence of a decision, the more relevant the merits should be. In 
Abdulaziz, for example, the consequence was a lost opportunity to defend a claim for 
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US$6million. Such a serious consequence could be said to be more disproportionate the greater 




These factors relate to features of the parties themselves and how a particular management 
decision will affect them. At the heart of many of them lies equality of arms, one of the core 
principles underlying the CPR. The need to ensure that parties are on an equal footing comes 
to the fore in various ways, with one of the most obvious being creating a level playing field 
where parties have different financial resources. As noted in Papa Johns (GB) Ltd v Doyley 
(2011), there ‘is not one law for the rich and another for the poor’.819 The context was the 
claimant’s application to rely on further witness evidence which, if allowed in, would require 
further disclosure and an extra day’s hearing. The claimant argued that any such consequences 
could be met by an appropriate costs order, to which the court replied that costs and who is to 
pay them ‘may be a relevant factor but cannot be conclusive’.820 This concept of costs being a 
‘universal panacea’ was left behind with the RSC.821 Litigation between two similarly resourced 
parties may proceed and need to be managed differently to litigation between parties with 
unequal levels of resources. Inequality of arms may, for example, weigh in favour of there being 
a trial of a potentially decisive preliminary issue on the basis that this would reduce costs, 
whereas on the same facts there would be no preliminary issue trial were the parties similarly 
resourced.822  
 
Another form of inter partes inequality is asymmetry of information. In respect of disclosure, 
for example, the nature of the parties’ businesses or activities may mean that a direct 
comparison cannot be drawn between the searches they have carried out. The fact that one has 
done more work does not of itself mean that the other’s efforts were inadequate.823 The 
disclosure exercise may carry particular importance for one party, for example in Vilca in which 
it was through disclosure that the claimants would secure sufficient evidence to be able to 
proceed with the case.824 This was the reason for the exercise being ‘time- and cost-
 
819 Papa Johns (n 781) [102]. 
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823 Digicel (n 472) [26]. 
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consuming’.825 In some cases, much of the relevant material will be exclusively within the 
control of one party,826 meaning that the disclosure obligation will be weighted more towards 
that party.827 The court must ensure that an overly-strict limitation of the scope of disclosure 
does not result in a party being kept in ignorance of important material.828 On the other hand, 
the fact that one party has a large amount of material is not a reason for adopting a procedure 
that could jeopardise the fairness of the proceedings: disclosure orders must still be 
proportionate, for example requiring specific disclosure upon request.829 This asymmetry can 
extend beyond disclosure, for example to expert evidence. The nature of the case and the 
witnesses required may mean that additional steps need to be taken to ensure the parties are 
on an equal footing. In S v Chesterfield (2003),830 for example, the claimant appealed an order 
directing that expert evidence be limited to a report from not more than one expert in the field 
of obstetrics on each side. If that order stood, there would be one obstetrician giving evidence 
for the claimant and three for the defendant. Although two of the latter would strictly be 
witnesses of fact rather than expert witnesses, they would in the course of their evidence be 
bound to refer to the practice of other obstetricians.831 This inequality, together with the 
importance, high value and complexity of the case, meant that it was appropriate for additional 
expert evidence to be allowed. 
 
Failing to deal with these inequalities would result in prejudice. The need to ensure that a party 
is not disproportionately prejudiced, or subjected to disproportionate burdens, is a major factor 
in case management decisions. Prejudice can take various forms. Amendments to statements 
of case may require the non-amending party to revisit significant steps already taken832 or 
undertake additional work,833 sometimes to the extent of preparing a whole new case at the 
same time as preparing their existing case for trial.834 This will require the expenditure of 
additional time and costs and may weigh against allowing the amendment. Conversely, if 
allowing an amendment or extension of time will not make a significant difference to the work 
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to be undertaken and costs incurred, or any such difference is not unreasonable, this will weigh 
in favour of allowing it.835 In CIP Properties (AIPT) Ltd v Galliford Try Infrastructure Ltd (2015), 
the court noted that prejudice to parties as a result of amendments will fall on a spectrum, 
ranging from being ‘mucked around’ at one end to the disruption of and additional pressure on 
lawyers in the run up to trial, and the duplication of cost and effort, at the other.836  
 
It is not simply a case of there being prejudice or no prejudice: the seriousness of the prejudice 
in context must be considered. Part of that context is the amount of work to which a party is 
already committed, including likely timescale and resource implications,837 and the work that 
a party should already have done.838 Taking this into account allows any additional burdens to 
be identified as accurately as possible. Determining how much additional work might be 
needed inevitably involves an element of conjecture, however it is ‘conjecture of the kind which 
is inevitably involved in all case management’.839 The amount of prejudice required to justify 
management decisions will vary. In the context of late applications to amend statements of 
case, where the explanation for lateness is weak, the amount of prejudice to the non-amending 
party that may justify refusal of the application will be less than if the explanation has greater 
merit.840 The court may need to balance prejudice accruing to both parties, as it did in Brown v 
Innovatorone (2011).841 The burden imposed on the defendant by allowing the claimant to 
introduce new allegations was balanced against the detriment to the claimant in being unable 
to pursue an important part of their case if the allegations were shut out.842 A fair balance was 
struck by allowing the claimant to introduce a limited number of new allegations.843  
 
Delay is a common cause of prejudice. The seriousness of the underlying facts may mean that 
delay in resolution is ‘intolerable’ for one party,844 or a party’s mental health condition may 
mean that greater weight is given to the prospect of having a claim hanging over them for a 
longer time, for reasons which are not their fault.845 A defendant’s worsening financial situation 
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may mean that the longer a trial is delayed, the lower a claimant’s chances of recovering 
anything even with judgment in their favour,846 or there may be real urgency to a party’s 
commercial position that justifies an expedited trial.847 Where a party has prosecuted an action 
quickly and proactively, the loss of a trial date on the ground of delay alone will cause that 
party to suffer ‘real and meaningful prejudice’.848 Delay may prejudice all parties in different 
ways, in which case those different types of prejudice need to be weighed against each other. 
In Gubarev v Orbis Business Intelligence Ltd (2019),849 for example, the claimant’s application 
for a split trial in a defamation case was refused. The claimants would potentially suffer 
prejudice if there was a single trial, because the need for further evidence would mean a delay 
in listing, which in turn would delay their achievement of vindication.850 However, the matter 
had already been delayed, in which context the additional delay was unlikely to be so 
substantial as to unfairly prejudice their wish for vindication.851 The potential prejudice to the 
defendant was that the claims against them would not be fully tested in court for a longer 
period of time.852 This outweighed the potential prejudice to the claimants.853  
 
Attempts to amend statements of case or submit evidence outside the prescribed timetable or 
close to a hearing date can cause delay. They may require the timetable to be amended or the 
hearing adjourned. Courts should be, and often are, slow to adjourn listed dates. This means 
that another aspect of potential prejudice is a party’s inability to sufficiently deal with new 
information as part of its trial preparation. It may not be possible for the necessary work to be 
undertaken in the time available,854 or imposing that additional work may disrupt the orderly 
preparation for trial.855 Where one party provides new disclosure on the eve of trial, procedural 
unfairness will result if the other party does not have a proper opportunity to respond or to 
investigate how to deal with the new documents in cross-examination.856 Where a party can 
 
846 Fitzroy (n 613) [25]. 
847 Nicoventures Trading Ltd v Philip Morris Produces, SA [2020] EWHC 1594 (Pat) [41]. 
848 Quah Su-Ling v Goldman Sachs International [2015] EWHC 759 (Comm) [90]. 
849 Gubarev (n 602). 
850 ibid [61]. 
851 ibid [74]. 
852 ibid [63]. 
853 ibid [71]. 
854 Cleveland Bridge (UK) Ltd v Sarens (UK) Ltd [2018] EWHC 460 (TCC) [25]; KMG International NV v 
Chen [2020] EWHC 1203 (Comm) [68]. 
855 GBM Minerals Engineering Consultants Ltd v GB Minerals Holdings Ltd [2015] EWHC 2954 (TCC) 
[22]; Davidson v Seelig [2016] EWHC 549 (Ch) [48]; Al Nahda (n 510) [22]; Lacuna (n 706) [13]; 
Cleveland (n 854) [25]; ADVA Optical Networking Ltd v Optron Holding Ltd [2018] EWHC 852 (TCC) 
[42], [47]; Donovan (n 832) [27]. 
856 Obaid (n 773) [35]. 
 134 
satisfactorily deal with new information before trial, this will be a factor in favour of allowing 
its admittance. This has occurred, for example, where the evidence in question is limited,857 of 
relatively low importance,858 or broadly similar to information already advanced such that little 
further evidence is required.859 In the specific context of expert evidence, this factor has been 
relevant where the receiving party’s expert had already opined or adduced evidence on the 
relevant question,860 and where they would not need to do much work to digest the new 
information.861  
 
The converse of this aspect of prejudice is the unfairness that could be suffered by a party by 
not being able to present relevant evidence. This may outweigh prejudice to the party on whom 
evidence is served. The procedural unfairness caused by late admission of evidence may be 
justified if the relevance of that evidence is of a ‘compelling nature’.862 The absence of some 
evidence may have such a serious effect on one of the parties that it will outweigh prejudice 
caused to the other party by late admission, such as in Gordon v Fraser (No.1) (2014) where 
the absence of certain evidence would have risked reaching the incorrect decision that the 
defendant was a thief.863 Similarly, in Razaq v Zafar (2020), where the fundamental issue 
related to a determination of dishonesty, it was important for the court to have a full picture 
rather than refuse admission of evidence that would leave the claimant ‘significantly 
hamstrung’ in the conduct of his case.864 The importance of being able to present all relevant 
evidence can also be important in other contexts. Where a split trial is ordered, the court will 
not be dealing with all of the issues and evidence at the same time. This may cause prejudice 
to one or both of the parties. In Gubarev,865 there was a risk that splitting the trial and deferring 
quantum issues may pressurise the defendant into settlement. They may not have wanted to 
risk the costs of a second trial without knowing the full extent of the damages claimed, and 
would have been unable to take an informed view as to whether the claimants would be likely 
to establish their losses.866 
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In some cases, a party may be prejudiced by being deprived of the opportunity to pursue all or 
part of their case. Sometimes, this will be too serious a consequence. Witness evidence may be 
allowed in,867 or amendments to statements of case allowed,868 because refusal would mean the 
effective termination of a party’s case. In GBM Minerals Engineering Consultants Ltd v GB 
Minerals Holdings Ltd (2015), amendments to the defence were allowed because, although the 
defendant would still have been able to defend the claim, the allegations in the amendments 
were so serious that without them there would be ‘extraordinary prejudice’ to the defendant 
and a risk of a ‘wholly unjust result’.869 The striking out of a claim, with the associated denial 
of an opportunity to have arguable claims determined by the court, has been held to be 
disproportionate where a claimant was not on notice that a sanction of that seriousness was 
available and had no opportunity to protest it.870 A similar determination has been made where 
the struck out claims would otherwise be statute-barred and the defendant had suffered limited 
prejudice.871 In Newland Shipping & Forwarding Ltd v Toba Trading FZC and Others (2017), 
refusing relief from sanctions in respect of an acknowledgement of service served over two 
years late would have had an ‘unusually disproportionate’ result, because it would have 
deprived the defendant of the opportunity to challenge a baseless assertion of jurisdiction 
against him.872 The consequence of bringing a defaulter’s case to an effective end may be only 
one consideration in determining whether to grant relief, but it is a ‘consideration of real 
importance’.873 A party deprived of a cause of action may be able to obtain a remedy from its 
legal advisers. The court should consider this,874 but it should not necessarily be given much 
weight. To ‘relegate a litigant to a claim against its advisers involves leaving the litigant to a 
claim based on loss of a chance’, which may be an unsatisfactory result.875  
 
Nevertheless, despite the ‘grave consequence’ of depriving a party of its cause of action, this is 
not necessarily a determinative factor.876 A party may have other avenues or defences that it is 
able to pursue.877 In some cases, grave consequences aside, it is a proportionate response. As 
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the Supreme Court stated in Abdulaziz, there is ‘undoubtedly attraction’ in the contention that 
preventing a party from challenging liability is a disproportionate sanction where that party 
appears to have a substantive defence.878 However, the importance of litigants obeying court 
orders is ‘self-evident’, and if persistence in disobedience would lead to an unfair trial, it seems 
hard to quarrel with a sanction that prevents the party in breach from presenting or resisting 
the claim.879 In situations such as that in Abdulaziz, where a party’s own failures or persistence 
in non-compliance underlie or contribute to the decision, the loss of the opportunity to pursue 
a claim or defence, or indeed the accrual of some less fatal prejudice, will be given less weight 
in the balancing exercise.880   
 
A final party-related factor is the parties’ legitimate expectations. All parties, and indeed the 
court, have a legitimate expectation that trial windows and dates will be kept.881 Parties are 
entitled to assume that they must meet and investigate their opponent’s case as pleaded882 and 
on the basis of evidence properly admitted in the proceedings, and to prepare their own case 
on that basis. This entitlement may weigh against, for example, allowing amendments883 or the 
admission of late evidence.884 The court will be particularly reluctant to allow a party to change 
its position in terms of how its case is pleaded or pursued where that change of position runs 
counter to previous assertions or actions on which its opponent was entitled to rely. In 
Benyatov,885 for example, a factor weighing against granting summary judgment was that the 
defendant’s actions prior to the application would have led ‘any reasonable observer’ to believe 
that a trial would take place.886 They were inconsistent with a firmly held belief that there was 
no part of the claim that should go to trial. In Rose, one reason for not allowing a late 
amendment was that the claimant sought to put forward an entirely different basis of claim 
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which they had deliberately chosen not to assert when proceedings commenced.887 They sought 
to do so after having repeatedly told the court and the defendant that they would not seek to 
take the action that lay at the heart of their new basis of claim.888  
 
A relevant factor in the decision-making process is that one party has acted in reliance on their 
opponent’s statement of case, evidence or assertions. As a result of that reliance, it would be 
unfair to allow the other party to change its position. Legitimate expectations pervade all 
aspects of litigation in that all parties expect their opponents, for example, to comply with rules 
and orders, to provide proper disclosure, to be truthful in pleadings and witness statements. 
Parties are entitled to conduct themselves accordingly. The court has similar legitimate 
expectations. Such expectations may therefore already be an implicit part of many case 
management decisions, particularly where the court considers questions of prejudice. In many 
cases, if a party suffers prejudice it will be because it conducted litigation in a certain way, on 
the basis of legitimate expectations, but those expectations were then thwarted by their 




Inter partes proportionality is arguably the easier aspect of proportionality to incorporate into 
case management decisions. It involves only the parties and instant case, in respect of which 
judges have, or can obtain, all the information needed to conduct the balancing exercise. A 
judge does not, however, have comprehensive information on the progress and resource 
requirements of other cases, which makes systemic proportionality more difficult to apply.  
 
Cases in which systemic proportionality is applied 
 
In various contexts, courts have acknowledged the balance that must be struck when 
considering systemic proportionality. The systemic effect of a decision has been weighed 
against, for example, the prejudice to a party in being deprived of certain witnesses,889 the 
court’s ‘instinct’ to have the fullest evidence available,890 the claimant’s right to a full trial of its 
 
887 Rose (n 449) [109]. 
888 ibid. 
889 Lorenzo v The Chief Constable of the West Midlands [2012] EWCA Civ 1863 [21] (Moses LJ). 
890 Lindsay v Debenhams Retail Plc [2014] EWCA Civ 630 [27] (Davis LJ). 
 138 
claim891 and the potential benefit to a claimant of a successful claim.892 This balance has been 
referred to in terms of a cost-benefit analysis.893 In Quah Su-Ling v Goldman Sachs International 
(2015), in the context of a very late application to amend, Carr J referred to the court striking 
a balance ‘between injustice to the applicant if the amendment is refused and injustice to the 
opposing party and other litigants in general, if the amendment is permitted’.894 This language 
highlights the fact that proportionality involves compromise, in that the achievement of 
perfection for some is rejected in favour of satisfaction for all.  
 
A central principle identified in Quah Su-Ling was that, where a late application to amend is 
made, the risk to a trial date may mean that lateness will of itself cause the balance to be 
‘loaded heavily’ against granting permission.895 One of the main contexts in which systemic 
proportionality is factored into management decisions is where a hearing or trial date is at risk. 
Case management decisions have been made so as to maintain a listed date, with one of the 
reasons being that adjourning would negatively impact the use of court resources and other 
litigants, in a diverse range of circumstances. These have included applications for permission 
to amend statements of case,896 to adduce additional evidence897 or to limit the evidence that 
an opponent can adduce;898 applications for security for costs;899 strike out;900 and, 
unsurprisingly, specific applications to adjourn.901 There are also cases where the fact that there 
will be minimal disruption to the court system and no adverse impact on other court users is 
expressly relevant to the analysis.902  
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The imminence of a trial date, and the associated systemic consequences of losing that date, 
can be a decisive factor, as exemplified by Murray v Devenish (2017) and Groarke v Fontaine 
(2014). In the former case, the first instance judge’s refusal of permission to rely on new expert 
evidence had to be understood in the context of concerns about lateness and the forthcoming 
trial. By the time the appeal was heard, that balance had changed, because the trial date had 
‘long gone’ and a new date had not been fixed.903 The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal 
because the first instance decision was within the judge’s discretion in the context in which it 
was made, but also determined that the claimant should now be entitled to introduce and rely 
on the new evidence.904 The evidence was relevant but refusing to admit it had been an 
appropriate result of the case management balancing exercise in the context of the imminent 
trial date. In Groarke, the court noted that if allowing the defendant to amend its defence had 
necessitated an adjournment, this would have made a ‘significant difference’ to the analysis.905  
 
Consideration of systemic issues is often confined to general comments, such as statements that 
there would be an ‘obvious effect on court resources’,906 an ‘impact on other court users’907 or 
‘disruption to the court and other court users’908 if a particular action were taken. Conversely, 
a judge might simply state that the impact on other court users would be ‘minimal’909 or that 
they would suffer ‘little or no prejudice’.910 Occasionally, however, judges have commented on 
specific listing issues. In Mandrake Holdings Ltd v Countrywide Assured Group Plc (2005), the 
court noted that the Chancery Division list at the relevant time was ‘already very full’ and there 
was ‘accordingly no leeway’,911 while in Fitzroy the judge went into some detail on his diary 
and how adjourning the trial would affect other litigants by leaving ‘a hole … of two weeks’.912 
In the majority of cases, it will be difficult to pinpoint precisely how the adjournment of a trial 
will affect court resources and other litigants. Judges do not have an overarching view of how 
those resources can be most efficiently assigned or a case-specific view of the requirements of 
all other cases before the court. Undertaking this sort of detailed analysis could itself be 
disproportionate. It is sensible to assume that vacating a listed date at the last minute will 
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usually have some deleterious effect on resources and other litigants. As noted in Gregor Fisken 
Ltd v Carl (2019), where the judge did not know what the state of the lists would be at the time 
fixed for trial and whether other useful work could be brought in, the very fact of having to 
relist a new trial and duplicate elements of the case to prepare for that trial would have an 
adverse effect on the administration of justice and the interests of other court users.913 
Approaching this assumption with a judge’s experience of how the lists are managed914 enables 
systemic considerations to be weighed in the balance without going into a detailed analysis.  
 
Most cases that consider systemic issues in the context of adjournment focus on the waste of 
court resources caused by removing a case from the list at the last moment and the inability to 
fill the resulting gap with another case. This is not, however, the only consideration. The court 
in Joint Liquidators of WR Refrigeration Ltd v WR Refrigeration Ltd (2017) noted that it might 
have been possible to bring in another case if an adjournment was allowed, but it was also 
important to bear in mind the fact that other court users had not had trials listed because of 
this case.915 In Warner, the court considered not only removal from the list but also the need to 
relist in the future.916 A late adjournment may have a broader systemic impact than the direct 
effect of removing a case from the lists. 
 
Concern about systemic considerations will not always result in refusal to adjourn or vacate a 
hearing. Judges may ameliorate their concerns by stating that any gap in the listings can be 
filled,917 although this may be expressed more as hope than certainty.918 Sometimes no such 
comments will be made but the hearing will, however reluctantly,919 be vacated. Inter partes 
factors can be weighed against systemic factors in situations where the balance comes out in 
favour of the former. Those factors have included, for example, the need to avoid a ‘highly 
unsatisfactory’ break between lay and expert evidence,920 the scale of outstanding disclosure 
issues meaning that the case would not be fit to be tried as listed,921 the ‘extraordinary prejudice’ 
to a party if they are not permitted to amend their pleadings to include very serious 
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allegations,922 and the risk that a damages claim may fail if an amendment is not allowed, 
where it is common ground that loss was caused by the defendant’s breach.923 These cases 
highlight an important point: systemic proportionality is no more important that inter partes 
proportionality. Systemic considerations are ‘only one factor relevant to the furtherance of the 
overriding objective’924 and there is no rule that where court resources and other litigants will 
be negatively affected those interests must prevail.  
 
In other cases, adjourning a hearing or trial may on balance be the systemically proportionate 
approach. In London & Henley (Middle Brook Street) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities 
and Local Government (2013), adjourning to allow settlement of a complex case, where the 
process was close to completion, would avoid the use of further court time in future.925 The 
court did, however, note the immediate detrimental systemic effect as the time could not be 
allocated to other cases, and stated that the circumstances were ‘truly exceptional’.926 In other 
cases, the court has factored in the resources that would be used should a claimant start a fresh 
action if amendments927 or the joinder of an additional defendant928 are refused. Systemic 
proportionality is a factor to be weighed in the balance and there will be cases where the 
balance comes out in favour of inter partes considerations. The crucial point is that it is weighed 
in the balance in the first place. 
 
Systemic considerations also become pertinent when courts are considering whether to order 
preliminary issue or expedited trials. In Steele v Steele (2001), Neuberger J set out ten points 
to take into account when considering whether to order a preliminary issue trial, the tenth 
being whether it was ‘just’ to order a preliminary issue.929 There is no explicit reference to 
systemic considerations in Steele. However, the court in Binstead v Zytronic Displays Ltd (2018) 
stated that when considering that tenth point, it is necessary to step back and consider the 
matter in the round, taking into account the Overriding Objective, including inter partes and 
systemic considerations.930  The earlier case of Lexi Holdings Plc v Pannone & Partners (2009) 
did not refer to Steele, but did highlight the importance of considering the use of the parties’ 
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and the court’s resources in deciding whether to order a preliminary issue.931 Ordering 
preliminary issue trials requires caution. They can seem like a way to save time, costs and 
resources for parties and the court. The preliminary issue trial will likely be shorter and require 
less work than a trial of all the issues. However, many preliminary issue trials have not been a 
success.932 The Supreme Court criticised the use of a preliminary issue trial in Woodland v Essex 
County Council (2013), noting that without it the matter ‘would almost certainly have been 
decided by now’.933 There is no explicit reference to systemic issues in the judgment, but it is 
clear that the case had used more resources than it should have done. In Bond v Dunster 
Properties Ltd (2011), the Court of Appeal noted that ‘[w]hile they have their value, it is 
notorious that preliminary issues often turn out to be misconceived, in that, while they are 
intended to short-circuit the proceedings, they actually increase the time and cost of resolving 
the underlying dispute’.934 In both that case and a subsequent one, Rossetti Marketing v Diamond 
Sofa (2012),935 the Court of Appeal stated that preliminary issue hearings will not be 
appropriate in the majority of cases. In Rossetti, the ordering of preliminary issues over-
complicated the matter, increasing expenditure of time, costs and resources.936 Considering 
these authorities, the judge in Binstead noted that he should ‘not be overly enthusiastic in 
assuming that the best outcome will occur should a preliminary issue trial take place’.937  
 
It is important to look beyond the immediate effect of a particular case management decision 
and consider how that decision will affect the case overall, and how in turn that will affect 
allocation of court resources. Ordering a preliminary issue or expedited trial will sometimes be 
appropriate from a systemic perspective. Resolving certain issues before others may mean that 
a case uses fewer court resources overall, for example if a claim will either end or potentially 
settle after resolution of a preliminary issue,938 or where early resolution of a discrete issue will 
narrow the scope and cost of the litigation.939 In some cases, however, this approach may lead 
to a case taking longer, costing more, and using more of the court’s resources.940  Where there 
is no significant difference between the timings for listing a preliminary issue trial and a full 
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trial, and a claim is ‘already … stale’, the systemic aspects of the Overriding Objective lend 
weight to bringing that claim on in its entirety as soon as possible.941 The court will need to 
balance inter partes concerns, such as having a particular issue resolved as soon as possible, 
with the disruption to the lists and other litigants that having one action ‘jump the queue’ may 
cause.942 As with many aspects of proportionality, this is not an ‘either or’ question. If 
preliminary issues are identified early, it may be appropriate to deal with them separately, 
where it is inappropriate to do so when those same issues are identified at a late stage.943 
 
In WL Gore & Associate GmbH v Geox SpA (2008),944 Lord Neuberger set down four points to be 
considered when deciding whether to order an expedited trial. The court must consider 
whether there is a good reason for expedition, whether it would interfere with the good 
administration of justice, any prejudice to the party not requesting an expedited trial, and any 
‘special factors’.945 The second factor includes the interests of ‘parties to other cases’.946 
Subsequent cases have referred to interference with the administration of justice where a trial 
is expedited as ‘inevitable’947 because such a decision will always involve ‘a degree of queue 
jumping’948 and queue jumping is assumed to be prejudicial, absent good reason.949 There is 
likely to be a large number of litigants who want their cases to be tried as early as possible, so 
there must be a good reason for expedition.950 Even if the court would have availability to bring 
a trial on swiftly, and there is no need to move other cases, the question must be considered as 
a matter of principle.951 Not all expedition is equal, as different degrees will cause different 
amounts of disruption. There should be no greater disruption than necessary to accommodate 
the degree of expedition sought.952  
 
Systemic issues have been considered and expedition has nonetheless been ordered where a 
party’s commercial position imports real urgency to the need for an early trial953 and where 
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there is a need to hear an application for injunctive relief before restrictive covenants come to 
an end, in order to avoid losing any benefit those covenants may have conferred.954 On the 
other hand, expedition has been refused where the requesting party has been slow to date in 
pursuing the litigation955 and where the parties were in the middle of a tender process in which 
the claimant might still be successful.956 In the latter case, the court thought that other court 
users might be ‘surprised’ to find that the claimant’s case had been given priority.957 In Law 
Debenture Trust Corporation Plc v Elektrim SA (2008), the court raised an important practical 
point: ordering an expedited trial may impose impossible working conditions and directions 
that may not work in practice and so would not be complied with, all of which would culminate 
in an application to adjourn the trial.958 This, of course, would not be a proportionate use of 
the court’s resources.  
 
Systemic considerations are not limited to decisions affecting trial listings. Use of court 
resources must be proportionate in the progress of a claim to trial, as well as the trial itself.959 
This means that courts will consider the disproportionate use of resources in the context of case 
management and interlocutory matters. Avoidable adjournment of CMCs wastes the court’s 
time, which is a factor to be taken into account when considering whether to grant relief from 
sanctions to a party whose behaviour contributes to such an adjournment.960 Concerns about 
future management being an inappropriate and inefficient use of court resources have 
supported decisions to refuse961 and allow962 permission to amend statements of case and to 
bring proceedings to an end.963 That a case has to date made ‘very significant calls on the court’s 
resources’, even if no hearings have been ‘imperilled’, can justify transferring the onus to a 
defendant to make out his case by applying to set aside a default judgment.964 The time and 
resources expended ‘behind the scenes’ to ensure that court business runs smoothly are also 
relevant, as exemplified by Richardson v Glencore Energy UK Ltd (2014). The parties wrote to 
the court the day before the first CMC to say that agreement had been reached on directions 
and to ask whether attendance was still required. Late requests such as this disrupt the ‘orderly 
 
954 Middlesbrough (n 951) [14]. 
955 Law Debenture Trust Corporation Plc v Elektrim SA [2008] EWHC 2187 (Ch) [7], [9]. 
956 Joseph Gleave & Son Ltd v Secretary of State for Defence [2017] EWHC 238 (TCC) [47]-[51]. 
957 ibid [50]. 
958 Law Debenture Trust Corp (n 955) [10]. 
959 Kings Security (n 827) [57]. 
960 Dass (n 381) [18]-[22]. 
961 Hague (n 833) [25]-[27]. 
962 Coral Reef Ltd v Silverbond Enterprises Ltd [2019] EWHC 887 (Ch) [32]. 
963 Bank of New York Mellon v Sterling Biotech Ltd [2014] EWHC 1889 (Comm) [13]. 
964 Hanson v Carlino [2019] EWHC 1940 (Ch) [21]-[23]. 
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conduct of the court’s business’, because each request must be put before a judge for 
consideration, meaning the listing section has to divert attention from other matters.965  
 
Disproportionate use of court resources can amount to an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal 
in Jameel, a defamation case, stated that ‘[a]n abuse of process is of concern not merely to the 
parties but to the court. … The court is concerned to ensure that judicial and court resources 
are appropriately and proportionately used in accordance with the requirements of justice.’966 
The question is whether the commitment of resources is proportionate to what is at stake, or 
whether ‘the game is worth the candle’.967 In Jameel, it would have been an abuse of process to 
continue to commit the court’s resources to an action where so little was at stake.968 The 
applicability of Jameel is ‘not confined to defamation’.969 It has been cited as authority for the 
general principle that a statement of case can be struck out pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(b) if it is 
‘pointless and wasteful including when the costs of the litigation will be out of all proportion 
to the benefit to be achieved’.970 More succinctly, it is authority for the court having jurisdiction 
to strike out ‘on proportionality grounds’.971 In cases applying this principle, a clear interplay 
can be seen between inter partes and systemic considerations. The court balances the inter 
partes benefit of taking the matter to trial against the benefit to the system and all court users 
if the time that would be used for this case is made available to others. The principle should 
only, however, be applied in ‘clear’ cases,972 highlighting the draconian nature of the strike out 
sanction.  
 
Several of the cases cited above involve unsatisfactory conduct by one or more parties, for 
example the making of very late applications to amend or failure to adhere to case management 
timetables. Where a party’s behaviour has systemic effects, those effects can increase the 
seriousness and consequences of that behaviour. This point was made in Denton.973 The Court 
of Appeal stated that in considering the seriousness or significance of a breach, it is relevant to 
take into account the effect on litigation generally.974 At the third stage of the Denton analysis, 
 
965 [2014] EWHC 3990 (Comm) [11]. 
966 Jameel (n 463) [54]. 
967 Schellenberg v British Broadcasting Corporation [2000] EMLR 296 [55]. 
968 Jameel (n 463) [70]. 
969 Higinbotham v Teekhungam [2018] EWHC 1880 (QB) [39]. 
970 Magdeev v Tsvetkov [2019] EWHC 1557 (Comm) [28]. 
971 Lloyd v Google LLC [2018] EWHC 2599 (QB) [104]. 
972 Liberty Fashion Wears Ltd v Primark Stores Ltd [2015] EWHC 415 (QB) [53]; Bayerische Motoren 
Werke Aktiengesellschaft v Kellmatt Ltd [2018] EWHC 2420 (IPEC) [6]. 
973 Denton (n 27) (Lord Dyson MR). 
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if the breach has prevented other litigation from being conducted efficiently and at 
proportionate cost, that will weigh in favour of refusing relief from sanctions.975 In Altomart Ltd 
v Salford Estates (No.2) Ltd (2014), for example, a delay of around 5 weeks in filing a 
respondent’s notice of appeal was not regarded as serious or significant because it did not 
disrupt the progress of the litigation or the business of the court more generally.976 In LBI HF v 
Stanford (2014), an application was made on the seventh day of trial for permission to call a 
witness and rely on a witness statement, which was refused. A relevant factor at both the first 
and third stages of the Denton analysis in that case was the effect that allowing the evidence 
would have in extending the length of the trial, and the inevitable knock-on effect on other 
litigation.977 In Lakhani v Mahmud (2017), the court was concerned with disproportionate use 
of case management time where the defendant served its costs budget a day late. It stated that 
the extent to which the impact of a breach on the parties and the court is minimised can affect 
the level of seriousness and significance assigned to that breach.978 A breach is not assigned 
one level of seriousness as soon as it occurs, which then remains static. If a party in breach 
takes steps to ameliorate the effect of that breach, they must consider the proportionate use of 
court resources and the interests of other litigants as well as their opponent. There are other 
cases in which the waste of court resources, in terms of other cases and litigants waiting their 
turn, have weighed against granting relief from sanctions.979 The sanctions regime lies at the 
heart of the CPR. It is essential that systemic proportionality form an integral part of that regime 
if it is to truly embed itself into the application and operation of the rules. 
 
Cases in which systemic proportionality is not applied 
 
There are instances where systemic concerns are relevant and yet they are not considered. 
Courts have adjourned or vacated trial dates without any explicit reference to systemic 
considerations, sometimes in response to adjournment applications made very close to the 
listed date.980 In Jumani v Mortgage Express (2012), it was stated on appeal that the first 
instance judge had not grappled with the question ‘at the centre of the application’ to adjourn, 
which was whether a fair trial could be had on the listed date in the absence of the defendant’s 
 
975 ibid [34]. 
976 [2014] EWCA Civ 1408 [22] (Moore-Bick LJ). 
977 [2014] EWHC 3385 (Comm) [33]. 
978 [2017] EWHC 1713 (Ch) [45]. 
979 Swinden v Grima [2014] EWHC 3387 (QB) [29]; Morgan v Arriva North West (unreported, 24 April 
2015) [39], [43]. 
980 Collins v Gordon [2008] EWCA Civ 110; Jumani v Mortgage Express [2012] EWCA Civ 1455; R (Twin 
Training International Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department) [2014] EWHC 1545 (Admin).  
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witnesses.981 This was not balanced against any adverse effects of adjournment on the court 
system and other litigants. The Court of Appeal also said that the first instance judge might 
have sustained a refusal to vacate had he ‘reasoned the matter properly’.982 There is no 
reference to whether such proper reasoning would include systemic considerations, and those 
considerations did not feature in the Court of Appeal’s analysis. Similarly, systemic 
considerations did not explicitly feature in the Court of Appeal’s analysis in National 
Westminster Bank Plc v Rabobank Nederland (2006), in which an appeal regarding amendments 
to statements of case was allowed where the first instance judge had been concerned with 
disturbance of the trial programme.983  
 
The Court of Appeal again failed to refer to systemic considerations in Collins v Gordon 
(2008),984 in which dismissal of an application to vacate was overturned. The first instance 
judge had noted the relevance of the Overriding Objective, including its systemic requirements. 
He took guidance from Practice Direction 29, specifically the statement that postponing a trial 
is an order of last resort.985 The Court of Appeal determined that he was ‘wholly wrong’ and 
ordered the trial dates to be re-fixed. Sir Paul Kennedy stated that because Practice Direction 
29 deals with a failure to comply with case management directions, the comment that 
postponement should be a last resort ‘does not really assist’986 where the application to vacate 
was based on availability of counsel and experts. Despite explicit reference by the first instance 
judge to the systemic aspects of the Overriding Objective, the Court of Appeal does not refer to 
them at all. The Court of Appeal again overturned a first instance decision that had considered 
systemic issues in Unadkat v West Bromwich Commercial Ltd (2017)987 and made no explicit 
reference to those issues in its re-exercise of discretion. Emphasis was given to the ‘overall 
leisurely approach’ taken by the parties prior to the application and the court considered 
detriment to the claimant of a short adjournment against that background.988 This is an inter 
partes-focused approach that gives no explicit weight to systemic interests. There are other 
cases where trials or hearings are adjourned with no explicit reference made to systemic 
 
981 Jumani (n 980) [15] (Laws LJ). 
982 ibid. 
983 [2006] EWCA Civ 1578 [30], [39] (Auld LJ). 
984 Collins (n 980). 
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986 Collins (n 980) [9]. 
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considerations in the underlying analysis.989 The lack of explicit reference is emphasised 
because it is not possible to tell whether systemic issues were factored in where, for example, 
the court simply states that ‘the overriding objective does require’990 that a matter be adjourned. 
Considering the inconsistencies in understanding of the Overriding Objective highlighted 
earlier,991 no assumptions can be made. 
 
Another context in which adjournment has been ordered without consideration of systemic 
issues is where a late application is made to adduce witness or expert evidence. Weight may be 
given to the importance of the trial judge having all relevant evidence before them,992 without 
prejudice to the parties if the evidence is refused and the trial date maintained being weighed 
against prejudice to the court system and its users if the trial is adjourned. In Sandisk IL Ltd v 
Kingston Digital Europe Ltd (2012), the judge stated that he did ‘not see how the overriding 
objective [could] be accomplished’ without allowing the evidence in question to be adduced,993 
but the lack of reference to systemic considerations suggests that the Overriding Objective was 
being considered in a solely inter partes context. This is supported by an earlier comment noting 
the parties’ views on keeping the trial date, with neither saying that ‘it is so important that it 
should be kept without regard to whether the case can be justly tried’.994 In Loanline (UK) Ltd 
v McIntosh (2017), in the context of a late disclosure application, the trial was vacated because 
‘[t]he court should not have to come to a determination on the merits of the rival cases without 
having before it the fullest possible picture of the relationship’ between the parties and their 
financial standing.995 With no mention being made of the systemic consequences of this 
decision, this appears to be yet another case where inter partes considerations and the ability 
of the court to resolve the matter on the merits are given precedence. 
 
There are also instances where the effects of potential future adjournments are considered on 
a solely inter partes basis. Additional disclosure searches were ordered in Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd 
v Cable & Wireless Plc (2008), with the judge noting that while it did not appear necessary to 
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re-fix the trial, if it did become necessary the claimants would have no complaint and the 
defendants would have to bear that consequence of their failure to carry out a reasonable 
search.996 The comments suggest that the court would be amenable to re-fixing but there is no 
indication of whether or how it was determined that this would be a proportionate use of court 
resources. In ARC Capital Partners Ltd v ARC Capital Holdings Ltd (2015),997 a stay pending 
challenge to and enforcement of an arbitration award was refused. The judge raised with the 
parties the possibility of vacating the trial date and ‘simply pushing the timetable back by six 
months’.998 This was concluded to be unsatisfactory, but depending on how matters progressed 
it would ‘of course always be open to the parties to come to the court’ and say that the trial was 
not necessary or could be reduced in scope.999 There is no acknowledgement of any potential 
systemic difficulties in fixing a new trial date and timetable, and the language suggests that if 
the parties wanted to vacate in future then the court would accommodate their wishes. This is 
not to say, however, that in these cases it would be inappropriate or disproportionate to adjourn 
the trials. The same is true in respect of all cases where trials or hearings have been adjourned 
or vacated. A court can consider systemic proportionality and determine that the balance falls 
in favour of adjournment or vacation. The point is that systemic proportionality must be 
considered, and in these cases it was not. 
 
Systemic issues form an express part of the guidance for decisions regarding preliminary issue 
and expedited trials.1000 This is not the case with split trials. Several cases1001 cite Electrical 
Waste Recycling Group Ltd v Philips Electronics UK Ltd (2012)1002 as setting down guidance on 
how the court should approach an application for a split trial. That guidance makes no 
reference to systemic considerations. The final ‘catch all’ point is that the court must consider 
‘generally, what is perceived to offer the best course to ensure that the whole matter is 
adjudicated as fairly, quickly and efficiently as possible’.1003 This can be contrasted with the 
position regarding preliminary trials.1004 The absence of systemic considerations continues in 
the cases applying the Electrical Waste guidance. In Gubarev, the judge did consider the increase 
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in court management time that two trials might entail,1005 but no consideration was given to 
whether it was a proportionate use of court resources. Hook v Sumner (2016) proceeded on the 
basis of an inter partes-focused interpretation of the Overriding Objective, with the judge stating 
that the court’s management powers ‘must be exercised in accordance with the overriding 
objective of deciding the case expeditiously and economically and in a manner that is 
proportionate to the matters truly in issue.’1006 These cases provide no indication as to why split 
trials should be dealt with differently to preliminary issue trials. Indeed, the two types of trial 
may sometimes be indistinguishable. A preliminary issue trial may serve a specific function in 
determining an issue the resolution of which is required before a matter can proceed any 
further, but that will not always be the case. The court in Gubarev used the terms 
interchangeably. Reference was made to the authorities warning against inappropriate 
preliminary issue trials,1007 but the guidance applied is that from Electrical Waste on split trials 
as opposed to Steele on preliminary issue trials.1008  Daimler AG v Walleniusrederierna Aktiebolag 
(2020), however, cites the Electrical Waste guidance as a ‘non-exhaustive list’ of relevant 
factors,1009 before noting that the court’s power under CPR 3.12(i) to direct a split trial must be 
exercised in accordance with the Overriding Objective, which includes considering systemic 
issues.1010 There is no reason why systemic considerations would be relevant to ordering 
preliminary issue trials but not split trials. Any discrepancies in approach are another example 
of inconsistency in the courts’ application of systemic proportionality.  
 
Failure to consider systemic issues can also be identified in a wider case management context. 
Hearing actions together, for example, could free up court resources for use by other litigants, 
but in Schutz (UK) Ltd v Werit UK (2009),1011 the court only considered the effect of this course 
on the parties. Inequality of arms in terms of financial resources meant that the just and 
convenient course was for the claims to be heard sequentially.1012 The fact that a case has 
already used a significant amount of court resources can be factored into how it is managed 
going forward. However, no such analysis was undertaken in A Khan Design Ltd v Horsley 
(2014), in which the claimant tried to pursue questions of costs and enquiries as to damages 
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two years after the conclusion of trial.1013 Nor was this done in BES Commercial, in which the 
matter had already been before the court for case management and in dealing with a disclosure 
dispute, the court ordered a further CMC to be listed.1014 A solely inter partes analysis can also 
be seen in cases where the court considers bifurcating the determination of jurisdiction 
issues,1015 the joinder of a new defendant,1016 strike out of a defence three months before trial1017 
and whether a claim for fundamental dishonesty after discontinuance merited a hearing.1018 It 
was noted above that one situation in which systemic issues may be relevant is where a 
particular decision would cause a party to commence fresh proceedings (with the concomitant 
use of court resources). There are also cases where it is noted that new proceedings may be 
commenced, but the resulting systemic effects are not considered.1019 This is not to say that the 
systemic considerations inherent in commencing separate proceedings would have changed the 
outcome of the analysis in those cases, simply that this was a relevant factor that did not form 
part of that analysis.  
 
Just as negative systemic consequences can affect the seriousness of a defaulting party’s 
behaviour, there are also cases where this is not considered. In Re Bankside Hotels Ltd 
(2014),1020 relief from sanctions was granted where, absent such relief, the defence would have 
stood struck out. The court went through the three-stage Denton analysis, but at no stage of 
that analysis were systemic issues considered. This is despite the evidence falling ‘not far short’ 
of establishing a clear course of conduct on the part of the defendant deliberately designed to 
delay the hearing.1021 Such conduct clearly has a systemic impact. The judge noted that he must 
consider the Overriding Objective but only specifically cited inter partes aspects. He went on to 
say that: 
 
An insistence on enforcing compliance with court orders in circumstances where 
there is no evidence of any substantial effect on the litigation and where it could 
not be said that as a result of non-compliance a trial has been put in jeopardy is in 
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my view not the right approach. It is expressly not so in the light of the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in Denton. To do so would be to ignore the need to deal with a 
case justly bearing in mind that the effect of refusing relief would be to prevent the 
respondents from defending these petitions. In my view it would not be just, fair or 
proportionate to refuse relief.1022 
 
Emphasis is placed on the trial being in jeopardy. Denton, however, goes beyond this. Lord 
Dyson MR made clear that the effect of a party’s breach on other litigation is an important 
factor at the first and third stages of the relief from sanctions analysis.1023 This did not feature 
in the analysis in Re Bankside Hotels or some subsequent cases. In Talos Capital Ltd v JCS 
Investment Holdings XIV Ltd (2014), the defendant deliberately caused delay which led to an 
urgent full day hearing,1024 but this waste of court resources was not factored into the relief 
from sanctions analysis. In Process and Industrial Developments Ltd v The Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (2018), the focus was on whether any prejudice to the claimant could be remedied in 
costs where late service of the acknowledgement of service late lead to additional hearings.1025 
In R (Plant) v Somerset County Council (2016), the defendant had not engaged ‘in any 
meaningful way’ with the claim for two years1026 and was unable to satisfy the first two stages 
of the Denton test, meaning the third stage was critical.1027 The judge noted that this was: 
 
precisely the sort of case in which the judge must consider all of the circumstances 
of the case so as to deal justly with the application including the need for litigation 
to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and the need to enforce 
compliance with rules, practice directions and court orders.1028  
 
In doing this, however, he only considered inter partes factors, notably negative effects on how 
the claimant would have to deal with his case.1029 Allowing the defendant’s applications would 
extend the length of the hearing,1030 but there was no comment on whether this would be a 
proportionate use of the court’s resources. 
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In some cases where systemic proportionality is not considered, the result of an inter partes 
analysis may be the most ‘systemically proportionate’ result. Inter partes factors that have 
contributed to a refusal to adjourn include cost consequences for the parties,1031 a lack of 
explanation for the change in circumstances underlying the application to adjourn,1032 a party’s 
failure to either instruct an expert promptly or obtain the information that the expert 
required,1033 the fact that there is sufficient time for parties to prepare for the hearing,1034 and 
that delay would prejudice one or more parties.1035 In these situations, the refusal to adjourn 
will mean that the court’s resources are not wasted and time that might have been assigned to 
an adjourned hearing can be assigned to other cases. This is a consequence of the court’s 
decision whether or not it is explicitly factored into the analysis. The absence of a systemic 
analysis here could mean one of two things: either the judge would never have considered 
systemic proportionality and it is by pure chance that the result is systemically proportionate, 
or it was determined that there was no need for an explicit systemic analysis because the result 
was systemically proportionate. In the latter case, there was a systemic analysis, it was merely 
implicit. If the latter were correct, this would raise a question as to why and how courts are 
using systemic proportionality, and whether it is sometimes used to reach a result that the court 
instinctively feels is right, but which cannot be reached on an inter partes analysis alone. This 
would mean that systemic concerns are still being treated as subordinate to inter partes 
concerns, because the former is being used as a means of reaching a desired inter partes result. 
It is not possible to determine conclusively whether this is actually the case, however the 
possibility lends further support to the need for more consistency in consideration of systemic 
issues. 
 
Assumptions and insufficient consideration of systemic proportionality 
 
The cases cited above reflect opposite ends of a spectrum: at one end, systemic issues are 
considered and at the other, they are not. There are also cases that fall between those two 
extremes. In some cases, the court will refer to the importance of maintaining a trial date or 
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avoiding delay, but will give no detail as to why this is important.1036 General comments are 
made, such as it being ‘in the public interest and in the interest of the parties that the fixed trial 
date be held’,1037 that losing the trial date would be the ‘worst case scenario’1038 or that a judge 
is ‘mindful of the need to preserve [the] trial window’1039 or ‘reluctant as a matter of case 
management to do anything that would cause the adjournment of the trial’.1040 The 
maintenance of trial dates has both inter partes and systemic importance, so reference to 
maintaining the trial date cannot be taken as evidence that systemic proportionality has been 
factored into the decision. References to the public interest or ‘the interests of justice’1041 widen 
the scope beyond the parties to a particular case, but these are general phrases which do not 
necessarily refer to systemic procedural justice. Maintenance of a trial date can be in the public 
interest because it is important for the public to know that if they bring a case to court, there 
will be certainty in terms of a set timetable and trial date. The phrase ‘in the interests of justice’ 
begs the question: ‘justice to whom?’. Without more detail, it cannot definitively be said that 
the reference is to justice to all users of the court system.  
 
In some cases, judges acknowledge that they must take systemic considerations into account, 
but do not factor them into the analysis when it comes to applying principles to the facts of the 
case. In Nottinghamshire and City of Nottingham Fire Authority, permission was given to admit 
evidence in response to an application made when the trial had been running for ten days and 
which resulted in an adjournment. The judge noted that ‘[c]ourt time which is wasted is lost 
to others who could have used it. Once a trial starts it is incumbent on the court to finish it as 
quickly as possible within the confines of the CPR.’1042 The analysis underlying the decision, 
however, refers only to whether an adjournment will cause an injustice that would affect the 
judge’s ability ‘properly to recall all the evidence and deal with it fairly as between the 
parties’.1043 In other adjournment cases courts have set out the need to consider ‘effective 
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management of the court’s case load’1044 and the benefits and disadvantages ‘for the court’,1045 
but then conduct the actual analysis on an inter partes basis only. In Bank St Petersburg v 
Arkhangelsky (2014), the court recognised the importance of the interests of other court users, 
noting that ‘nothing could be worse’ for either them or the parties to a particular case than a 
trial ‘which simply meanders and disintegrates’.1046 In the analysis underlying the adjournment, 
however, there is no consideration of the effects of removing the trial from the list or of re-
listing, and no balancing of these systemic effects against those that might result from a 
‘meandering’ trial. In several cases involving applications to amend statements of case, judges 
quote from the relevant authorities setting out the principles to be applied, which include 
systemic considerations where late amendment might affect the trial date, but then conduct 
the case-specific analysis on a solely inter partes basis.1047 The majority of these cases fall into 
the situation identified above, where an inter partes analysis has yielded a systemically 
proportionate result. In GBM Minerals, however, the trial was vacated with no systemic 
considerations having been expressly factored into the analysis.1048 
 
Adjournment is not the only situation where this issue arises. In Howard v Chelsea Yacht and 
Boat Company Ltd (2018),1049 the court considered whether there should be a preliminary issue 
trial. The judge referred1050 to Lexi Holdings, which references the importance of systemic 
considerations.1051 In conducting its analysis, however, the court focused on inter partes issues 
only, notably cost, delay, duplication of time and effort1052 and the defendant’s legitimate 
interests in having matters determined within a reasonable timescale.1053 A comparison was 
made between the amount of court time that would be used for a single trial on the one hand 
and a preliminary issue trial on the other, but there was no reference to what would be a 
proportionate amount of court time to allot to this case.1054 In Orange Personal Communications 
Services Ltd v Hoare Lea (2008), the court considered whether there should be a joint trial of 
 
1044 The Three Mile Inn Ltd v Daley [2012] EWHC Civ 970 [15].   
1045 Malhotra v Malhotra [2014] EWHC 4340 (QB) [4]. 
1046 [2014] EWHC 695 (Ch) [44]. 
1047 GBM Minerals (n 855); Mishcon de Reya (n 881); Cleveland (n 854); ADVA Optical (n 855); 
Montvale Invest Ltd v Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd [2018] EWHC 1507 (Ch); Keadby Generation Ltd v 
Promanex (Total FM & Environment Services) Ltd [2020] EWHC 2444 (TCC) 
1048 GBM Minerals (n 855). 
1049 Howard v Chelsea Yacht & Boat Co Ltd [2018] EWHC 1118 (Ch). 
1050 ibid [21]. 
1051 See above at 141-142. 
1052 Howard (n 1049) [45]. 
1053 ibid [56]. 
1054 ibid [46]. 
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two ‘intimately connected’ claims to allow for one to go through the relevant PAP process.1055 
It was noted that ‘the Court’s resources are a factor’1056 in considering the application of PAP 
requirements, but when deciding that it would be ‘unfortunate’ if the claims were tried 
separately, only the inter partes factors of additional cost, delay and the risk of inconsistent 
findings were considered.1057 The role of systemic considerations within the Overriding 
Objective was also identified in Simmons v City Hospitals Sunderland NHS Foundation Trust,1058 
but those considerations were not factored into the case-specific analysis of the claimant’s 
amendment application. These ‘spectrum points’ muddy the waters yet further in circumstances 
where the application of systemic proportionality is clearly inconsistent.  
 
IV. PARTY PROPORTIONALITY 
 
CPR 1.3 requires parties to ‘help the court to further the overriding objective’.1059 The 
Overriding Objective has a two-sided nature, with full implementation requiring engagement 
from parties and the court. In Price v Price (2003), the claimant’s failure to comply with CPR 
1.3 meant that the court was ‘deprived of the opportunity of managing the case actively in 
pursuance of the overriding objective’.1060 As stated in Phaestos v Ho (2012), ‘[i]t is important 
that all parties to litigation are aware that they are bound by the overriding objective … because 
the Court is seriously hindered in dealing with cases justly unless the parties and their legal 
advisers act in a way to enable them to do so.’1061 Despite this, there are numerous instances of 
parties failing to comply with CPR 1.3. Non-compliance begins before proceedings are issued. 
Parties fail to comply with pre-action processes, for example by not sending1062 or responding 
to letters before action,1063 holding back documents either by falsely asserting that they have 
 
1055 [2008] EWHC 223 (TCC) [32]. 
1056 ibid [31]. 
1057 ibid [32]. 
1058 [2018] EWHC 3931 (QB) [32]. 
1059 See ch 3 at 73. 
1060 Price v Price (n 636) [42]. 
1061 Phaestos (n 446) [5]. 
1062 Phoenix Finance Ltd v Federation International D’Automobile [2002] EWHC 1242 (Ch) 3; Daejan 
Investments Limited v The Park West Club Limited [2003] EWHC 2872 [14]; Sinclair v Dorsey & Whitney 
[2015] EWHC 3888 (Comm) [5]. 
1063 Aegis Group Plc v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2005] EWHC 1468 (Ch) [35]-[36]; Riniker v 
Employment Tribunals and Regional Chairmen [2009] EWCA Civ 1450 [19], [20], [33] (Smith LJ); 
Pepe’s Piri Piri (n 673) [38]. 
 157 
none to disclose1064 or failing to respond to reasonable requests,1065 and failing to engage in 
negotiations1066 or arrange a pre-action meeting.1067  
 
Non-compliance extends beyond the letter of the PAPs to the spirit of pre-action conduct. In 
Prior v Silverline International Ltd (2015), it was held that a party cannot automatically be said 
to have acted reasonably if it issues a claim when technically entitled to under a PAP.1068 The 
pre-2013 Road Traffic Accidents Protocol entitled a claimant to issue if the defendant did not 
reply to a letter of claim within 21 days. The defendant in Prior did not reply within that time 
and the claimant issued, but was not automatically entitled to its costs. Even though issue was 
legitimate, all the circumstances had to be taken into account, including significant pre-issue 
co-operation between the parties. Issuing the claim form in that context, even though 
technically permitted, was not within the spirit of the PAP.1069 That compliance must embody 
both the letter and spirit of a PAP is also exemplified by Pepe’s Piri Piri v Junaid (2019).1070 The 
court did not distinguish between a defendant who provided no response to a letter before 
action and one who sent the ‘barest of denials’.1071 In Thornhill v Nationwide Metal Recycling Ltd 
(2011), the claimant failed so completely to comply with the Pre-Action Conduct Practice 
Direction that the Court of Appeal noted that its provisions ‘appear to have been unfamiliar to 
the representative of the claimants’ solicitors who conducted this litigation’ and that ‘it is 
essential that all parties to any prospective litigation and their solicitors should take this 
Practice Direction seriously’.1072  
 
Courts have criticised parties for failing to co-operate with opponents after issue, including a 
lack of engagement with correspondence. Parties do not engage ‘properly with the logic of the 
other’s position’,1073 take a ‘consciously unhelpful attitude’,1074 do not respond to disclosure 
proposals1075 and fail to copy opponents into correspondence with the court regarding 
 
1064 Chapman v Tameside Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (unreported, 15 June 2016) [12]-[13]. 
1065 Webb Resolutions Ltd v Waller Needham & Green [2012] EWHC 3529 (Ch) [21]; Harrath v Stand for 
Peace [2016] EWHC 665 (QB) [62]. 
1066 Straker v Tudor Rose [2007] EWCA Civ 368 [31] (Waller LJ). 
1067 Higginson Securities (Developments) Ltd v Hodson [2012] EWHC 1052 (TCC) [26]; Frontier 
Agriculture Ltd v Wilkinson [2014] EWHC 2548 (TCC) [3], [19]. 
1068 unreported, 8 July 2015 [24]-[25]. 
1069 ibid [23]. 
1070 Pepe’s Piri Piri (n 673). 
1071 ibid [38]. 
1072 [2011] EWCA Civ 919 [44] (Sir Henry Brooke). 
1073 Ventra (n 826) [242]. 
1074 Brit Inns Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd [2012] EWHC 2489 (TCC) [59]. 
1075 Phaestos (n 446) [7]. 
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progression of the action.1076 These failures will cause problems for opponents and the court. 
Unco-operative attitudes increase expenditure of time and money and mean that a case takes 
up more of the court’s time and resources than it should. This is exemplified by Keith,1077 in 
which proper engagement by the claimant’s solicitors in correspondence regarding disclosure 
could have avoided later difficulties when the matter had to come before the court because the 
defendant allegedly failed to comply with an unless order.1078 Lack of co-operation extends 
further to failure to agree on issues and practicalities for disclosure,1079 failure and refusals to 
engage in ADR,1080 repeated failures to serve documents on time1081 and failure to agree a 
sensible timetable.1082 Engagement must be meaningful, a point made particularly clear in the 
context of failures to properly consider ADR and settlement. Courts have stated that ‘going 
through the motions will not be good enough’,1083 that ‘some attempt in correspondence 
between solicitors to settle’ may be insufficient,1084 and that ‘best endeavours … does not mean 
second best endeavours’.1085 Failure to co-operate also manifests as an insistence on 
maintaining a weak claim or an untenable position through to trial.1086 This would be far less 
likely to happen if parties fully engaged with each other with the genuine aim of bringing the 
dispute to a satisfactory close. These are all examples of the continuing prevalence of aggressive 
attitudes.  
 
As recently as 2019, a case generated  ‘a dispiriting volume of mistrust’ and ‘unfortunate 
hostility’, with the court reminding the parties that ‘[c]ourt proceedings are not a stage for a 
grudge match’.1087 They ‘ruin winners and losers alike’.1088 A similar situation emerged in 
 
1076 Artibell Shipping Company Ltd v Markel International Insurance Company Ltd [2008] EWHC 811 
(Comm) [70]. 
1077 Keith (n 547). 
1078 ibid [23]. 
1079 Centenary (n 691) [9]-[10]; Agents’ Mutual (n 690) [15]. 
1080 Burchell v Bullard [2005] EWCA Civ 358 [40]-[41] (Ward LJ); Painting v Oxford University [2005] 
EWCA Civ 161 [22] (Maurice Kay LJ); Faidi v Elliot Corporation [2012] EWCA Civ 287 [36]-[37] 
(Jackson LJ); Ghaith v Indesit Company UK Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 642 [26], [29] (Longmore LJ); 
Garritt-Critchley (n 627) [3]-[9]; NJ Rickard Ltd v Holloway [2015] EWCA Civ 1631 (Vos LJ); BXB (n 
627) [8]. 
1081 First National Trustco (UK) Ltd v Page [2018] EWHC 899 (Ch) [41]. 
1082 Buchanan v Metamorphosis Management Ltd [2016] EWHC 3386 (Ch) [36]. 
1083 AB v Ministry of Defence (n 623) [11]. 
1084 Ghaith (n 1080) [29]. 
1085 Honda (n 603) [39]. 
1086 Wates (n 673) [19]-[21]; IPC Media (n 673) [24]-[26]; NatWest v Rabobank (n 673) [66]; Igloo (n 
673) [27]-[28]; Richmond (n 673) [28]-[34]; Consortium (n 673) [53]; Imperial Chemical (n 673) 
[14]; Pepe’s Piri Piri (n 673) [39]; Hamad M Aldrees (n 673) [40], [43]; Lejonvarn (n 673) [56]-[65]; 
De Sena (n 673) [22]. 
1087 UTB v Sheffield (n 295) [6] (Vos C). 
1088 Gamatronic (n 513) [57]. 
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McTear v Engelhard (2016), in which there was ‘heated email correspondence between 
solicitors’, each accusing the other of inappropriate behaviour in the conduct of litigation.1089 A 
bad relationship between legal advisers was also an issue in MacLennan v Morgan Sindall 
(Infrastructure) Plc (2013), where it was no justification for a failure to agree sensible 
directions: the court was ‘entitled to expect legal advisers to co-operate in a pragmatic and 
sensible manner’.1090 There is little difference between these cases and the earlier case of King 
v Telegraph Group Ltd (2004), in which conduct of the litigation was ‘illustrative of what always 
tended to happen in the pre-CPR regime when litigation solicitors took up unnecessary time 
and incurred disproportionate expense in litigating aggressively in correspondence instead of 
conducting themselves within the structured framework provided by the rules.’1091 One might 
expect old attitudes to remain a few years after the CPR came into force, however they have 
persisted as the rules became more established. Indeed, as noted, judicial comments suggest 
that these aggressive attitudes are not only prevalent but accepted as the norm.1092 The judge 
in Lexi Holdings (In Administration) v Pannone and Partners stated that CPR 1.3 requires parties 
and lawyers to ‘put on one side their understandable feelings of mutual outrage and hostility, 
and to co-operate with each other in a process of preparation for trial which incurs only 
proportionate costs and uses no more than an appropriate share of the court’s resources’.1093 
The court does not expect there to be no hostility between parties, but it should not filter 
through into how they and their lawyers conduct litigation. 
 
Parties often try to gain tactical advantages over their opponents. In Petter v EMC Europe Ltd 
(2015), the Court of Appeal noted that there was ‘nothing particularly unusual’ about both 
sides using litigation to try to gain a tactical advantage.1094 This is not only an overly indulgent 
reaction to tactical litigation, but it also suggests that such an approach was still common. This 
too can begin before proceedings are issued. In Jet 2 Holidays Ltd v Hughes (2019), the claimant 
provided a dishonest witness statement pre-action aimed at eliciting an admission from the 
potential defendant that could be deployed in any subsequent proceedings.1095 Parties may 
conduct matters pre-action in such a way as to increase costs pressure on opponents1096 and 
have tried to obtain an order in respect of pre-action costs as a way of putting themselves in an 
 
1089 McTear (n 714) [11] (Vos LJ). 
1090 MacLennan (n 572) [12]. 
1091 [2004] EWCA Civ 613 [66] (Brooke LJ). 
1092 See above at 115. 
1093 [2010] EWHC 1416 (Ch) [7]. 
1094 Petter (n 950) [21]. 
1095 [2019] EWCA Civ 1858 [40]. 
1096 Chapman (n 1064) [15]. 
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advantageous position going into a mediation.1097 This is despite the statement in the Pre-Action 
Conduct Practice Direction that neither it nor any PAP should be used ‘as a tactical device to 
secure an unfair advantage over another party’.1098  
 
Once proceedings are commenced, attempts to gain a tactical advantage have taken the form 
of applying to adjourn in order to improve a party’s negotiating position,1099 making 
applications designed to obstruct an opponent in obtaining and enforcing judgment,1100 
unnecessarily opposing applications,1101 dragging litigation out through repeated non-
compliance to increase pressure on an opponent of limited means,1102 applying for a split trial 
to delay consideration of the sanction that should attach to a serious breaches of disclosure 
orders,1103 seeking to increase pressure on an opponent by repeated failure to particularise a 
case1104 and trying to impose significant additional work very close to trial.1105 In more than one 
case, a claimant has attempted to use its reply as a ‘Trojan horse’, essentially as a way to insert 
new claims into the proceedings by arguing that because they are included in the reply, then 
they must arise out of matters already in issue. This is an approach that ‘smacks of tactical 
manoeuvring’1106 and may lead to the court refusing permission to amend even if the threshold 
test is satisfied.1107  
 
One notable tactical approach is attempting to take advantage of minor procedural errors by 
opponents. In Raayan Al Iraq Co Ltd v Trans Victory Marine Inc (2013), the defendant attempted 
to exploit the claimant’s error in serving particulars of claim two days late by resisting their 
application to regulate the position, which the court described as ‘regrettable’.1108 Defendants 
also attempted to take advantage of a short delay in Summit Navigation Ltd v Generali Romania 
Asiguarare Reasigurare SA (2014).1109 The claimants were ready to provide security for costs 
 
1097 TJ Brent Ltd v Black & Veatch Consulting Ltd [2008] EWHC 1497 (TCC) [4]. 
1098 Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols, para 4. 
1099 Fitzroy (n 613) [11], [32]. 
1100 Talos (n 1024) [40]. 
1101 GBM Minerals Engineering Consultants Ltd v GB Minerals Holdings Ltd [2015] EWHC 3091 (TCC) 
[16]. 
1102 Hayden v Charlton [2010] EWHC 3144 (QB) [76]-[77]. 
1103 Byers v SAMBA Financial Group [2020] EWHC 853 (Ch) [114]-[115]. 
1104 Foley v Lord Ashcroft [2012] EWCA Civ 423 [42]-[43] (Pill LJ and Sharp J). 
1105 Abramovich (n 689) [34]. 
1106 Lokhova (n 496) [58]. 
1107 Compagnie Noga D’Importation et D’Exportation SA v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 
[2005] EWHC 225 (Comm) [41]. 
1108 [2013] EWHC 2696 (Comm) [18]. 
1109 [2014] EWHC 398 (Comm). 
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the day after the specified deadline, but the defendants refused to accept it and refused to lift 
the stay that had been imposed pending provision of security. The claimant’s default had no 
material impact on the efficient conduct of the litigation, but the defendant’s response had a 
substantial effect on the timetable and orderly management of the case.1110 Judgment in both 
of these cases was given prior to the Court of Appeal’s warning in Denton that litigants should 
not take advantage of opponents’ mistakes in order to gain ‘litigation advantage’,1111 however 
that approach continued thereafter. It can be seen, for example, in opposition to an application 
for relief as an attempt to have evidence shut out,1112 in a strike out application made after 
mistakes led to late service of particulars of claim in a breach deemed neither serious nor 
significant by the court,1113 and in an attempt to seek the benefit of a sanction for late provision 
of security for costs where the applying party had suffered no prejudice and was fully protected 
by that late provision.1114 The judge in GBM Minerals v GB Minerals highlighted the relevance 
of the warning in Denton beyond its immediate context of relief from sanctions and avoiding 
satellite litigation, stating that ‘it makes clear that seeking opportunistic advantage will not 
achieve the aim of efficient conduct of litigation’.1115  
 
Parties (or, more likely, their lawyers) can find ways to use new rules in a tactical manner. The 
rules on costs budgeting, for example, were introduced with the aim of enhancing the court’s 
ability to keep costs at a proportionate level. At the same time, an express reference to 
proportionate cost was added to the Overriding Objective. It could not have been clearer that 
the CPR 1.3 duty included compliance with the rules on costs budgeting. However, the court’s 
comments in Findcharm Ltd v Churchill Group Ltd (2017) suggest that parties still found ways 
to try to turn the rules to their tactical advantage: 
 
… even now, some parties seem to treat cost budgeting as a form of game, in which 
they can seek to exploit the cost budgeting rules in the hope of obtaining a tactical 
advantage over the other side. In extreme cases, this can lead one side to offer very 
low figures in their Precedent R, in the hope that the court may be tempted to 
 
1110 ibid [53]. 
1111 Denton (n 27) [41] (Lord Dyson MR). 
1112 McTear (n 714) [38]-[41] (Vos LJ). 
1113 Viridor Waste Management v Veolia Environmental Services [2015] EWHC 2321 (Comm) [22], [39]. 
1114 Everwarm Ltd v BN Rendering Ltd [2019] EWHC 2078 (TCC) [46]. 
1115 GBM Minerals v GB Minerals (n 1101) [18]. 
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calculate its own amount, somewhere between the wildly different sets of figures 
put forward by the parties.1116 
 
In Findcharm, the defendant’s Precedent R did precisely that, and was determined to be ‘of no 
utility’.1117 More recently, the Disclosure Pilot1118 aimed to further embed a culture change 
driven by concepts of reasonableness and proportionality, with emphasis on disclosure being 
focused on the issues in dispute. A party could seek so-called Extended Disclosure, an order for 
which had to be reasonable and proportionate.1119 In UTB v Sheffield, however, the defendant 
made a wide application for Extended Disclosure, after thousands of documents had already 
been disclosed, prompting the court to state that ‘[e]xtended disclosure is not … something 
that should be used as a tactic, let alone a weapon, in hard fought litigation. It is all about the 
just and proportionate resolution of the real issues in dispute.’1120 The defendant’s application 
was ‘outside the spirit’ of the Pilot.1121 It was noted in McParland & Partners Ltd v Whitehead 
(2020)1122 that some parties sought to use the Pilot ‘as a stick with which to beat their 
opponents’, an approach that was ‘entirely unacceptable’.1123 The inescapable conclusion is that 
if parties can find a way to use a new rule tactically then they will try to do so. 
 
The Supreme Court commented on parties’ tendency to conduct litigation in a disproportionate 
manner in Vedanta in the context of a jurisdiction dispute,1124 referring to cases in which 
warnings had been given about the need to litigate those issues proportionately and which had 
been ignored.1125 The written case in Vedanta ran to 294 pages, electronic bundles included 
8,945 pages, and there were 13 bundles of authorities. Lord Briggs, giving the judgment of the 
court, stated that: 
 
[t]he fact that it has been necessary, despite frequent judicial pronouncements to 
the same effect, yet again to emphasise the requirements of proportionality in 
relation to jurisdiction appeals, suggests that, unless condign costs consequences 
 
1116 [2017] EWHC 1108 (TCC) [3]. 
1117 ibid [9] 
1118 Practice Direction 51U. 
1119 ibid para 6.4. 
1120 UTB v Sheffield (n 294) [79] (Vos C). 
1121 ibid [97]. 
1122 McParland (n 621). 
1123 ibid [54]. 
1124 See above at 112. 
1125 Vedanta (n 657) [6]-[10]. 
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are made to fall upon litigants, and even their professional advisors, who ignore 
these requirements, this court will find itself in the unenviable position of beating 
its head against a brick wall.1126 
 
Jurisdiction disputes are not the only area in which matters are routinely litigated 
disproportionately. Parties often present cases to the court in an inappropriate and 
disproportionate way, providing huge numbers of documents together with long and complex 
skeleton arguments.1127 Vedanta is not the only case in which this sort of conduct has run 
counter to a clear judicial exhortation to litigate proportionately. In R (Network Rail 
Infrastructure Ltd) v The Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2017),1128 
the claim was accompanied by six volumes of documents, comprising over 2,000 pages of 
irrelevant material. At the hearing, only a court-ordered 250-page core bundle and five or six 
extra pages were required. The claimant’s skeleton argument was long, diffuse and often 
confused, lacked proper cross-referencing to the bundles, and buried the one ‘rather obvious’ 
point on which the claimant succeeded in two paragraphs within the discussion of an argument 
to which it did not belong.1129 The claim was presented in this ‘inappropriate manner’ despite 
the ‘clear statement’1130 in R (Newsmith Stainless Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions) (2001) on the need to limit the evidence in judicial review cases 
challenging decisions of planning inspectors.1131  
 
Parties must ensure that the material they present to the court is proportionate to the issue to 
be determined. Applications on case management decisions, for example, are not the place for 
an ‘extraordinary volume of paper … extravagantly long skeleton arguments … and … 
inordinate citation of authority’.1132 Looking beyond the materials presented to the court, courts 
have criticised parties for litigating too widely by making no attempt to narrow issues, 
quantum,1133 or the scope of procedural disputes.1134 In Vodafone, the parties failed to even 
 
1126 ibid 7. 
1127 Brudenell-Bruce v Moore [2013] EWHC 4408 (Ch) [5]; Tesco (n 558) [3]; Vneshprombank LLC v 
Bedzhamov [2019] EWHC 3616 (Ch) [5]-[6]. 
1128 R (Network Rail) (n 384). 
1129 ibid [8]-[9]. 
1130 ibid 3. 
1131 [2001] EWHC Admin 74 [6]-[10]. 
1132 Broughton (n 424) [2] (Lewison LJ). 
1133 JP Morgan (n 676) [13]; Digicel (n 676) [47], [60]-[63]; Euroption (n 676) [18]; Excalibur 
Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc [2013] EWHC 4278 (Comm) [6]-[9]; Courtwell Properties Ltd v 
Greencore PF (UK) Ltd [2014] EWHC 184 (TCC) [42]; Hart (n 675) [56]-[57]. 
1134 Lexi Holdings (In Administration) v Pannone & Partners [2010] EWHC 1416 (Ch) [6]. 
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address the scale of the proceedings in terms of both quantum and costs at the management 
stage.1135 Even if parties commence a case with a wide scope and numerous allegations, they 
must be willing to adapt this approach during the course of the litigation, for example if it 
becomes clear after disclosure and inspection that the scope must be narrowed.1136  
 
Another way in which parties fail to comply with CPR 1.3 is through delay, which can take 
many forms and occur at different stages. A party may, for example, deliberately fail to comply 
with agreed directions meaning that a trial date is lost,1137 repeatedly fail to provide the security 
for costs required for the action to progress,1138 fail to act with expedition in order to get the 
case to trial despite being aware that expedition is required,1139 or fail to provide particulars of 
core elements of its claim for so long that a fair trial is no longer possible.1140 In Multiplex 
Construction (UK) Ltd v Cleveland Bridge UK Ltd (2008), the litigation ‘dragged on for years’ 
after the parties ignored the court’s suggestion that they might seek a commercial resolution of 
quantum issues.1141 Delay can also be relevant in terms of trial time itself, for example in 
Peakman,1142 in which the trial took around a year to complete, with the advocates having ‘lost 
all sense of proportion in their conduct of it’.1143 ‘Unacceptably slow’ progress in pursuing a case 
is contrary to the underlying principles of the CPR,1144 one of the reasons being that delay has 
both inter partes and systemic consequences. Delays not only affect opponents, they prevent 
the court from managing the case and its resources effectively. Long delays inevitably generate 
applications that would not have been made had the litigation progressed efficiently and such 
applications cause the court’s resources to be expended unnecessarily.1145 Similarly, a party’s 
failure to grapple with its obligations in a timely manner may lead to both delay and 
unnecessary applications.1146 Many failures to comply with deadlines will ultimately lead to 
delay, but every delay will have consequences that are unique to the circumstances in which it 
occurs. 
 
1135 Vodafone (n 545) [19]. 
1136 Richmond (n 673) [28]-[30]. 
1137 Pantano v Super Nova Racing [2003] EWHC 255 (QB) [10], [28]; Smith v Wellington Court (n 919) 
[19], [28]. 
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1140 Djurberg (n 452). 
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1142 Peakman (n 660). 
1143 ibid [33] 
1144 Dass (n 381) [8] 
1145 Wearn v HNH International Holdings Ltd [2014] EWHC 3542 (Ch) [111]. 
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Delay is not the only way in which parties’ behaviour can have adverse systemic consequences. 
Failure to co-operate on disclosure1147 or on agreeing a timetable,1148 for example, may mean 
that disproportionate court time is devoted to interlocutory disputes. The taking of every 
possible point is likely to consume more of the court’s limited resources than is appropriate.1149 
The greater the volume of material produced by the parties and the less organised it is, the 
more of the court’s time is required to deal with it, all of which is time that cannot be allocated 
to other cases. In Adoko v Jemal (1999), the case came before the Court of Appeal in ‘complete 
disarray’ and the only way the appeal could proceed was through a ‘wholesale restructuring of 
the notice of appeal’.1150 This was not a proper use of the court’s time, and it was ‘neither 
appropriate nor just that any further share of the court’s resources should be allocated to a case 
conducted in this way’.1151 Without the restructuring, there were no grounds on which the 
appeal could proceed, so the notice of appeal was struck out. Laws LJ stated that it was 
‘disgraceful that [the Court of Appeal] should have been treated as it has been. The proper and 
proportionate use of court resources is now to be considered part of substantive justice itself.’1152 
Adoko came before the Court of Appeal only a few months after the CPR came into force. One 
might assume, or hope, that matters subsequently improved. However, that was not always the 
case, and there are more recent examples of cases in which an explicit connection has been 
made between parties’ behaviour and a disproportionate use of court resources.1153 As noted in 
Secker v Fairhill Property Services Ltd (2016), ‘the achievement of justice means something new 
now’. Parties can no longer ‘expect indulgence’ if they fail to comply with their procedural 
obligations, because those obligations serve the wider purpose of ensuring that other litigants 
can obtain efficient and proportionate justice.1154  
 
THE COURTS’ RESPONSE 
 
Judicial responses to this non-compliant and disproportionate behaviour by parties vary. To an 
extent this is understandable, because any response must be appropriate to the facts of a case. 
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EWHC 154 (Ch) [6]. 
1148 Buchanan (n 1082). 
1149 Kings Security (n 827) [14]; Brake v The Chedington Court Estate Ltd [2020] EWHC 694 (Ch) [3]. 
1150 (1999) The Times, July 8, 1999; 1999 WL 477353 5 (May LJ). 
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1153 Foley (n 1104) [43]; Excalibur (n 1133) [63]; Bank of New York v Sterling Biotech Ltd (n 963) [12]; 
Richardson (n 965) [9]-[10]; Secker (n 896) [30]; R (Network Rail) (n 384) [11], [25]. 
1154 Secker (n 896) [30]; Avanesov (n 880) [66]. 
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However, there is inconsistency on a more general level as to whether parties face any 
consequence at all for their behaviour. In some cases, the nature of the application means that 
a party’s behaviour can contribute to the striking out of its claim1155 or defence,1156 a refusal to 
grant an extension of time to allow a jurisdiction challenge,1157 a refusal to allow amendments 
and the addition of new causes of action,1158 a refusal to provide disclosure leading to judgment 
on liability,1159 or the loss of the benefit of certain evidence1160 or an interim remedy.1161  In 
many cases, the court’s disapproval sounds in costs, either in the form of an order against the 
non-compliant party or a reduction in that party’s recoverable costs. This may result from 
failure to comply with a pre-action protocol,1162 failure to co-operate in providing 
information,1163 taking an unhelpful attitude in correspondence,1164 attempting to take tactical 
advantage of an opponent’s short delay,1165 failure to act with expedition,1166 substantial and 
conscious failure to comply with directions1167 or acting unreasonably in pursuing parts of a 
case,1168 including pursuing a claim with no evidential basis, thereby having the case allocated 
to the multi-track instead of the small claims track, with the attendant increase in 
expenditure.1169  
 
A party’s disproportionate conduct will sometimes contribute to all or a proportion of costs 
being awarded to their opponent on the indemnity basis. Such contributions have been made, 
for example, by failure to engage in ADR1170 or accept a settlement offer,1171 repeated failure to 
 
1155 Pantano (n 1137) [28]; Hayden (n 1102) [75]-[80]; Wearn (n 1145) [133]; Sinclair (n 1062) [45]; 
Djurberg (n 452); WTA Global Holdings Ltd v Lombard North Central Plc [2019] EWHC 277 (Comm) 
[41]. 
1156 Foley (n 1104). 
1157 Talos (n 1023) [39]-[44]. 
1158 Lokhova (n 496). 
1159 Eaglesham (n 845) [46]. 
1160 Dass (n 381) [1]-[2]; Glaxo v Glenmark (n 576) [28]; Harrison v Pilkington (n 705) [20]. 
1161 EDO Technology (n 1139) [68]. 
1162 Daejan (n 1062) [20]-[21]; Aegis Group (n 1063) [45]; Charles Church Developments Ltd v Stent 
Foundations Ltd [2007] EWHC 855 [46]-[49]; Straker (n 1066) [42]-[43] (Waller LJ); Orange (n 
1055) [33]-[36]; Riniker (n 1063) [34] (Smith LJ); Thornhill (n 1072) [45]-[49] (Sir Henry Brooke); 
Higginson (n 1067) [29]; Webb Resolutions (n 1065) [23], [28]; Prior (n 1068) [25]; Chapman (n 
1064) [18]-[19]; Hart (n 675) [56]-[57]. 
1163 Price v Price (n 636) [42]. 
1164 Brit Inns (n 1074) [59], [62]. 
1165 Summit Navigation (n 1109) [63]. 
1166 Powell (n 1139) [19] (Potter LJ); Hart (n 675) [56]-[57]. 
1167 Smith v Wellington Court (n 919) [19]. [30]. 
1168 Pepe’s Piri Piri (n 673) [42]. 
1169 Peakman (n 660) [29]-[32]. 
1170 Garritt-Critchley (n 627) [10]; DSN v Blackpool Football Club Ltd [2020] EWHC 670 (QB); BXB (n 
628) [8], [11], [13]. 
1171 De Sena (n 673) [26]-[30]. 
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deal with disclosure issues,1172 delay in quantifying a claim,1173 unnecessary applications or 
adjournment caused by a party’s delayed approach,1174 or persisting in the pursuit of an overly 
broad claim that could have been narrowed1175 or a weak claim when the weaknesses should 
have been readily apparent.1176 In Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc (2013), a 
particularly extreme example, indemnity costs were awarded due to the claimant’s pursuit of a 
speculative and opportunistic claim that was ‘gargantuan’ in scope1177 and pursued as if it was 
‘an act of war’.1178 Solicitors sent ‘interminable and heavy-handed correspondence’1179 and 
provided unworkable trial bundles,1180 and the case proved an ‘enormous drain’ on court 
resources.1181 Where a party shows no regard for proportionality in its conduct of a case, it is 
appropriate to deprive that party of the benefit of a costs assessment that is subject to the 
limitation of proportionality.1182 While the award of litigation costs is intended to be 
compensatory rather than penal, it is in practice difficult to separate the compensation awarded 
to the receiving party from the censure of the paying party’s behaviour, and an award of 
indemnity costs may be viewed by the latter as punishment. The court has a wide discretion as 
to costs,1183 and may factor the conduct of the parties into any order.1184 As noted in Summit, 
costs orders can reflect a party’s ‘unreasonable conduct’ and can be used to ‘discourage’ 
inappropriate litigation behaviour.1185 
 
In some cases, however, there are no immediate, tangible consequences to parties’ 
disproportionate behaviour. The relevance of parties’ approach to litigation may stop at brief 
criticism, or simply identification, by the court.1186 In McTear, for example, the Court of Appeal 
 
1172 Phaestos (n 446) [45]. 
1173 ibid. 
1174 R (Kalah) (n 989) [16]; Serco (n 1146) [11]. 
1175 JP Morgan (n 676) [12]-[13]; Digicel (n 676) [47], [60]-[63], [68].  
1176 IPC Media (n 673) [24]-[26]; Wates (n 673) [25]-[26]; NatWest v Rabobank (n 673) [66], [71]; 
Consortium (n 673) [64]; Richmond (n 673) [28]-[34]; Imperial Chemical (n 673) [14]; Lejonvarn (n 
673) [67]-[68]; De Sena (n 673) [34]. 
1177 Excalibur (n 1133) 9. 
1178 ibid 12. 
1179 ibid 48. 
1180 ibid 60. 
1181 ibid 63. 
1182 Digicel (n 676) [68]; Euroption (n 676) [25]. 
1183 CPR 44. 
1184 CPR 44.2(4)(a). 
1185 Summit (n 1109) [63]. 
1186 King v Telegraph (n 1091) [35], [66] (Brooke LJ); Broughton (n 424) [2] (Lewison LJ); MacLennan 
(n 572) [12]; McTear (n 714) [38]-[39] (Vos LJ); Joseph Gleave (n 956) [2]; Ventra (n 826) [242]-
[243]; UTB v Sheffield (n 295) [6], [112] (Vos C); Brudenell-Bruce (n 1127) [5]. 
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identified ‘aggressive and unco-operative correspondence’ and ‘mutual suspicion’1187 between 
solicitors in circumstances where they should have co-operated regarding disclosure issues. 
This behaviour had no immediate consequence, and there was neither warning nor incentive 
given to steer the parties towards a more co-operative attitude once the matter was remitted 
for retrial. In Joseph Gleave & Son Ltd v Secretary of State for Defence (2017) and Brudenell-
Bruce v Moore (2013) the parties were criticised for underestimating the length of the hearing 
due to tactical applications1188 and ‘voluminous’ papers and issues1189 respectively, but in neither 
case did they face any consequences for this inappropriate use of court time. On occasion the 
court will highlight that parties must change their approach, for example stating that ‘both 
sides will need to demonstrate a much higher level of co-operation and realism’1190 if the case 
is to be ready for trial, that the parties ‘will need to keep proportionality in the forefront of 
their minds as matters proceed’,1191 or that they are asked to ‘reflect before raising yet further 
interlocutory matters, and to satisfy themselves that they are really necessary’.1192 These 
statements are not, however, accompanied by any concrete incentive to encourage that change. 
These cases generally involve disproportionate behaviour by both parties. Identifying effective 
consequences and incentives in such circumstances may not be easy, as it is not simply a case 
of penalising one party and compensating another in costs. A starting point might be a strong, 
specific warning about the potential costs consequences, even for ultimately successful parties, 
of future disproportionate behaviour. 
 
There is some overlap between cases cited in this section and those cited in support of the 
assertion that courts do not always take on the active management role required of them.1193 
Active case management was introduced because Lord Woolf determined that litigation could 
not be conducted proportionately if the parties were in control. It is unsurprising, therefore, 
that in cases where there is insufficient management an aggressive, adversarial approach wins 
out. Parties want to ‘win’ and will generally do everything they can to ensure this, whether it 
is expending large amounts of time, cost and resources where available, or taking every 
opportunity to obtain a tactical advantage. The court can step back and take an objective view 
of the case, something which parties and to an extent their legal advisers cannot do. Three 
 
1187 McTear (n 714) [39] (Vos LJ). 
1188 Joseph Gleave (n 956) [2]. 
1189 Brudenell-Bruce (n 1127) [5]. 
1190 Ventra (n 826) [243]. 
1191 UTB v Sheffield (n 295) [6] (Vos C). 
1192 Brake (n 1149) [3]. 
1193 See above at 111-117. 
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points can be drawn from this. The first is the importance of the combination of active judicial 
case management and proportionate litigating by parties. Judicial case management can only 
go so far, and there are some aspects of litigation that the court cannot control. The court 
cannot, for example, actually conduct disclosure exercises or prepare witness statements. 
Parties have the knowledge and information on which a case is based, and the court acts on 
the basis of that information. Secondly, there is a conflict at the heart of the CPR between the 
court’s and parties’ conceptions of proportionality. Finally, parties are likely to require 
incentives to police their own behaviour. These points must be acknowledged and understood 
if concrete improvements are to be made to the application of case management 
proportionality. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
 
It is suggested that three main insights emerge from the detailed analysis set out in this chapter. 
First, this analysis has revealed that over two decades after the CPR came into force, neither 
proportionality nor active judicial case management are fully integrated into the civil justice 
system. There are inconsistencies in judicial understanding of the nature of justice underlying 
the Overriding Objective, and in application of the active management role required by the 
CPR. The former manifests itself in the persistence of the primacy of substantive justice and the 
view that the court’s role is to do justice on the merits between the parties to the case before 
it. The latter manifests itself in an approach that leaves control and progress of litigation largely 
in the parties’ hands.  
 
Beyond these general points, the practical content of those inconsistencies has been identified. 
Application of the Overriding Objective’s concept of proportionate justice has been seen, for 
example, in the weighing of inter partes and systemic interests and in the balancing of different 
types of prejudice. The factors which the court considers when applying proportionality have 
been identified. It has been determined that they are not limited to those specified in CPR 
1.1(2)(c). On the other hand, an inappropriate inter partes focus has been found, for example, 
in late adjournment of hearings and in determining whether to order split trials. Where the 
court has taken on the active role required of it, it has been possible to see how cases are 
managed, for example by controlling the scope of a case and by appropriate encouragement of 
settlement and ADR. Practical tools for applying those management techniques have also been 
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identified. Conversely, it has been revealed that a failure to take on this active role is linked to 
acceptance that aggressive litigation remains the norm.  
 
The second main insight concerns the crucial role of the parties, and by extension their legal 
representatives, in ensuring that the court fulfils its management role and that litigation 
proceeds proportionately. Many parties do not comply with the duty imposed on them by CPR 
1.3. An aggressive approach to litigation is commonplace. This is despite clear judicial 
statements that parties must litigate in a proportionate manner, co-operate with their 
opponents, and assist the court in managing the case. Once again, the analysis has allowed us 
to go beyond general points and identify precisely how parties litigate disproportionately, for 
example by failing to engage in correspondence, refusing or failing to provide requested 
information, and providing too much material to opponents and the court. Another 
inconsistency has also been identified in the form of courts’ responses to disproportionate party 
behaviour, which range from simple factual identification to the imposition of indemnity costs. 
Identifying these inconsistencies and practical details is valuable in and of itself. It enables us 
to better understand the role and application of proportionality. However, that value is limited 
if problems are defined but then allowed to continue.  
 
The third insight is that the study has yielded a body of information that can be used to develop 
focused, realistic ways of dealing with the inconsistencies identified. It enables us, for example, 
to compile practical guidance on management techniques, and to target improvement measures 
at specific problems such as parties’ persistent pursuit of weak claims and judges’ failure to 
explicitly consider systemic proportionality. In Chapter Six proposals will be made, based on 
the results of this investigation, for combatting the problems and inconsistencies identified in 






















England is not the only jurisdiction to have faced issues of cost, complexity and delay in civil 
litigation, nor is it alone in looking to proportionality and judicial case management as solutions 
to those issues. Three other jurisdictions which have faced the same problems and identified 
similar solutions are the United States, Canada and Australia. These are common law 
jurisdictions1194 that were identified by both Lord Woolf and Sir Rupert Jackson as potential 
sources of inspiration for the reform of civil procedure. This chapter reviews how those 
jurisdictions have integrated those solutions into their respective procedural rules.  
 
Several points emerge that may assist with the issues identified in Chapter Four. They cover, 
broadly, case management powers and requirements, the obligations imposed on parties and 
lawyers, and the publication of guidance. The first of these can be broken down into three 
areas: docketing, compulsory case management language, and the role of settlement and ADR. 
Docketing was considered by both Lord Woolf and Jackson. Lord Woolf took the view that the 
lack of flexibility in judicial deployment inherent in docketing, combined with the structure of 
the English civil justice system, would make it difficult to introduce.1195 Jackson noted that 
consultations had been favourable to its introduction1196 and that from his own experience a 
docket system makes it ‘easier for the court to deliver a cost effective service to users’.1197 He 
recommended docketing of multi-track cases, so far as possible.1198 At that time docketing was, 
to an extent, already established in England,1199 notably in the Business and Property Court1200 
and the Technology and Construction Court.1201 When the Jackson reforms were implemented, 
it was thought that docketing would ‘play an important part in the future development of case 
 
1194 The exception is Quebec in Canada, which follows civil law principles. This will be considered 
where appropriate, as there are some aspects of the procedural rules in Quebec that fall within a 
broader pattern across the Canadian jurisdictions. 
1195 Woolf, Interim Report (n 214) ch 6, para 28; ch 11, para 3; Woolf, Final Report (n 224) ch 8, para 
13. 
1196 Jackson Preliminary Report Vol 1 (n 262) 118; Jackson, Final Report (n 262) 218, 232, 290, 294, 
388, 389. 
1197 Jackson, Preliminary Report Vol 2 (n 262) 434. 
1198 Jackson, Final Report (n 262) 392. 
1199 Neuberger, ‘Docketing’ (n 315) 14. 
1200 Jackson, Supplemental Report (n 290) 134. 
1201 Jackson, Final Report (n 262) 294-5. 
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management’.1202 As docketing has already been given significant consideration as part of the 
ongoing reform of English civil procedure, and its benefits recognised, the intention here is not 
to re-tread old ground. Attention will be given to other measures that may improve the 
application of case management proportionality.  
 
Some jurisdictions prescribe judicial management actions,1203 for example by mandating issues 
to be considered at management conferences.1204 Although some parts of the CPR do impose 
prescriptive requirements on the court, consideration will be given in the next chapter to 
whether they should be extended.1205 Another area in which rules can be prescriptive is that of 
settlement and ADR, and several jurisdictions take a stronger approach than England to forms 
of resolution other than trial. This includes requiring the court to consider options for ADR,1206 
and empowering the court to refer a matter to ADR without the parties’ consent.1207 Many 
jurisdictions also impose obligations on parties to consider ADR and settlement,1208 as well as 
how any such process must be conducted.1209 Similar powers and requirements could usefully 
be incorporated into the CPR.1210 Some jurisdictions also go further than the CPR in terms of 
the obligations imposed on parties and lawyers more generally, for example by detailing the 
content of litigation duties1211 and imposing certification requirements.1212 The CPR would 
benefit from a similar approach.1213 Finally, case management guidance has been published in 
the United States and Australia,1214 covering matters such as issues that judges may take into 
account when making management decisions, questions they may ask parties and lawyers, and 
practical management techniques. Similar guidance, the content of which will be considered in 





1202 Neuberger, ‘Docketing’ (n 315) 18. 
1203 See below at 174-175, 184-185, 191. 
1204 See below at 182, 188, 196. 
1205 See ch 6 at 229-232. 
1206 See below at 178, 188, 196. 
1207 See below at 178, 188, 195. 
1208 See below at 178, 187, 196. 
1209 See below at 196. 
1210 See ch 6 at 223, 225, 231. 
1211 See below at 185, 193. 
1212 See below at 176, 193. 
1213 See ch 6 at 223-224. 
1214 See below at 178-180, 197-198. 
1215 See ch 6 at 210ff. 
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I. THE UNITED STATES 
 
The United States (‘U.S.’) federal court system is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 1938 (as amended) (‘FRCP’), the life of which has been characterised by complaints 
about cost and delay.1216 They are the issues that the FRCP aims to combat and one of the main 
bases on which it has been reformed. The ‘scope and purpose’ of the FRCP are that it ‘should 
be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding’.1217 The word 
‘administered’ highlights the duty of judges and lawyers to ensure that civil litigation is resolved 
not only fairly, but without undue cost and delay.1218 The wording ‘… and employed by the 
court and the parties…’ was added in 2015 to provide an ‘aspirational goal to all participants 
in the legal system’.1219 In contrast to the CPR’s Overriding Objective, FRCP 1 does not identify 
expedition and cost-efficiency as being part of an overarching concept of ‘justice’, rather they 
are separate aims to be balanced with the aim of determining a matter according to justice. 
The reference to ‘every action and proceeding’ reflects an inter partes focus and there is no 
explicit reference to systemic concerns.  
 
Proportionality is central to discovery (i.e. disclosure) under the FRCP, which has long been a 
focal point for reform. Its role as a forum for abuse and the cause of high costs and delay is ‘a 
constant theme emerging from analysis of the civil justice system’.1220 Parties may only obtain 
discovery that is:  
 
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at 
stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant 
information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the 
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its 
likely benefits.1221 
 
1216 Robert G. Bone, ‘Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules’, (2010) 87(2) Denver 
University Law Review 287. 
1217 FRCP 1. 
1218 Patrick Johnston, ‘Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1’, (1995) 75(5) B.U.L. Rev. 1325, 1328. 
1219 John J. Jablonksi, Alexander R. Dahl, ‘The 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: Guide to Proportionality in Discovery and Implementing a Safe Harbor for Preservation’, 
2015 82 Def. Counsel J. 411, 432. 
1220 John L. Carroll, ‘Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary Tale’, (2010) 32 Campbell L. Rev. 455, 
455. 
1221 FRCP 26(b)(1). 
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These factors are identical to some of those relevant to the proportionality analysis under the 
CPR. The most recent amendment to FRCP 26, in 2015, saw the above wording moved from 
FRCP 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to FRCP 26(b)(1). There was no substantive change to the scope of 
discovery and no material change to the court’s or the parties’ obligations.1222 The problem was 
not with the text of the rule but with its implementation. The emphasis of the rule changed, 
the aim being to force parties and the court to confront discovery cost containment at the 
outset, and to balance utility against cost.1223 This highlights the fact that reforms do not have 
to be aimed at the substance of the rules. Changing in drafting and expression, for example 
amending the order in which obligations are set out or making explicit something that was 
implicit (as with the amendments to CPR 1.1 post-Jackson), is an alternative way to try to 
influence the conduct of parties and the court.  
 
Judicial management is a fundamental aspect of U.S. federal civil justice, with perhaps its most 
prominent aspect being the docketing system. This is a crucial lens through which to view U.S. 
case management, as a judge who knows that they will be dealing with all pre-trial aspects of 
a matter may take a different approach to one whose involvement is limited to a single 
interlocutory application. The FRCP gives judges wide management powers, but many are 
discretionary. Under FRCP 16, for example, the court ‘may’1224 order parties to appear for one 
or more pre-trial conferences, ‘for such purposes as’1225 expediting disposition,1226 establishing 
early control of the case so that it will not be protracted for lack of management,1227 
discouraging wasteful pre-trial activities,1228 improving the quality of trial through more 
preparation1229 and facilitating settlement.1230 A conference is not compulsory, nor is 
consideration of these issues at any conference that does take place. This does not, however, 
mean that the court is disengaged at the start of an action. In all cases, a scheduling order 
‘must’1231 be issued with certain required contents, namely deadlines for joinder, amendment 
of pleadings, completion of discovery and filing of motions.1232 These can be described as bare 
 
1222 Craig B. Shaffer, Ryan T. Shaffer, ‘Looking Past the Debate: Proposed Revisions to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure’, (2014) 7(1) Federal Courts Law Review 175, 192. 
1223 Jablonksi and Dahl (n 1219) 414. 
1224 FRCP 16(a). 
1225 ibid. 
1226 FRCP 16(a)(1). 
1227 FRCP 16(a)(2). 
1228 FRCP 16(a)(3). 
1229 FRCP 16(a)(4). 
1230 FRCP 16(a)(5). 
1231 FRCP 16(b)(1). 
1232 FRCP 16(b)(3)(A). 
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minimum case management requirements. Other matters ‘may’ be included,1233 for example 
modification of the extent of discovery1234 and setting dates for further conferences and trial 
itself.1235 These broad, discretionary powers mean that the effectiveness of case management 
will depend on the individual judge. The court’s management powers are, however, stricter 
and more prescriptive in the context of discovery. The court ‘must’1236 limit the frequency or 
extent of discovery if it is, inter alia, unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,1237 available from 
a more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive source,1238 or is outside the 
proportionality limits specified in FRCP 26(b)(1).1239 Such steps can be taken on motion or on 
the court’s own initiative.1240 One of the few compulsory items in the scheduling order required 
by FRCP 16 is a time limit for the completion of discovery, although there is no requirement to 
include limitations on the scope or extent of discovery. Practically speaking, however, because 
the court must limit discovery, any limits applied may well be included in the scheduling order. 
 
Complementing the court’s management obligations are duties placed on parties and legal 
representatives. Once again, a particular focus is discovery, in respect of which parties must co-
operate. They must meet and confer ‘as soon as is practicable’ to develop a discovery plan, to 
be submitted to the court before the scheduling conference takes place or the scheduling order 
is made.1241 The plan ‘must’1242 state their views and proposals on, for example, the subjects on 
which discovery may be needed, whether it should focus on particular issues, and whether a 
phased approach would be appropriate.1243 This obligation on parties to work actively to ensure 
that the discovery process is proportionate is also reflected in a prohibition on ‘boilerplate’ 
objections to discovery requests. Objections must be specific and reasoned.1244 Lawyers, and all 
unrepresented parties, must attempt ‘in good faith’ to agree the discovery plan.1245 Express 
requirements of co-operation and good faith are not limited to discovery. The court may 
 
1233 FRCP 16(b)(3)(B). 
1234 FRCP 16(b)(3)(B)(ii). 
1235 FRCP 16(b)(3)(B)(vi). 
1236 FRCP 26(b)(2)(C). 
1237 FRCP 26(b)(2)(C)(i). 
1238 FRCP 26(b)(2)(C)(ii). 
1239 FRCP 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
1240 FRCP 26(b)(2)(C). 
1241 FRCP 26(f). 
1242 FRCP 26(f)(3). 
1243 FRCP 26(f)(3)(B). 
1244 FRCP 34(b)(2)(B). 
1245 FRCP 26(f)(2). 
 176 
sanction a party or lawyer if they inter alia are ‘substantially unprepared to participate’ in a 
scheduling or pre-trial conference or do not ‘participate in good faith’.1246 
 
The FRCP also imposes certification requirements. By presenting a pleading, motion or ‘other 
paper’ to the court, a lawyer or unrepresented party ‘certifies that to the best of the person’s 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances’1247 the item presented is not presented for ‘any improper purpose’,1248 legal 
contentions are warranted1249 and factual contentions have or will likely have evidentiary 
support,1250 and denials of factual contention are warranted on the evidence or reasonably 
based on belief or a lack of information.1251 Once again, discovery is singled out for additional 
measures. FRCP 26(g) requires discovery requests, responses and objections to be signed, 
certifying that they are consistent with the rules and the certification requirements in FRCP 11, 
and that they are ‘neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the 
needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance 
of the issues at stake in the action’.1252 This is a certification of inter partes proportionality. 
These requirements mean that lawyers must think carefully about how they approach litigation 
and may help keep tactical litigation to a minimum.  
 
Unlike the CPR, the FRCP imposes no explicit pre-action obligations. However, the rules cited 
above mean that some pre-action work will be required. In order to comply with the 
certification requirements, the factual and legal basis for a claim must be investigated. Once a 
claim has been issued, it is likely to move forward quickly. A scheduling order ‘must’ be issued 
within the earlier of 90 days after any defendant has been served with the complaint or 60 days 
after any defendant has appeared.1253 Both the discovery conference and any scheduling 
conference must take place before that order is issued.1254 Being unprepared for the latter is an 
explicit basis for the imposition of sanctions.1255 Pre-action work will be required to determine 
 
1246 FRCP 16(f)(1)(B). 
1247 FRCP 11(b). 
1248 FRCP 11(b)(1). 
1249 FRCP 11(b)(2). 
1250 FRCP 11(b)(3). 
1251 FRCP 11(b)(4). 
1252 FRCP 26(g)(1)(B)(3). 
1253 FRCP 16(b)(2). 
1254 FRCP 16(b)(1). 
1255 FRCP 16(f). 
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the nature of the case and the potential scope of discovery and evidence in order that these 
milestones may be met.  
 
Judges have broad jurisdiction to sanction parties and legal representatives for non-compliance, 
either on motion or on their own initiative.1256 There is generally no requirement to impose 
sanctions, although a notable exception is where discovery has been improperly certified.1257 
The mandatory nature of this sanction is, however, tempered by the fact that the violation must 
have been ‘without substantial justification’.1258 The nature of any sanction is at the court’s 
discretion. Sanctions for breach of certification requirements, for example, ‘may include’ an 
order to pay legal costs resulting from the violation or ‘nonmonetary directives’,1259 ranging 
from admonitions to merits penalties.1260 If a party or lawyer fails to obey a scheduling or pre-
trial order, the court may issue ‘any just orders’.1261 Failures to make disclosures, co-operate in 
discovery and obey disclosure orders may result in a range of sanctions, including payment of 
expenses, prohibitions on introducing designated matters into evidence and strike out or 
dismissal.1262 Sanctions must, however, be proportionate to the seriousness of the violation. 
This is reflected in references to ‘just orders’1263 and ‘appropriate sanctions’,1264 and the 
statement that sanctions under FRCP 11 ‘must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of 
the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated’.1265 Imposition of sanctions is 
reviewable for abuse of discretion,1266  as are other case management decisions such as refusals 
to extend deadlines or to allow late filings.1267 This is a difficult standard to meet. U.S. appeal 
courts take a similar approach to those in England and are ‘especially reluctant’ to interfere 




1257 FRCP 26(g). 
1258 FRCP 26(g)(3); Steven S. Gensler and Lumen N. Mulligan, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 
and Commentary, Rule 26. 
1259 FRCP 11(c)(4). 
1260 FRCP Commentary n.63 Rule 11. 
1261 FRCP 16(f)(1). 
1262 FRCP 37(b)(2); FRCP 37(c)(1). 
1263 FRCP 16(f)(1); FRCP 37(b)(2)(A). 
1264 FRCP 26(g)(3); FRCP 37(c)(1)(C). 
1265 FRPC 11(c)(4). 
1266 FRCP Commentary n.63 Rule 11, Rule 16. 
1267 FRCP Commentary n.63 Rule 16. 
1268 Hussain v Nicholson, 435 F.3d 359, 365; Gensler and Mulligan (n 1258) Rule 16.  
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Federal civil cases are ‘virtually never’ resolved through trial.1269 ADR and settlement have been 
prominent in U.S. procedural law for some time. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 1998 
(the ‘ADR Act’) requires every district court to provide parties in civil cases with ‘at least one’ 
ADR process.1270 One express purpose of the scheduling conference is ‘facilitating 
settlement’.1271 The court may, at that conference, take appropriate action in ‘settling the case 
and using special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when authorised by statute or 
local rule’.1272 Party consent is not required, and the court may compel attendance at a 
conference to consider possible settlement.1273 The ADR Act requires parties to consider an ADR 
process ‘at an appropriate stage in the litigation’.1274 At the discovery conference, they must 
also ‘consider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities of promptly 
settling or resolving the case’.1275 There is no requirement for parties to inform the court that 
such discussions have taken place, but it seems likely that an active management judge might 
ask them to confirm this at the scheduling conference. 
 
Guidance on practical management techniques has been published in the U.S.1276 Matters for 
consideration at the scheduling conference are listed.1277 Actions are suggested for narrowing 
or defining issues,1278 such as requiring counsel to list the essential elements of the cause of 
action, requiring parties to present statements of contentions with supporting facts and 
evidence,1279 and asking direct and leading questions at the conference.1280 Examples of limits 
on discovery are provided, such as phased, sequenced or targeted approaches,1281 prioritising 
by subject matter1282 and sequencing by parties.1283 Means of encouraging settlement are 
 
1269 J. Maria Glover, ‘The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement’, (2012) 87(6) NYU L. Rev. 1713, 1716. 
1270 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 1998 §652(a). 
1271 FRCP 16(a)(5). 
1272 FRCP 16(c)(2)(I). 
1273 FRCP 16(c)(1). 
1274 ADR Act 1998 (n 1270). 
1275 FRCP 26(f)(2). 
1276 Robert J. Niemic, Donna Stienstra, Randall E. Ravitz, Guide to Judicial Management of Cases in ADR 
(Federal Judicial Center 2001); Manual for Complex Litigation (Federal Judicial Center 2004); Civil 
Litigation Management Manual (The Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on Court 
Administration and Case Management 2010); Benchbook for U.S. District Judges (Federal Judicial 
Center 2013). 
1277 Manual for Complex Litigation (n 1276) 33. 
1278 ibid 45. 
1279 ibid 46. 
1280 Civil Litigation Management Manual (n 1276) 27. 
1281 Manual for Complex Litigation (n 1276) 54; Benchbook (n 1276) 195. 
1282 ibid.  
1283 Manual for Complex Litigation (n 1276) 55. 
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suggested, such as targeting discovery at information needed for settlement1284 and asking 
counsel for reports on negotiations and how settlement might be facilitated.1285 Similar themes 
run through these publications. The first is that judges should take active control as early as 
possible, because early investment of judicial time ‘will lead to earlier dispositions, less wasteful 
activity, shorter trials and, in the long run, economies of judicial time and fewer judicial 
burdens’.1286 This may include becoming familiar with the substantive issues at an early 
stage,1287 holding the scheduling conference as soon as is practicable,1288 providing an initial 
scheduling order setting out important dates and structuring parties’ initial activities,1289 and 
providing specific and early notice of required pre-conference preparation.1290 Counsel should 
be prompted to give early attention to the case, for example by requiring them to prepare 
specified work products.1291 Early involvement extends to setting the tone for the proceedings 
and expectations as to behaviour. Counsel should be informed at the start of a case of the 
court’s expectations regarding co-operation and professionalism.1292 After this initial early 
control, management should be continuing and ‘firm, but fair’.1293 Progress should be monitored 
periodically, and interim reports may be ordered.1294 Additional conferences can help to 
monitor progress and address problems as they arise: some judges schedule these as the need 
arises, some at regular intervals.1295  
 
These publications highlight the importance of co-operation between opposing legal 
representatives and between parties and the court. They also recognise the court’s role in 
fostering co-operation. The controlling issues in a case can almost always be identified by 
thorough and candid discussion with counsel at the scheduling conference.1296 Conference 
preparation should require opposing counsel to talk to each other, as the ‘desirability of having 
counsel talk, not write, to each other about the case at the earliest moment cannot be 
overstated’.1297 The question of settlement should be raised at the first conference, and parties 
 
1284 ibid 168; Civil Litigation Management Manual (n 1276) 91. 
1285 Civil Litigation Management Manual (n 1276) 91. 
1286 Manual for Complex Litigation (n 1276) 8. 
1287 ibid 12. 
1288 ibid 11. 
1289 Civil Litigation Management Manual (n 1276) 6-8; Benchbook (n 1276) 191. 
1290 Civil Litigation Management Manual (n 1276) 8. 
1291 ibid 11. 
1292 Manual for Complex Litigation (n 1276) 15. 
1293 ibid 12. 
1294 ibid. 
1295 ibid 40. 
1296 ibid 43. 
1297 Civil Litigation Management Manual (n 1276) 22. 
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should be encouraged to re-examine their positions as the case progresses.1298 The importance 
of ADR is highlighted by the fact that there is a separate management handbook for cases in 
ADR.1299 This gives advice on issues such as when ADR should be considered,1300 points to 
consider when determining whether a case is suitable for ADR,1301 considerations relating to 
mandatory and voluntary referrals and the role of party consent.1302 The guide also covers 
managing cases in the ADR process,1303 dealing with how they can be kept on track1304 and 
whether and when sanctions should be imposed.1305 
 
Research has been undertaken by the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal 
System and the American College of Trial Lawyers (the ‘ACTL’) into how judges manage 
cases,1306 consisting of interviews with judges ‘identified as being outstanding case managers 
and whose civil case management experience can serve as a model for others’.1307 The report 
highlights how individual judges tailor management in a given case. Some suggest that a key 
part of balancing limited resources and active management is ‘as simple as being available and 
accessible to lawyers when certain aspects of the case begin to fall off the tracks’.1308 Setting a 
trial date early is a common practice, as it forces all involved to be more disciplined.1309 Several 
judges are firm in their practice of not moving the date, because when parties know that a 
judge is firm about trial dates they will adjust their behaviour accordingly.1310 Many 
interviewees highlight the importance of setting out expectations about civility and 
professionalism at the outset,1311 and one judge includes expectations concerning behaviour in 
a standard pre-trial order.1312 One judge requires parties to make written settlement demands 
before the initial conference in a specified order, the idea being to remove the pressure of being 
the first party to make a settlement move.1313 
 
1298 Manual for Complex Litigation (n 1276) 167. 
1299 Niemic, Stienstra and Ravitz (n 1276). 
1300 ibid 13. 
1301 ibid 21-30. 
1302 ibid 48-53. 
1303 ibid 111. 
1304 ibid 114. 
1305 ibid 115. 
1306 Working Smarter Not Harder: How Excellent Judges Manage Cases (Institute for the Advancement of 
the American Legal System and American College of Trial Lawyers 2014). 
1307 ibid 1. 
1308 ibid 9. 
1309 ibid 16. 
1310 ibid 17. 
1311 ibid 27. 
1312 ibid.  




The Canadian legal system comprises various jurisdictions, each of which has its own rules of 
civil procedure. The analysis here will consider the Federal Court Rules (‘CFCR’)1314 and the 
rules applicable in the Canadian provinces.1315 There is a general commitment to 
proportionality in all of these rules. The majority of Canadian procedural rules have a general 
principles or purpose clause referring to justice, cost-efficiency and expedition. In Alberta, 
claims are to be ‘fairly and justly resolved in or by a court process in a timely and cost-effective 
way’.1316 The objective of the Alberta rules has been summed up in the words ‘settlement’, 
‘cooperation’, ‘simplicity’, ‘expediency’ and ‘economy’.1317 The Nova Scotia rules echo the U.S. 
FRCP with their object of the ‘just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
proceeding’.1318  Some rules, within this just, expeditious and cost-efficient context, include a 
specific reference to determining a given case ‘on its merits’.1319 Ontario takes matters further 
in this regard, occasionally echoing the position as it stood in England under the RSC. The court 
may grant amendments to pleadings ‘on such terms as are just, to secure the just determination 
of the real matters in dispute’1320 and ‘shall’ grant leave to amend ‘on such terms as are just, 
unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment’.1321 
Some rules mention proportionality as being relevant to the application of the rules, however 
this is sometimes limited to consideration of the amount in dispute and the importance and 
complexity of the proceedings.1322 In Alberta, remedies or sanctions must be ‘proportional to 
the reason for granting or imposing’ them,1323 requiring a balance to be struck between the 
 
1314 Federal Court Rules, SOR/9-106. 
1315 Alberta Rules of Court, AR 124/2010; British Columbia Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 
168/2009; Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench Rules, Manitoba Regulation 553/88; New Brunswick 
Rules of Court; Newfoundland and Labrador Rules of the Supreme Court 1986, SNL1986 C42 
Schedule D; Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules; Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, 
Regulation 194; Prince Edward Island Rules of Civil Procedure; Quebec Code of Civil Procedure C-
25.01; Saskatchewan Queen’s Bench Rules. 
1316 Alberta (n 1315) r.1.2(1). 
1317 Darren J. Reed and Glen H. Poleman, Civil Procedure and Practice in Alberta (LexisNexis Canada 
Inc, 2019) 10; Kwok v Canada (Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council) [2013] AJ No. 752, 
[24]. 
1318 Nova Scotia (n 1315) r.1.01. 
1319 Ontario (n 1315) r.1.04(1); British Columbia (n 1315) r.1-3; Manitoba (n 1315) r.1.04(1); Prince 
Edward Island (n 1315) r.1.04(1). 
1320 Ontario (n 1315) r.2.01(1)(a). 
1321 ibid r.26.01. 
1322 ibid r.1.04(1.1); British Columbia (n 1315) r.1-3(2); New Brunswick (n 1315) r.1.02.1; Prince 
Edward Island, (n 1315) r.1.04(2). 
1323 Alberta (n 1315) r.1.2(4). 
 182 
objectives of resolving a claim ‘fairly and justly’ and in a ‘timely and cost-effective way’.1324 As 
in the U.S., there is no explicit incorporation of systemic concerns.  
 
The Canadian Supreme Court in Hryniak v Mauldin (2014)1325 highlighted issues that are 
reflected in several of these general purpose clauses, namely that trials are expensive and 
protracted and costs are too high, both of which affect access to justice:  
 
Increasingly, there is recognition that a culture shift is required in order to create 
an environment promoting timely and affordable access to the civil justice system. 
This shift entails simplifying pre-trial procedures and moving the emphasis away 
from the conventional trial in favour of proportional procedures tailored to the 
needs of the particular case. The balance between procedure and access struck by 
our justice system must come to reflect modern reality and recognise that new 
models of adjudication can be fair and just.1326 
 
The ACTL, in a companion report to that produced in the U.S., saw this as a call to arms that 
should be responded to with a more active and unified approach to case management.1327 Case 
management is not unknown in the Canadian jurisdictions, however it is more limited than in 
the U.S., Australia and England. Some jurisdictions allow for post-issue, pre-trial conferences 
in all cases, although these are not always compulsory. In the federal jurisdiction a party 
‘may’1328 apply for a pre-trial conference and there are no mandatory orders to be made at any 
conference.1329 In Ontario, parties must schedule the pre-trial conference,1330 although a judge 
‘may’ direct an initial1331 or subsequent1332 conference at any time. Certain matters ‘shall’ be 
considered at the conference,1333 although there is no requirement for specific orders to be 
made. In other jurisdictions, a conference may be scheduled but there is no obligation on parties 
or the court to do so.1334 Courts have a broad discretion at these conferences to, for example, 
 
1324 Reed and Poleman (n 1317) 10; Donaldson v Farrell [2011] AJ No.18 [14]. 
1325 2014 SCC 7. 
1326 ibid [2] 
1327 Working Smarter Not Harder in Canada: The Development of a Unified Approach to Case Management 
in Civil Litigation (American College of Trial Lawyers 2016) 2. 
1328 CFCR (n 1314) Art.258. 
1329 ibid Art.265. 
1330 Ontario (n 1315) r.50.02(1). 
1331 ibid r.50.02(3). 
1332 ibid r.50.13(1). 
1333 ibid r.50.06. 
1334 British Columbia (n 1315) r.1-5(1) and (2); Manitoba (n 1315) r.50.02(1); Prince Edward Island 
(n 1315) r.50.01(1). 
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establish timetables,1335 give procedural orders and directions,1336 identify and simplify 
issues1337 and make any order ‘respecting the conduct of the action’1338 or that will further the 
object of the rules.1339 Conferences have few compulsory outcomes. Under the CFCR, a trial 
date ‘shall’ be fixed by the judge who conducts the conference,1340 while in British Columbia 
the court ‘must’ make a case plan order where a conference takes place,1341 but there are no 
prescribed contents for that order.1342 
 
In other jurisdictions there is no judicial management unless specifically ordered, the rationale 
being that court intervention should be targeted at cases that truly need it. Rules refer to 
providing management for ‘selected proceedings’,1343 ‘selected actions’1344 and ‘only … those 
proceedings for which a need for the court’s intervention is demonstrated’.1345 Ontario and the 
Federal Court take a two-tiered approach, with parties and the court being able to apply for 
and order case conferences in all cases, and with the court able to order stricter judicial 
management where appropriate. Links are drawn to the limited nature of judicial resources. In 
Ontario, the nature and extent of judicial management is to be informed by inter alia ‘judicial 
resources issues’.1346 Recent changes to case management assignment procedures in Alberta 
highlight ‘the current need to deploy … judicial resources in ways that reduce unacceptably 
long lead times to trial’.1347 The issues that universal case management may cause are 
exemplified by the introduction of such a system in Toronto in 2001. That system proved to be 
unworkable, largely due to the volume of cases and relative lack of resources.1348 Case 
management had to be reworked to apply resources only to cases that needed management.1349  
 
 
1335 Ontario (n 1315) r.50.13(5)(d); Manitoba (n 1315) r.50.01(2); British Columbia (n 1315), r.5-
3(1)(a). 
1336 Ontario (n 1315) r.50.13(6); Manitoba (n 1315) r.50.01(2). 
1337 Manitoba (n 1315) r.50.01(2); Ontario (n 1315) 50.06, r.50.13(5). 
1338 CFCR (n 1314) Art.265(1)(a). 
1339 British Columbia (n 1315) r.5-3(1)(v). 
1340 CFCR (n 1315) Art.264. 
1341 British Columbia (n 1315) r.5-3(3). 
1342 ibid r.5-3(4). 
1343 Newfoundland and Labrador (n 1315) r.18A.01. 
1344 Nova Scotia (n 1315) r.26B.01(1). 
1345 Ontario (n 1315) r.77.01(1). 
1346 ibid r.77.01(2). 
1347 Notice NPP#2019-7. 
1348 Warren K. Winkler, ‘The Warren Winkler Lectures on Civil Justice Reform (2007) 39(1) Ottawa 
Law Review 99, 106. 
1349 ibid 107. 
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Criteria for assigning a matter to case management may include the complexity of the issues, 
the importance of the issues to the public, the time required for discovery, trial preparation and 
trial itself, and whether there has been any substantial delay in conduct of the action.1350 In 
Alberta, a management judge may be appointed for one or more of four specified reasons: to 
encourage parties to participate in ADR, to promote and ensure fair and efficient conduct and 
resolution of the action, to keep parties on schedule, and to facilitate trial preparation and 
scheduling of the trial date.1351  In the Federal Court, while the Chief Justice has a general 
discretion to assign a case to be managed where appropriate,1352 delay is a particular concern. 
The court is required to either issue a notice of status review or to assign a matter to continue 
as a ‘specially managed proceeding’ if parties have not taken steps to set the matter down for 
trial within a specified time.1353  Some jurisdictions appoint a single management judge to deal 
with the entirety of a matter, either automatically or as directed.1354 An express ground for 
application for a case management order in Newfoundland and Labrador is whether the case 
would ‘benefit from management, supervision and direction by a single judge’.1355  This 
approach is a halfway house between full docketing for all cases and having all cases being 
managed by a succession of judges. Whether the management judge can also preside at trial 
differs between jurisdictions. This is not permitted under the CFCR1356 or in Ontario,1357 whereas 
in Newfoundland and Labrador1358 and Nova Scotia,1359 one judge can be appointed as both 
management and trial judge.  
 
Case management judges, when appointed, have broad, discretionary powers. A judge in the 
Federal Court ‘may’ give any directions or orders that are ‘necessary for the just, most 
expeditious and least expensive determination of the proceeding on its merits’.1360 Judges in 
Ontario have similarly wide powers,1361 while in Alberta a judge may make ‘any procedural 
order … necessary’.1362 Some imperatives are imposed. In Newfoundland and Labrador, once 
 
1350 Ontario (n 1315) r.77.05(4); Manitoba (n 1315) r.50.1. 
1351 Alberta (n 1315) r.4.12. 
1352 CFCR (n 1314) Art.381, Art.384. 
1353 ibid Art.380. 
1354 ibid Art.385; Ontario (n 1315) r.77.06(1); Newfoundland and Labrador (n 1315) r.18A.07(1); 
Nova Scotia (n 1315) r.26B.02; Quebec (n 1315) r.157; Saskatchewan (n 1315) r.4-7(2). 
1355 Newfoundland and Labrador (n 1315) r.18A.03. 
1356 CFCR (n 1314) Art.266. 
1357 Ontario (n 1315) r.77.06(2). 
1358 Newfoundland and Labrador (n 1315) r.18A.09. 
1359 Nova Scotia (n 1315) r.26B.02(2). 
1360 CFCR (n 1314) Art.385(1)(a). 
1361 Ontario (n 1315) r.77.04. 
1362 Alberta (n 1315) r.4.14(1)(f). 
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notified of appointment, a management judge ‘shall’ convene a case management meeting to 
discuss pre-trial procedural matters.1363 Similarly, in Nova Scotia, the judge appointed as case 
manager ‘must’ convene a conference as soon as is convenient to consider ‘all subjects pertinent 
to management’,1364 and ‘must’ monitor progress of the action by holding further conferences, 
hearing motions, exchanging correspondence ‘or by other means’.1365 Even where a 
management judge is appointed, however, an underlying principle across the Canadian 
jurisdictions is that the parties, rather than the court, bear responsibility for progressing cases. 
In Ontario, even where case management is applied, ‘the greater share of the responsibility for 
managing the proceeding and moving it expeditiously to a trial, hearing or other resolution 
remains with the parties’1366. In Alberta and Saskatchewan, the ‘parties are responsible for 
managing their dispute and for planning its resolution in a timely and cost-effective way’.1367 
They must monitor the progress of the case and adjust dates as necessary.1368 Rather than court 
management, the rules refer to ‘court assistance in managing litigation’.1369 In Nova Scotia, the 
application of judicial management in selected actions ‘departs from a general principle of 
procedure that an action is managed by the parties until trial dates are requested’.1370  
 
In some jurisdictions, parties’ obligations go beyond management responsibility. In Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, those obligations are set out in the ‘purpose and intention’ provision. They 
include identifying the real issues in dispute, facilitating the quickest means of resolving the 
claim at the least expense, periodically evaluating ADR, refraining from applications that do 
not further the purpose of the rules, and using publicly funded court resources effectively.1371 
In Quebec, parties ‘must be careful to confine the case to what is necessary to resolve the 
dispute, and must refrain from acting with the intent to cause prejudice to another person or 
behaving in an excessive or unreasonable manner, contrary to the requirements of good 
faith’.1372 They are ‘duty-bound to co-operate and, in particular, to keep one another informed 
at all times of the facts and particulars conducive to a fair debate…’.1373  In other rules, while 
there are no express obligations imposed, expectations as to parties’ behaviour are apparent in 
 
1363 Newfoundland and Labrador (n 1315) r.18A.06. 
1364 Nova Scotia (n 1315) r.26B.03(1). 
1365 ibid r.26B.04. 
1366 Ontario (n 1315) r.77.01(2). 
1367 Alberta (n 1315) r.4.1; Saskatchewan (n 1315) r.4-1. 
1368 Alberta (n 1315) r.4.7(1). 
1369 ibid Part 4, Division 2; Saskatchewan (n 1315) Part 4, Division 2. 
1370 Nova Scotia (n 1315) r.26B.01(1). 
1371 Alberta (n 1315) r.1.2(3); Saskatchewan (n 1315) r.1-3(3). 
1372 Quebec (n 1315) r.19. 
1373 ibid r.20. 
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the rules on costs assessment. Under the CFCR and in Ontario, for example, in assessing costs 
the court may take into account inter alia ‘the conduct of any party that tended to shorten or 
lengthen unnecessarily the duration of the proceeding’,1374 whether any step was ‘improper, 
vexatious or unnecessary’1375 and whether a party failed to admit something that should have 
been admitted.1376 Parties’ obligations do not extend to the pre-action phase, with the exception 
of Quebec where parties ‘must consider private prevention and resolution processes before 
referring their dispute to the courts’.1377 Unlike in the U.S., there are no certification 
requirements which by practical extension would require parties and lawyers to take some pre-
action steps. Pre-action requirements have been considered by some Canadian reform 
projects,1378 but no measures have been implemented as a result.  
 
The general position that responsibility for progressing litigation lies with the parties is 
reflected in some jurisdictions’ approach to sanctions for non-compliance. Sanctions have a 
central position in Alberta, where the ‘purpose and intention’ provision states that the rules are 
intended to be used inter alia to ‘provide an effective, efficient and credible system of remedies 
and sanctions to enforce these rules and orders and judgments’.1379 This is one of several 
jurisdictions where sanctions and remedies for non-compliance are available on application by 
a party, rather than on the court’s own initiative.1380 This is not the case across the board, 
however, as in Ontario a judge or case management master may on their own initiative require 
parties to appear before them to deal with any case management matter, ‘including a failure to 
comply with an order or the rules’.1381 Once an issue of non-compliance is before the court, 
there is generally a broad discretion as to how to deal with it, with courts able to respond to 
non-compliance with any orders that will carry out or further the purpose of the rules1382 or 
such orders as may be ‘just’.1383 Some rules are more prescriptive than others. In Manitoba, 
 
1374 Ontario (n 1315) r.57.01(1)(e); CFCR (n 1314) Art.400(3)(i). 
1375 Ontario (n 1315) r.57(1)(f)(i); CFCR (n 1314) Art.400(3)(k). 
1376 Ontario (n 1315) r.57(1)(g); CFCR (n 1314) Art.400(3)(j). 
1377 Quebec (n 1315) r.1. 
1378 The British Columbia Civil Justice Reform Working Group, Effective and Affordable Civil Justice: 
Report of the Civil Justice Reform Working Group to the Justice Review Task Force, November 2006, viii; 
The Alberta Rules of Court Project, Management of Litigation: Consultation Memorandum No.12.5, 
March 2003 52-3; The Alberta Rules of Court Project, Promoting Early Resolution of Disputes by 
Settlement: Consultation Memorandum No.12.6, July 2003 26-32. 
1379 Alberta (n 1315) r.1.2(2). 
1380 Alberta (n 1315) r.1.5(1); British Columbia (n 1315) r.5-3(6); Ontario (n 1315) r.3.04(4); 
Saskatchewan (n 1315) r.1-6.  
1381 Ontario (n 1315) r.77.04(2). 
1382 British Columbia (n 1315) r.22-7(2); Ontario (n 1315) r.77.04(1). 
1383 Manitoba (n 1315) r.30.08(1)(b), r.60.11(c); New Brunswick (n 1315) r.31.08; Ontario (n 1315) 
r.3.04(4), r.60.12. 
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where a party does not comply with a pre-trial order or direction, is unprepared for the pre-
trial conference or does not participate in good faith, the judge ‘must’ make an order from the 
list provided, which includes adverse costs and strike out orders. The final item in that list, ‘any 
order that the pre-trial judge considers appropriate’,1384 indicates that the judge’s discretion 
remains broad. Alberta and Saskatchewan provide the most detail on situations in which the 
court may cure non-compliance. Four criteria must be met, namely that curing the non-
compliance will cause no irreparable harm to any party, terms will be imposed that eliminate 
or ameliorate reparable harm or prevent reoccurrence, a suitable sanction is issued, if any, and 
it is in the overall interests of justice.1385  
 
Further obligations are often imposed on parties and legal representatives in terms of resolving 
proceedings by means other than trial. The FCR require solicitors to discuss settlement within 
60 days of close of pleadings,1386 and parties ‘must’ be prepared to discuss settlement at a pre-
trial conference.1387 In Quebec, after proceedings have been commenced, parties are ‘required 
to co-operate to either arrive at a settlement or establish a case protocol’, which must indicate 
the consideration given to resolving the dispute other than through the courts.1388 Parties in 
Alberta must participate in ADR in ‘good faith’1389 and throughout the litigation must 
‘periodically evaluate dispute resolution process alternatives to a full trial, with or without 
assistance from the Court’.1390 In Saskatchewan, parties ‘make a genuine attempt to settle an 
action before a pre-trial conference’.1391  
 
These obligations are part of a robust approach taken in the Canadian jurisdictions to ADR and 
settlement. It is clear from several of the rules that settlement is one of their main purposes. In 
Alberta, encouraging parties to resolve the claim themselves, as early as is practicable, is an 
explicit aim of the rules.1392 In Ontario, the purpose of case conferences is to provide ‘an 
opportunity for any or all of the issues … to be settled without a hearing and, with respect to 
any issues that are not settled, to obtain’1393 orders or directions. The priority is settlement, with 
 
1384 Manitoba (n 1315) r.50.09(1). 
1385 Alberta (n 1315) r.1.5; Saskatchewan (n 1315) r.1-6. 
1386 CFCR (n 1314) Art.257. 
1387 ibid Art.258. 
1388 Quebec (n 1315) r.148. 
1389 Alberta (n 1315) r.4.16(1). 
1390 Alberta (n 1315) r.1.2(3). 
1391 Saskatchewan (n 1315) r.4-12(1). 
1392 Alberta (n 1315) r.1.2(2). 
1393 Ontario (n 1315) r.50 
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proceeding to trial being secondary. Similarly, in Saskatchewan, the pre-trial conference ‘must’ 
be for the purpose of attempting to settle, and if that is not possible to consider inter alia 
identifying and simplifying the issues, amendments to pleadings and trial preparation.1394 In 
some jurisdictions, courts can compel parties to participate in ADR or settlement discussions.1395 
The value of mandatory mediation was explained by the Civil Justice Review Task Force in its 
1995 report on civil justice in Ontario. Even if settlement was not reached at an early stage, 
the use of mandatory mediation would force parties to evaluate their case and lawyers to focus 
on relevant settlement issues early in the life of the case.1396 
 
Although case management in the Canadian jurisdictions is in some senses limited, the ACTL 
suggests that, in light of Hryniak,1397 judges and lawyers should adopt a more expansive and 
flexible use of case management. This may result in substantially reducing expense and delay 
while allowing justice to be dispensed fairly and regularly.1398 The ACTL report, like its U.S. 
counterpart, provides useful insight into the practicalities of case management. The facts, 
evidentiary problems or legal issues on which the case will turn must be identified early.1399 
Decisions should be timely.1400 Trial dates should be fixed early in the process.1401 Judges should 
encourage an atmosphere of collegiality and co-operation,1402 and should utilise informal 
procedures where appropriate.1403 Finally, it should be remembered that case management is 
not ‘one size fits all’, but must be tailored to each case.1404 Proportionality was repeatedly cited 
by interviewees as a key principle that should be used in devising and implementing 
management procedures, and as ‘the lens through which virtually all pre-trial procedures 
should be viewed’.1405 A number of interviewees noted that there is still some reluctance and 
misunderstanding on the part of Canadian judges regarding case management, despite the 
recognised benefits,1406 a point that was absent from the equivalent U.S. report. The report 
 
1394 Saskatchewan (n 1315) r.4-12(4). 
1395 CFCR (n 1314) Art.386(1); Alberta (n 1315) r.4.16(4); British Columbia (n 1315) r.5-3(1); 
Newfoundland and Labrador (n 1315) r.37A.03; Saskatchewan (n 1315) r.4-10; Ontario (n 1315) 
r.24.1. 
1396 The Ontario Civil Justice Review, Supplemental and Final Report, November 1996, Chapter 5, 
section 5.2a. 
1397 Hryniak (n 1325). 
1398 Working Smarter Not Harder (n 1327) 3. 
1399 ibid 11. 
1400 ibid. 
1401 ibid 12. 
1402 ibid 13. 
1403 ibid 14. 




suggests that this may in part be due to the varying approaches to case management across 




Australian civil procedure comprises a federal jurisdiction1409 and state-specific rules.1410 They 
all have an overarching purpose or objective provision, implicit in which is ‘an understanding 
that the rights of the parties to justice on the merits are subject to the goal of promoting 
efficiency in the administration of justice’.1411 The clauses vary between jurisdictions, but share 
the common feature of ‘promoting efficiency, minimising costs and delays and facilitating the 
just determination of disputes’.1412 Australia has close ties to England in this regard, in that 
these provisions were introduced after Lord Woolf’s review prompted a ‘fundamental rethink 
of rules of court [in Australia], commencing with first principles’.1413 It is clearer in Australia 
than in either the U.S. or Canada that these overarching provisions include both inter partes 
and systemic considerations. In Victoria, for example, the court must have regard to inter alia 
the just determination of proceedings, the importance and complexity of the dispute, the 
efficient conduct of court business and the efficient use of judicial and administrative 
resources.1414 Similar factors apply in the Federal Court and in New South Wales, where those 
factors are linked to a requirement that courts must ‘follow the dictates of justice’.1415 Some 
rules draw a link between their overarching purpose and the role of court management in its 
implementation.1416 This link was made clear by the High Court of Australia in Aon Risk Services 
Ltd v Australian National University (2009),1417 which has been said to embody ‘the triumph of 
case management’.1418 The court in that case also determined that case management required 
 
1407 ibid 17. 
1408 ibid 26. 
1409 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (‘FCAA 1976’); Federal Court Rules 2011 (‘FCR 2011’). 
1410 Australian Capital Territory Court Procedures Rules 2006; New South Wales Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 2005; Northern Territory Supreme Court Rules; Queensland Uniform Civil Procedure 
Rules 1999; South Australia Uniform Civil Rules 2020; Victoria Supreme Court (General Civil 
Procedure) Rules 2015; Western Australia Rules of the Supreme Court 1971.c 
1411 Andrew Hemming and Tania Penovic, Civil Procedure in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths 2015) 
46. 
1412 ibid.  
1413 Stephen Colbran, Peta Spender, Roger Douglas, Sheryl Jackson, Civil Procedure Commentary and 
Materials (7th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2019) 60. 
1414 Victoria (n 1410) r.9. 
1415 FCAA 1976, s.37M(2); New South Wales (n 1410) r.57, r.58. 
1416 New South Wales (n 1410) r.56-58; Western Australia (n 1410) r.4B. 
1417 [2009] HCA 27. 
1418 Jeremy Sher, ‘Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University: the triumph of case 
management’, (2010) 29(1) CJQ 13. 
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consideration of systemic as well as inter partes issues.1419 Aon Risk has since been applied with 
‘great vigour’ and cited ‘thousands’ of times.1420 Across the Australian jurisdictions, the meaning 
of ‘justice’ has been broadened by the procedural rules and case law to include systemic as well 
as inter partes considerations.1421  
 
As in England, judicial case management was introduced in Australia in conjunction with the 
overriding purpose provisions to deal with similar flaws in the civil justice system1422 such as 
high costs, delay, party control of litigation and a lax approach to compliance driven by the 
primacy of substantive justice.1423  Some form of case management is provided for by all 
Australian procedural rules, although approaches differ between jurisdictions. Only the Federal 
Court runs a docketing system. This ‘Individual Docketing System’ survived the recent 
introduction of the National Court Framework (‘NCF’), described as a fundamental reform of 
the court and the way it operates, intended to ‘reinvigorate the Court’s approach to case 
management’.1424 There are no other court-wide docketing systems, although some jurisdictions 
do allow cases to be managed and heard by the same judge.1425 Courts are generally given 
broad, discretionary management powers. The Federal Court Rules 2011 (‘FCR 2011’) set out 
actions that the court ‘may’ take and orders that it ‘may’ make. These include any order 
considered appropriate ‘in the interests of justice’1426 and directions at any hearing.1427 A non-
exhaustive list of thirty-four possible directions is included.1428 The Australian Capital Territory 
rules include twenty orders that the court ‘may’ make ‘at any time’.1429 In New South Wales, a 
court may make ‘such directions as it thinks fit’.1430  
 
Language is also often discretionary in referring to the balance the court must strike when 
making these decisions. Under the FCR 2011, a court ‘may’ deal with a proceeding in a manner 
proportionate to its nature and complexity.1431 In Queensland, the court ‘may’ have regard to 
 
1419 Aon Risk (n 1417) [5], [23]-[24]. 
1420 Colbran, Spender, Douglas and Jackson (n 1413) 75. 
1421 Michael Legg, ‘Reconciling the goals of minimising cost and delay with the principle of a fair trial in 
the Australian civil justice system’ (2014) 33(2) CJQ 157, 166. 
1422 Colbran, Spender, Douglas and Jackson (n 1413) 22. 
1423 ibid 37. 
1424 <https://www.fedcourt.gov.au/about/national-court-framework> last accessed 25 May 2020. 
1425 Australian Capital Territory (n 1410) r.1402; Queensland (n 1410) r.386. 
1426 FCR 2011 r.1.32. 
1427 ibid r.5.04(1). 
1428 ibid r.5.04(3). 
1429 Australian Capital Territory (n 1410) r.1401(4). 
1430 New South Wales (n 1410) r.61(1). 
1431 FCR 2011 r.1.31(2). 
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factors such as the reasonableness of any time allowed, issues of complexity and importance, 
the volume and character of evidence and the state of the court lists.1432 The Australian Capital 
Territory rules include a list of similar matters that the court ‘may’ have regard to in making 
orders.1433  The Northern Territory rules, on the other hand, are more prescriptive. After a 
matter is filed, a Master ‘must’ fix an initial directions hearing within a specified time,1434 at 
which the case must be designated to one of five categories,1435 based on for example required 
hearing time, complexity and urgency, which will determine how the case proceeds. There are 
imperatives on the Master to make orders regarding the next stage of the proceedings. The 
South Australia rules, on the other hand, allow the court ‘in its discretion’ to order at any stage 
that a proceeding may be managed, or cease to be managed, as appropriate.1436 
 
In Western Australia, the rules recognise the potential for tension between judicial 
management and limited court resources. Actions will be managed ‘to the extent that the 
resources of the Court permit’ in accordance with ‘a system of positive case flow 
management’.1437 The Western Australia system also incorporates an Inactive Cases List 
(‘ICL’).1438 If no procedural step is taken for 12 months, a case is taken to be inactive1439 and 
the case manager may require the parties to show why it should not be put on the ICL.1440 If a 
case is on the ICL, only certain documents may be filed1441 and a case is taken to be dismissed 
for want of prosecution if it remains on the ICL for six continuous months after the date of 
notice to the parties.1442 The same is true if the case is taken off the list and no procedural step 
is taken for six months.1443 This is a clear and systematic way of ensuring that parties get on 
with a case and that court time is not wasted on cases that are either making their way to trial 
too slowly, or in which parties have no intention of getting to trial at all. A balance does need 
to be struck, however, between the resources saved by the existence of such a list and the 
administrative resources required to run it. 
 
 
1432 Queensland (n 1410) r.367(1). 
1433 Australian Capital Territory (n 1410) r.1401(5). 
1434 Northern Territory (n 1410) r.48.04. 
1435 ibid r.48.06. 
1436 South Australia (n 1410) r.311.3. 
1437 Western Australia (n 1410) r.4B. 
1438 ibid Division 5. 
1439 ibid r.24. 
1440 ibid r.22. 
1441 ibid r.26. 
1442 ibid r.28(1). 
1443 ibid r.28(2). 
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Some Australian courts have issued practice notes and directions dealing with the management 
of specific types of case. The Central Practice Note of the Federal Court of Australia (‘CPN-1’) 
sets out the principles of case management under the NCF. These include allocation to a 
specialist judge1444 and several options for parties to seek expedited or streamlined 
procedures.1445 Parties can also opt to use procedures from specific national practice areas. The 
Commercial and Corporations Practice Note (‘C&C-1’), for example, sets out a discovery 
procedure which requires parties to collaborate on the production of a schedule, with only 
focused disagreements being dealt with by the court.1446 Queensland introduced a case flow 
management system in the Brisbane registry by way of Practice Direction 4 of 2020, aimed at 
monitoring the progress of proceedings and intervening when that progress is unsatisfactory. 
All cases in which a request for a trial date has not been filed within a specified time are placed 
on a case flow management list. Directions are given in cases on the list at monthly case flow 
reviews. Queensland also runs a ‘supervised case list’ (Practice Direction 11 of 2012), for 
matters where the hearing will take more than five days or which impose ‘a greater than normal 
demand on resources because of considerations such as length of time, complexity of issues, or 
multiplicity of parties’.1447  
 
These case management systems still place significant responsibility on the parties for 
management and progress of the case. CPN-1 states that while the court: 
 
will manage the issues in dispute, the proceeding is always the parties’ proceeding. 
In everything they do, the parties should approach their role as the primary actors 
responsible for identifying the issues in dispute and in ascertaining the most 
efficient, including cost-efficient, method of its resolution.1448  
 
The Queensland supervised case list requires parties to attempt to reach agreement on matters 
such as the adequacy of pleadings, expert evidence, and whether and when ADR should be 
attempted. Matters on the list will not be allocated trial dates unless a request is filed or a judge 
 
1444 CPN-1, r.3.1. 
1445 ibid r.6.5. 
1446 C&C-1, r.8.4. 
1447 Practice Direction 11 of 2012, para 7. 
1448 CPN-1, r.7.4. 
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‘otherwise orders’,1449 and before a request for trial date is filed parties ‘should seek directions’ 
on certain matters.1450 
 
Several Australian rules impose obligations on parties and their lawyers. In the Federal Court, 
parties must conduct proceedings, including settlement negotiations, consistently with the 
overarching purpose.1451 Lawyers must take account of that duty and assist their client to 
comply.1452 A lawyer who fails to do so may be ordered to personally bear resultant costs, which 
they are unable to recover from their client.1453 Parties are expected to be prepared and to co-
operate. CPN-1 includes a list of ‘case management imperatives’ that ‘should’ be considered by 
parties in preparation for the first case conference.1454 Parties and practitioners must 
communicate in a ‘meaningful way’ about matters to be raised at any case management 
hearing.1455 New South Wales imposes a duty not unlike CPR 1.3, in that a party is ‘under a 
duty to assist the court to further the overriding purpose and, to that effect, to participate in 
the processes of the court and to comply with directions and orders of the court’.1456  
 
Victoria and South Australia impose detailed and prescriptive ‘overarching obligations’.  The 
obligations imposed in Victoria include acting honestly,1457 only taking steps that a party 
‘reasonably believes … is necessary to facilitate resolution or determination of the 
proceeding’,1458 co-operation between parties and lawyers and with the court,1459 and using 
‘reasonable endeavours’ to narrow issues in dispute1460 and minimise delay.1461 Each party must 
certify that they have read and understood these obligations.1462 The certification must be filed 
at court, together with a ‘proper basis’ certification confirming that the claim or response has a 
proper factual and legal basis.1463 The court can take contravention of these requirements1464 
into account when making any order, including as to costs. The South Australia rules impose 
 
1449 Practice Direction 11 of 2012, para 31. 
1450 ibid para 33. 
1451 FCAA 1976, s.37N(1). 
1452 ibid s.37N(2). 
1453 ibid s.37N(5). 
1454 CPN-1, r.8.5 
1455 CPN-1, r.8.9 
1456 New South Wales (n 1410) r.56(2). 
1457 Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Victoria) s.17. 
1458 ibid s.19. 
1459 ibid s.20. 
1460 ibid s.22. 
1461 ibid s.23. 
1462 ibid s.41. 
1463 ibid s.42. 
1464 ibid s.28, s.46. 
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similar obligations,1465 although without an analogous certification requirement. Some 
jurisdictions also impose a duty on lawyers to facilitate the overarching purpose, in addition to 
their general duties to the court and their clients.1466  
 
The pre-action provisions in Australian jurisdictions are closer to the CPR than either the U.S. 
or Canada, although the position differs between jurisdictions within Australia. Several allow 
a party to apply for pre-action disclosure.1467 The jurisdictions that go furthest in terms of pre-
action requirements are the Commonwealth, Victoria and South Australia. The Commonwealth 
requires parties to take ‘genuine steps’ to resolve a dispute before proceedings are commenced 
and to file a statement confirming that this was done if and when proceedings are indeed 
commenced.1468 In Victoria, not only must the factual and legal basis of a claim be investigated 
prior to filing, but the various overarching obligations must be explained to potential 
litigants.1469 The pre-action requirements in South Australia are the most detailed. They aim to, 
inter alia, encourage resolution before litigation is commenced and ensure that any litigation 
is conducted expeditiously, efficiently, at proportionate cost and on focused issues.1470 Parties 
must file a pre-action claim1471 and response1472 respectively, the contents of which are 
prescribed by the rules, as are the information and evidence that must accompany them. A pre-
action meeting must be held ‘to attempt to resolve the dispute’.1473 If a claim is issued, the 
issuing party must certify whether these pre-action steps were taken.1474 If they should have 
been but were not, the court will list the matter for a special directions hearing to determine 
whether orders should be made for pre-action steps or steps in lieu to be taken.1475  
 
All Australian jurisdictions give the courts broad discretion to deal with non-compliance. 
Several allow the court to set aside the proceeding or any document, judgment or order, in 
 
1465 South Australia (n 1410) r.3.1 
1466 FCAA 1976 s.37N(2); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (New South Wales), s.56(3); CPA 2010 (n 1456), 
ss.13-15; Colbran, Spender, Douglas and Jackson (n 1413) 66. 
1467 FCR 2011 r.7.23; New South Wales (n 1410) reg.5.3; Northern Territory (n 1410) r.32.01-32.11; 
Western Australia (n 1410) Order 26A. 
1468 Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011, ss.6 and 7. 
1469 CPA 2010 (n 1457) Part 2.3, s.42. 
1470 South Australia (n 1410) r.61.1. 
1471 ibid r.61.7. 
1472 ibid r.61.9 
1473 ibid r.61.12. 
1474 ibid r.61.13. 
1475 ibid r.61.14. 
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whole or in part, to allow amendments, or to make such orders as it deems appropriate.1476 
Some go further in detailing how courts may act in specific situations. In Queensland, the party 
entitled to the benefit of an order that has not been complied with may apply to require the 
non-compliant party to show cause, on which application the court may give judgment, extend 
time for compliance, give directions or ‘make another order’.1477 In South Australia, a party can 
apply for judgment in default of compliance where its opponent has committed serious or 
persistent breaches which ‘seriously prejudice the proper and expeditious conduct of an action’ 
or where the opponent ‘manifests an inability or unwillingness to prosecute or defend an action 
with due diligence’.1478 The court has a wide discretion in dealing with such an application. It 
may, for example, stay the action until the non-compliance is rectified, grant judgment, list the 
matter for an early trial, or ‘make any other or further order as it thinks fit’.1479 The Australian 
rules are less clear than the CPR in stating that the courts can take any steps relating to non-
compliance of their own initiative, although in Victoria the court has an inherent power to 
strike out where a party has failed to take any step required of it under the rules or has failed 
to comply with an order.1480 
 
Settlement and ADR have a prominent place in Australian procedural rules. The range of 
mechanisms introduced to facilitate early resolution has been identified as a dominant feature 
of Australian civil procedure.1481 In South Australia, the object of the rules refers to ‘resolution 
or determination of the issues’, giving resolution other than at trial a prominent place.1482 In 
Victoria, the overarching purpose of the rules may expressly be achieved by agreement between 
parties or any dispute resolution process agreed to by parties or ordered by the court.1483 The 
court may order parties to use ADR in Victoria,1484 and the same is true in many other Australian 
jurisdictions. The Federal Court can require parties to submit to mediation,1485 and can make 
an order at any hearing referring a matter to mediation, arbitration or another ADR process.1486 
In contrast to the discretionary management powers considered above, the court ‘will’ consider 
 
1476 Northern Territory (n 1410) r.2.01; Queensland (n 1410) r.371(2); Victoria (n 1410) r.2.01(2); 
Western Australia (n 1410) Ord.2, r.1(2). 
1477 Queensland (n 1410) r.374 
1478 South Australia (n 1410) r.146.1 
1479 ibid r.146.1(3). 
1480 Victoria (n 1410) r.24.05. 
1481 Hemming and Penovic (n 1411) 29. 
1482 South Australia (n 1410) r.1.5 
1483 Victoria (n 1410) r.7(2). 
1484 ibid r.48(d). 
1485 FCAA 1976 (n 1409) s.53A. 
1486 FCR 2011, r.5.04(3). 
 196 
options for ADR as early as is reasonably practicable.1487 The Northern Territory rules are 
similarly prescriptive. At the initial directions hearing, the Master ‘must’ consider whether it is 
appropriate to refer the matter to mediation or a settlement conference, and order 
accordingly.1488 Several other rules do not require the court to consider ADR or settlement, but 
they do allow it to refer a matter to ADR without the parties’ consent.1489 The introduction of 
these powers allowing the court to mandate ADR has been described as one of the ‘most striking 
developments in ADR’ in Australia in the past 15 to 20 years.1490  
 
Some rules impose imperatives on parties to consider ADR or to otherwise try to resolve the 
dispute. Under the FCR 2011, while the court ‘will’ consider ADR options, parties ‘must’ do so 
as early as is reasonably practicable.1491 The court ‘expects’ parties to ‘always’ consider or seek 
early resolution using ADR.1492  As noted, the Commonwealth Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 
requires parties to take ‘genuine steps’ to resolve a dispute before proceedings are 
commenced.1493 ‘Genuine steps’ include notification of and an offer to discuss issues, responding 
appropriately, providing relevant information and documents, considering ADR processes, 
considering a different process if one is carried out and fails, and attempting to negotiate.1494 
In Victoria, parties must use reasonable endeavours to resolve a dispute by agreement, 
including ADR, unless it is not in the interests of justice to do so or the dispute is of such a 
nature that only judicial determination is appropriate.1495 The Federal jurisdiction and New 
South Wales both require parties to participate in mediation in good faith.1496 Queensland 
requires parties to ‘act reasonably and genuinely’ in mediation.1497 There are also some 
Australian legislative provisions that require parties with certain types of claims, for example 
some native title claims and proceedings relating to children, to attend some form of ADR as a 
pre-condition to litigation.1498 
 
 
1487 ibid r.28.01. 
1488 Northern Territory (n 1410) r.48.06(4). 
1489 New South Wales (n 1410) r.26; South Australia (n 1410) r.131.2-3; Western Australia (n 1410) 
Order 4A(2), r.8(1); Queensland (n 1410) r.319, r.320; CPA 2010 (n 1456) s.66. 
1490 Hemming and Panovic (n 1411) 102. 
1491 FCR 2011 r.28.01. 
1492 CPN-1 r.9.1. 
1493 CDRA 2011 (n 1468) ss.6 and 7. 
1494 ibid s.4. 
1495 Victoria (n 1410) r.22. 
1496 CPN-1, r.9.5; New South Wales (n 1410) r.27. 
1497 Queensland (n 1410) r.325 
1498 Colbran, Spender, Douglas and Jackson (n 1413) 92.  
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In order to assist with the practicalities of case management, the Law Council of Australia and 
the Federal Court of Australia have published a case management handbook.1499 This highlights 
tools and techniques available to the court and practitioners, and ‘more importantly’ gathers 
and distils experience as to the merits or perils of specific techniques in different contexts.1500 
Important points are made about the relationship between the work carried out by lawyers, 
litigation costs and judges’ role in that relationship. It cannot be ‘too plainly stated’ that the 
only effective means of reducing litigation costs are those which result in less work being done 
by lawyers over the course of a proceeding.1501 There is a tendency for this to be overlooked, 
and for case management to be seen as a series of timetabling events with the court focusing 
its role on ‘keeping the case on the rails’. This may increase speed, but it may also increase 
costs.1502 This means that efficiency cannot be left to parties1503 or lawyers.1504 Judges play a 
crucial role, and perhaps their most important power is ‘the power to question’, to require 
practitioners and parties to account for the positions they have taken. This takes the form of, 
for example, asking whether a claim adds materially to prospects of success and if not, why it 
is being pressed, or asking why facts not seriously in dispute have not been admitted.1505 
 
The handbook covers all aspects of case management, including directions hearings, 
communications between parties and the court, the identification and narrowing of issues, 
ADR, discovery, evidence, and interlocutory applications. As with the U.S. and Canadian 
guidance, it is recommended that judges identify and narrow issues as early as possible.1506 The 
court can make a discovery order at any stage, and early production of documents may assist 
in identifying and narrowing issues in some cases.1507 The importance of tailoring management 
to the individual case is highlighted. Requiring parties to agree on a list of issues, for example, 
may seem like a time-saving decision, but it might not always be appropriate. Depending on 
the nature of the case, it may simply result in additional disputation and costs.1508 The 
handbook lists practical matters for judges to consider at different stages of the proceedings. It 
includes questions to ask concerning consent and timing in the context of ADR.1509 Matters to 
 
1499 Case Management Handbook (Law Council of Australia and Federal Court of Australia 2014). 
1500 ibid 11. 
1501 ibid 15. 
1502 ibid. 
1503 ibid. 
1504 ibid 16. 
1505 ibid. 
1506 ibid 21. 
1507 ibid 30. 
1508 ibid. 
1509 ibid 36. 
 198 
be considered early, prior to the formulation of a request or order for discovery, are set out, for 
example whether discovery can be staged, limited to issues or defined by categories, or whether 
the intended purpose can be achieved by less expensive means.1510 There are suggested orders 
that can be made where parties are not co-operating regarding discovery, for example requiring 
them to file evidence to more clearly define the matters in dispute, to produce specific or 
summary documents or provide further particulars, or remove inadequately particularised 
allegations in pleadings. In some cases, it may be appropriate to direct parties to file and serve 
regular progress reports.1511 Specific objectives are set out which can be addressed at the first 
directions hearing to avoid the ‘blizzard of documents’ that can build up through the witness 
evidence process.1512 It is recommended that the court direct the manner and form in which 
evidence is to be adduced.1513 Bundles can be created as the matters proceeds, for example, 
with documents being added or removed where necessary.1514 The court can urge parties to 
consider whether and why it is necessary to file witness statements which simply annex or refer 
to documents without comment,1515 and can also make the point that there is usually no good 




The management of civil litigation in the U.S., Canadian and Australian jurisdictions has much 
in common with the equivalent process in England. All incorporate notions of proportionality 
and judicial control of proceedings. On a more specific level, however, there are points from 
each jurisdiction which might usefully be applied in England to improve the operation of case 
management proportionality.  
 
In the U.S., the FRCP uses prescriptive language in respect of party behaviour and actions to 
be taken by the court. Incorporation of this kind of language into the CPR might steer cases 
more forcefully towards proportionate litigation and active management. The certification 
requirements imposed by FRCP 11, and the associated power of the court to sanction legal 
representatives, would assist in targeting the tactical pursuit of weak claims. They should also 
 
1510 ibid 45-6. 
1511 ibid 47. 
1512 ibid 75. 
1513 ibid 76. 
1514 ibid. 
1515 ibid. 
1516 ibid 75. 
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increase the quality of pre-action work, with a resulting positive effect on efficiency and 
proportionate use of resources post-issue. Codification within the rules of robust powers to 
compel parties to consider settlement would provide judges with a useful management tool, 
particularly in the context of a system that is intended to see trial as a last resort. The 
publication of detailed, and crucially practical, guidance on how to manage cases is a final 
aspect of the U.S. approach to civil litigation management that could be transposed to the 
English system. 
 
The aspects of Australian civil procedure that might most usefully be applied in England fall 
within similar categories. The obligations imposed on parties and lawyers in some jurisdictions 
are much more detailed than those imposed by the CPR. The most extreme example is Victoria, 
which also imposes a certification requirement in respect of those obligations. England is also 
once again less robust when it comes to settlement and ADR, with some Australian jurisdictions 
imposing prescriptive requirements to consider settlement or ADR, and some allowing the court 
to refer a matter to ADR without the parties’ consent. As in the U.S., guidance has been 
published in Australia on the practicalities of case management. This is a resource that would 
have real value in England. 
 
The Canadian jurisdictions are arguably the least useful. Judicial management is more limited 
in Canada, and responsibility for progress of litigation lies more prominently with the parties 
than it does in England. That is not to say, however, that they are unhelpful. The rules in some 
jurisdictions give more detail to the parties’ obligations than the CPR, an approach which might 
better serve to keep that behaviour in line with the aims of the rules. This is particularly true 
of express obligations regarding the consideration of ADR and settlement. Despite the more 
limited approach to judicial management in Canada, in some jurisdictions the court may 
require parties to participate in ADR without their consent, further highlighting the importance 
of resolution other than by trial. 
 
There is a notable consistency in these points across all three jurisdictions. This suggests that 
they are not unusual or inappropriate, rather that they are logical tools to consider in adapting 
and improving civil procedure. Each of those tools was developed within the context of the 
system in which they operate. It would be at best unhelpful, and at worst counterproductive, 
to simply transplant a procedural tool from one jurisdiction to another without considering 
whether and how it would fit within the system to which it is being transplanted. The next 
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chapter will consider, as part of proposals for dealing with the problems and inconsistencies 
identified in Chapter Four, how the points identified here might fit within the system as 



































ANALYSIS AND REFORM PROPOSALS 
 
 
The preceding chapters have explored various facets of proportionality, both as a general 
principle of law and in a procedural case management context. From the meaning and 
application of proportionality in areas of law other than civil procedure, the focus narrowed to 
the civil justice system as governed by the CPR. Starting with Lord Woolf’s review of the civil 
justice system, the introduction and development of proportionality and active judicial case 
management were traced. Procedural proportionality was then defined by comparing it to the 
more established general principle of law. The heart of this work, an analysis of CPR case 
management case law, identified inconsistencies in the application of both proportionality and 
active case management, as well as practical detail on how courts apply proportionality and 
manage cases. A step was then taken away from England, to consider how cases are managed 
in three other common law jurisdictions.  
 
In the present chapter, it is intended to bring everything together. The aim of this work is not 
only to increase understanding of proportionality in a case management context, but to provide 
practical suggestions as to how its application may be improved. This chapter sets out those 
suggestions. First, however, it will be necessary to collate the main points from the previous 
chapters and analyse preliminary issues of meaning and objective. This will provide the 
platform upon which proposals for improvement can be considered.    
 
I. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
 
Proportionality as a general principle is not unique to civil procedure. It has been a central 
aspect of various areas of law for some time.1517 Nevertheless, it is difficult to attach a precise 
meaning to the concept, and Lord Neuberger’s observation that it is ‘elusive’ has broader 
application than the costs context in which the comment was made.1518 Even the ‘tests’ for 
proportionality developed in some areas1519 do not take us very far in that regard. They use 
 
1517 See ch 2. 
1518 See ch 4 at 92-93. 
1519 See ch 2 at 29-34. 
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general terminology, leaving details to be filled in as required. In all contexts, the 
proportionality analysis is fact-specific, and being too prescriptive about meaning may reduce 
the flexibility that allows the concept to be applied to any given factual scenario. 
Proportionality provides an analytical framework, into which relevant facts can be inserted, 
rather than a rule. Over-prescriptiveness in terms of meaning misconceives the nature of the 
inquiry. 
 
Nevertheless, the proportionality analysis can be given some meaning and structure. 
Proportionality describes the relationship between two or more factors. In the contexts 
considered in Chapter Two, it describes the relationship between means and ends. Taking the 
most structured form of analysis identified in that chapter, proportionality requires that the 
ends be legitimate, that the means be suitable and necessary for achieving them, and that the 
means satisfy a cost-benefit analysis. The heart of the analysis in any context is balancing the 
rights and interests of relevant parties. If those rights and interests cannot be met to each party’s 
entire satisfaction in a given factual scenario, any limitation must go no further than is 
necessary to achieve the specified aim. Means that limit rights or interests must not be chosen 
if less burdensome means are available. The costs of pursuing those means must not outweigh 
the benefit that achievement of the aim in question will confer. Although proportionality was 
not structured in this way when it was made a central part of the CPR’s Overriding Objective, 
these aspects can be identified within proportionality in that context.1520 
 
II. CASE MANAGEMENT PROPORTIONALITY UNDER THE CPR: THE CURRENT 
POSITION 
 
Three general points can be drawn from the case law review in Chapter Four. The first is that 
inconsistency is a persistent problem in the integration and application of proportionality and 
in the adoption of a robust approach to case management. Secondly, the relationship between 
parties and the court lies at the heart of proportionate litigation and of giving full effect to the 
Overriding Objective. Finally, the application of case management proportionality is a fact-
specific exercise. These points form the foundation on which improvements to the application 








In Chapter Four, four main areas of inconsistency were identified. They covered judicial 
interpretation of the Overriding Objective, the application of inter partes and systemic 
proportionality, the extent to which courts take active and robust control of cases, the extent 
to which parties comply with CPR 1.3, and how courts respond to breaches of that duty. These 
inconsistencies cannot be explained by the fact-specific nature of case management decisions. 
They are points of principle in respect of which consistency of approach should be achievable. 
It should, for example, be possible to state that whenever a hearing has been vacated, inter 
partes and systemic considerations were taken into account. Instead, there are instances where 
hearings have been vacated without any explicit consideration of systemic issues.1521 The pre-
CPR approach that compensating for prejudice by way of a costs order is sufficient should not 
persist; however, this was articulated relatively recently by the Court of Appeal.1522 Courts 
should consistently criticise and, where appropriate, sanction parties for breach of CPR 1.3, but 
there is a tendency at times to accept that aggressive, unco-operative litigation is the norm.1523 
Each type of inconsistency undermines the Overriding Objective by preventing both it and its 
underlying concepts of justice from becoming fully embedded within the civil justice system. 
Inconsistency in and of itself is also a problem. A consistent approach allows judges to identify 
more easily how they might deal with a particular issue. It allows parties and lawyers to plan 
with confidence and efficiency, as it will be easier to take a view on how a case management 
question might be decided. This may mean that parties are less likely to take a high risk or 
tactical approach, as the detrimental consequences of such an approach will be more 
predictable. One of the main aims of the proposals that follow is to remove, or at least to reduce, 
these inconsistencies. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTIES AND THE COURT 
 
Inconsistencies in judicial interpretation of the Overriding Objective and the application of 
proportionality are within the court’s control. The court also controls the extent to which a 
robust approach is taken to case management, however it is the parties that provide the 
information on the basis of which management decisions are made. They must also comply 
with those decisions. Parties’ behaviour may also increase the need for judicial intervention. 
 
1521 See ch 4 at 146-149. 
1522 See ch 4 at 89. 
1523 See ch 4 at 115-116. 
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This creates a link to the final inconsistency, parties’ compliance with CPR 1.3. Just as the 
parties are not irrelevant to case management, neither is the court irrelevant to party 
compliance. Parties and lawyers are autonomous entities that cannot be completely controlled, 
but the court can direct their behaviour through its approach to management and non-
compliance, for example through appropriate use and enforcement of orders and sanctions. 
Full engagement is required from both sides if litigation is to proceed proportionately. This 
relationship must be borne in mind when considering how to improve case management 
proportionality. It is not enough, for example, to provide guidance on or even supplement the 
rules in respect of matters to be dealt with at a CMC, if no consideration is given to how parties 
might best be required to provide the comprehensive information that must form the basis of 
a useful CMC. As judges are encouraged to take early and robust control of cases, parties and 
lawyers must be steered towards a co-operative approach that supports judicial control. 
 
There is the potential for conflict within the relationship between parties and the court. They 
have different aims, meaning that the court’s determination as to whether a decision is 
proportionate may be different to, and indeed conflict with, a party’s view on the same issue. 
The court’s aim is, or should be, that set out in the Overriding Objective. In an ideal world, 
parties’ aims would chime with the court’s, in that they would prioritise proportionate litigation 
and compliance with the rules, in particular the Overriding Objective and CPR 1.3. In reality, 
their aims are more personal. A party will want to succeed on the merits at trial or to otherwise 
bring litigation to as advantageous a conclusion as possible. Their conception of proportionality 
will support those aims. It will minimise cost and prejudice to themselves while shifting any 
disadvantages to their opponents. This is an intensely inter partes approach, yet one that will 
differ to that taken by the court, which can take an objective approach to balancing inter partes 
interests that parties are unable or unwilling to take. Parties are unlikely to give much 
unprompted thought to the interests of their opponent. The same is true of systemic issues, 
unless there is a tactical advantage in doing so, and a party may overestimate the proportion 
of court resources that should be allocated to their case. The court should in any event be better 
informed as to systemic consequences. This tension will prevent the full implementation of the 
Overriding Objective unless one player steers the other in that direction. That steering must be 
done by the court. In taking control it must be aware that it will have to divert parties clearly 






Courts have emphasised that management decisions are limited to the facts of a case, and that 
caution must be exercised in how they are treated in subsequent cases.1524 This is in line with 
the discussion in Chapter Two, which highlighted that the proportionality analysis is tied to the 
facts of the case at hand.1525 This fact-specific characteristic applies at the inter partes and 
systemic levels. On an inter partes level, every case has its own unique set of facts and 
circumstances within which proportionate management decisions must sit. On a systemic level, 
those facts and circumstances mean that each case interacts with the system as a whole in a 
unique way. The underlying facts may be sufficiently serious to justify the allocation of more 
court resources than might be allocated to a less serious case of commensurate monetary value. 
Alternatively, the parties’ resources may be sufficiently plentiful that they should have been 
able to keep to an ordered timetable and as such there is no justification for adjourning a 
hearing, with the resulting increase in use of court resources. This aspect of proportionality 
means that care must be taken in using existing case law as a basis for improvement. This will 
be considered further below, in the context of proposals on the publication of guidance. 
 
III. IMPROVING CASE MANAGEMENT PROPORTIONALITY 
 
SHOULD PROPORTIONALITY BE REPLACED? 
 
Assy has recently proposed that proportionality should be replaced with tests for affordability 
and expedition.1526 His contention is that the considerations relevant to proportionality, such 
as value, importance, complexity, and the financial positions of the parties, are ‘open-ended 
and potentially conflicting, rendering the proportionality test all but meaningless’.1527 The 
current definition of proportionality, Assy argues, does not rule out a scenario in which ‘the 
resources allocated to a case are beyond the reach of either or both parties, because their 
financial means are just one consideration among many’.1528 Replacing proportionality with 
tests for affordability and expedition would ensure that cost and time as dimensions of justice 
 
1524 See ch 4 at 93-94. 
1525 See ch 2 at 45. 
1526 Rabeea Assy, ‘Taking Seriously Affordability, Expedition, and Integrity in Adjudication’ in Principles, 
Procedure, and Justice: Essays in Honour of Adrian Zuckerman, ed. Rabeea Assy and Andrew Higgins 




mean something ‘more than merely eliminating waste’.1529 He suggests that if cost and time are 
dimensions of justice, then the costs and time spent on any given proceeding become criteria 
for measuring the quality of the process.1530 There ‘can be no doubt that expensive and lengthy 
litigations are bad in and of themselves and should be avoided; no intangible [sic] value lies in 
them’.1531 Assy’s proposal assumes that it is possible in the abstract to identify a costs figure that 
is ‘too expensive’ or an amount of time from issue to judgment that is ‘too long’. It suggests that 
there is a point at which, regardless of the features of an individual case and of the parties’ 
interests in fighting it, expenditure of more time and money in pursuit of an accurate judgment 
is inappropriate.  
 
Against Assy, it might be argued that if proportionality is used correctly, it is a more useful tool 
than narrower tests for affordability and expedition. ‘Inappropriate’ values for cost and time 
cannot be identified with any precision without weighing cost and time against other features 
of the parties and the case. Simply saying that £100,000 of costs or a two-year timetable to 
trial is ‘too expensive’ or ‘too long’ means little on its own. We are better able to understand 
why £100,000 is too expensive if that expenditure is compared to, for example, the value of a 
case, or its importance to either the parties or the public at large. Similarly, we can better 
understand why a two-year timetable to trial is too long if that timeframe is considered against 
the context of lengthy delay posing an insolvency risk for one party, or where a party has 
already had to endure significant delays. The meaning of ‘expensive’ and ‘lengthy’ cannot be 
judged, at least in a non-arbitrary way, without comparison to other factors. Ignoring those 
factors would itself increase the risk of injustice. Requiring comparisons to those other factors 
then brings us back in any event to the proportionality analysis. Assy’s comment that the open-
ended factors underlying that analysis render ‘the proportionality test all but meaningless’ fails 
to appreciate the nature of proportionality and the advantages that lie in its flexibility. 
Proportionality is not a ‘test’, it is a malleable analytical framework to which the circumstances 
of any case can be added. If all relevant factors are added and balanced, the outcome should 
be proportionate. The scenario identified by Assy, whereby a ‘proportionate’ allocation of 
resources is beyond the reach of either or both parties would be unlikely to arise. This mere 




1530 ibid 186. 
1531 ibid. 
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Proportionality is by no means a perfect tool. This can be seen in the issues of 
incommensurability and in the difficulty of developing consistent bodies of decisions from a 
fact-sensitive analysis. However, its advantages in terms of flexibility and the fact that it can be 
applied to the broadest possible range of factual scenarios outweigh any disadvantages. If 
properly applied, and if all relevant factors are weighed in the balance, proportionality is a 




Having decided that proportionality will be retained, the next preliminary step is to identify 
the objectives of any improvement measures. There is no one perfect way to manage a case or 
to apply proportionality. A consequence of the fact-specific nature of the exercise is that what 
works in one case may not work in others. The broad judicial management discretion means 
that within the context of a single case or decision, there may be more than one proportionate 
solution. Improvement measures cannot, therefore, dictate a ‘correct’ way of applying 
proportionality that will apply in every case. In line with the interplay between the role of the 
court and that of parties and lawyers, the aims must be approached from two directions. From 
the court’s perspective, the aim is to ensure that proportionality is applied consistently and in 
accordance with the principles of justice underlying the Overriding Objective. This is not a case 
of requiring or even encouraging identical application across different cases, but instead 
ensuring that all relevant factors are taken into account in every case. Parties and lawyers, on 
the other hand, need to be aware of the nature of their duties to the court and to each other, 
of what amounts to non-compliance, and of its potential consequences. They also need to be 
able to predict, at least generally, how the court will manage a case or will respond to a 
particular action by one of the parties. Conduct of the litigation can then be planned 
accordingly.  
 
The targets of improvement actions must also be identified. This comes down to the nature and 
purpose of case management. In managing a case, the court controls its progress through the 
litigation process. Ultimately, however, the court is controlling the actions of parties and 
lawyers: cases are not autonomous and cannot progress of their own accord. Once again, the 
question must be approached from two directions. From the court’s perspective, improvement 
measures should aim to encourage and enable courts to exercise more effective control, while 
from the perspective of parties and lawyers they should aim to incentivise compliance. One 
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crucial target is the so-called ‘culture change’ that lies at the heart of Lord Woolf’s reports and 
subsequent amendments to the CPR. This is not just a pithy phrase: it is the practical context 
within which civil litigation is conducted, and which underpins decisions made by parties, 
lawyers and judges. ‘Culture’ in this context denotes the attitudes and aims that all players in 
the process bring to the conduct of civil litigation. The litigation culture that the CPR was 
intended to embody is one of a co-operative approach within a managed system where the 
court, rather than the parties, controls the progress of cases in a manner that balances inter 
partes and systemic interests. The extent to which this culture is embedded within the civil 
litigation system remains inconsistent.  
 
Without a true culture change, attempts at improvement will simply patch up expensive or 
time-consuming issues, with superficial effects that are limited in scope and longevity. 
Improvement measures will have a more enduring impact if they aim to strengthen the 
litigation culture recommended by Lord Woolf. Sorabji has noted that an essential element of 
ensuring a true culture change is a clear line of Court of Appeal authorities that reflect the new 
culture.1532 Zuckerman has identified the Court of Appeal’s failure to ‘speak with one voice’ in 
articulating how the CPR are to be applied.1533 The role of the Court of Appeal is certainly 
important; however, even clear statements by appeal courts on the requirements of 
proportionate litigation are not always followed.1534 When they are adopted by lower courts it 
may be too late. Citing requirements that parties should litigate proportionately after they have 
already spent time litigating disproportionately is of limited use. Practical, day to day 
management decisions, consistent with the intended culture, will assist in embedding that 
culture within the system. They will build up into a body of case law from which judges can 
draw appropriate guidance, and which will inform how lawyers approach litigation, how they 
advise their clients, and in turn shape clients’ expectations and attitudes. Improvement 
measures aimed at bolstering that body of consistent management decisions should have a 
significant impact on litigation culture as a whole. 
 
Care must also be taken to ensure that so-called ‘improvements’ are not in fact 
counterproductive in that they increase expenditure of time, costs and resources. If, for 
example, an attempt to ensure a more consistent application of case management 
 
1532 Sorabji, English Civil Justice (n 7) 239. 
1533 Adrian Zuckerman, ‘The continuing management deficit in the administration of civil justice’ 
(2015) 34(1) CJQ 1, 2. 
1534 See ch 4 at 162-163. 
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proportionality requires the court to spend too much time on a complex decision-making 
process, this is arguably in itself disproportionate. It is important, however, to look at each 
individual case as a whole, and within the context of the civil litigation system. A case cannot 
proceed without expenditure of some time, costs and resources, and viewing any such 
expenditure negatively is inappropriate and unhelpful. Where expenditure exists, it must be 
proportionate. Spending some additional time and resources on case management, where that 
will result in savings in the broader context of both the case and the system as a whole, can be 
a positive investment. As is often the case where proportionality is concerned, the solution is 
balance, and improvement measures must strike that balance. There are various options 
available, each with their own advantages and disadvantages. Just as there is no one perfect 
way to apply case management proportionality, there is unlikely to be one perfect way to 
achieve the identified aims. 
 
A PROPORTIONALITY TEST? 
 
The main limbs of the proportionality tests established in other areas of law1535 are applicable 
in a case management context.1536 This raises the question as to whether it would be appropriate 
to introduce a test for case management proportionality. A test gives predictable structure to 
the analysis and promotes consistency in decision-making. It also promotes transparency, in 
that more of the underlying reasoning may be visible in the judgment, although the fact that 
the tests themselves use general terminology limits this particular advantage. A formal test is 
also useful for practitioners and parties. They can more easily plan their litigation strategy and 
focus procedural applications if they are aware of the structure that the court will use to 
consider case management issues.  
 
There are, however, disadvantages to introducing a formal test. This is arguably too prescriptive 
an approach to a flexible principle, although there is limited weight in this particular argument 
given that any test could be drafted in broad terms and applied flexibly. Other disadvantages 
carry more weight. The provision of more detailed reasoning would provide more ammunition 
to parties wanting to appeal case management decisions, something that judges are likely to 
be anxious to avoid. This is not to say that rules should be drafted so as to deter legitimate 
appeals, and the standard of appeal for case management decisions would remain high, but an 
 
1535 See ch 2 at 29-34. 
1536 See ch 3 at 77-82. 
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increase in interlocutory appeals would not further the Overriding Objective. Introduction of a 
test also has the potential to overcomplicate the decision-making process. Following a multi-
stage structured test for every case management decision would be time-consuming. As a result, 
expenditure of costs and resources would likely increase. One major difference between case 
management proportionality and the areas of law considered in Chapter Two is the frequency 
with which case management decisions are made. They are much more frequent than, for 
example, the judicial review of public authority decisions. Every litigation case will incorporate 
many such decisions, some of which will be easier to make than others. This requires a practical 
approach, and one that does not make the decision-making process too rigid or time-
consuming. The disadvantages of a proportionality test outweigh the advantages, and its 
introduction would be likely to cause more problems than it solves. However, aspects of existing 




Case law as a Source of Guidance 
 
Details can be drawn from the case law as to factors that judges consider when applying 
proportionality and managing cases. The former can be seen, for example, in the forms of 
prejudice identified and the aspects of a litigant’s financial position that are considered, while 
the latter can be seen in measures such as staged disclosure and forensic approaches to the 
amendment of statements of case. When considering whether and how to translate this 
information into practical guidance, two issues arise: first, that case management does not 
immediately appear to lend itself to the lifting of considerations or techniques from one case 
to another, and secondly that there is an incommensurability at the heart of proportionality 
that may resist the development of concrete guidance.  
 
The fact-specific and discretionary nature of case management decisions means that the 
application of principles to facts can rarely be used as a direct authority in subsequent cases. It 
is unlikely that any two cases will feature the same combination of facts. This specificity will 
also limit the reach of appellate oversight. However, this does not mean that previous decisions 
have no value. First, principles must be separated from their application to the facts. Cases with 
different facts can reinforce the same point of principle, for example that evidence must be 
sufficiently relevant to an issue in dispute if it is to be admitted. In considering a case’s value 
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as authority, there is no need to go beyond this to whether and how a particular piece of 
evidence was relevant. Cases are useful in identifying in the first place the principles and factors 
that may need to be considered. The CPR is not comprehensive in this regard and case law can 
supplement the rules. Cases are also a useful means of identifying practical management tools, 
such as forms of order or ways to approach and control issues. It is unlikely that a particular 
order or technique can be lifted from one case and applied without adjustment to another, but 
awareness of a wide range of techniques allows judges to adapt a technique to the case before 
them, and perhaps to discover new management methods. A full awareness of factors 
considered and approaches taken in other cases, such as could be provided by comprehensive 
guidance, should result in better informed and more consistent decision-making. 
 
It is here that the issue of incommensurability arises. This is a criticism of proportionality as a 
general principle,1537 and is as much an issue in the procedural context. It is difficult to assign 
concrete values to relevant factors to aid in the balancing exercise, and to identify a standard 
of comparison common to all potentially relevant factors in the proportionality analysis. Each 
factor is relevant to one or more of the core concepts of justice (i.e. inter partes substantive 
justice, inter partes procedural justice and systemic procedural justice), but those concepts may 
conflict. Taking the example of an application to allow in witness evidence close to trial: how 
does one balance relevance, additional work that the evidence would impose on the 
respondent, and the potential lengthening or even adjournment of the trial that allowing in the 
evidence may require? There is no central standard against which these questions can be 
measured, other than ‘compliance with the Overriding Objective’, which is not helpful as it 
simply brings the analysis back to balancing the core concepts of justice. Ultimately, the final 
balance will come down to an individual judge’s intuition, albeit based on knowledge and 
experience, as to the justice of the situation. This raises the question as to whether it is even 
possible to provide guidance on how the relevant factors might be balanced in a logical and 
consistent way.  
 
Situations can be identified in which it might be possible to be prescriptive. Take, for example, 
two cases in which the facts are the same, including factors such as complexity, party resources, 
importance, length of trial and amount of evidence required, but the monetary value of one 
case is higher than the other. In that situation, it can be said confidently that the higher value 
alone of one case does not justify the expenditure of any additional time, costs or resources, 
 
1537 See ch 2 at 46-48. 
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because that case could be resolved with the same expenditure as the lower value case. Any 
additional expenditure is disproportionate. The same logic could be applied to a single case 
where the value increases, but all other factors remain the same. That value increase in and of 
itself will not justify an increase in time, costs and resources, which again would be 
disproportionate. This was the point made, in the context of expert evidence, in CIP 
Properties.1538 The problem is that these scenarios are artificial. Rarely, if ever, will two cases 
or litigants be exactly the same, meaning that no two combinations of proportionality factors 
will be the same. Where value increases, other factors may also change, such as the complexity 
of the issues or the amount of evidence required, which may then bring in other factors such 
as relevance. Even if two cases were to increase in financial value by identical amounts, those 
other factors may change to different degrees. Hypotheticals may be useful in testing how 
proportionality might be applied, but imposing rules as to how certain factors should be 
balanced in particular circumstances would introduce the impossible task of identifying all 
possible combinations of facts and factors. It would also impose unwarranted rigidity onto the 
flexible case management discretion. This does not, however, mean that there is no scope for 
guidance. If it were to take the form of a guide to the potentially relevant factors, how they 
might be balanced, and practical suggestions as to orders and other case management actions, 
judges could be assisted in achieving a more consistent application of proportionality whilst 
maintaining flexibility.  
 
Guidance for Judges 
 
Judges’ broad case management discretion is central to ensuring that management can be 
tailored to the needs of each case, but it also risks inconsistency. Supplementing the CPR with 
practical guidance, such as that produced in the U.S. and Australia,1539 would reduce this risk, 
while retaining crucial flexibility. Flexibility would also be maintained by ensuring that 
guidance does not remain static, rather that it is regularly updated and amended to reflect the 
most recent case law and management techniques. This guidance would have advantages over 
the White Book1540 and the Green Book.1541 Both texts comment on the entire CPR. Specific 
focus on case management would allow inclusion of more detail on factors relevant to 
management decisions. That detail would inform suggestions as to management techniques 
 
1538 See ch 4 at 122. 
1539 See ch 5 at 178-180, 197-198. 
1540 Civil Procedure (Sweet & Maxwell 2021). 
1541 The Civil Court Practice (LexisNexis 2021). 
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and how judges might approach different management issues. The guidance would therefore 
incorporate a level of practical detail which goes beyond that in either the White or Green Book.  
 
The meaning of the Overriding Objective 
 
The meaning of the Overriding Objective, specifically the need to balance substantive and 
procedural justice, and inter partes and systemic considerations, would feature prominently in 
this guidance. Judges could be encouraged to refer explicitly to each of these factors when 
giving reasons for a case management decision. Consideration was given to making this a 
requirement within the CPR, however a prescriptive approach might be counterproductive. It 
is important that judges retain maximum flexibility as to the content of their judgments. There 
is also the risk that a prescriptive requirement would turn the inclusion of these issues into little 
more than a tick-box exercise. On the other hand, their inclusion in non-prescriptive guidance 
first reminds judges of their relevance, and secondly allows them to incorporate them into their 
judgment in the most appropriate way. The guidance would, however, need to make clear the 
benefits of expressly including references to these points in a judgment. This would contribute 
to more consistent application in future cases. It would also make clear to parties and lawyers 
that the court will always consider the provision of procedural as well as substantive justice, 
and will take into account rights and interests beyond those of the case at hand. This should 
prompt parties and lawyers to take those considerations into account when progressing a case 




Judges would be encouraged to take early, active control of cases. The guidance would suggest 
various ways in which this might be done. This could include general advice, such as noting 
that judges can take an active approach to management without being bound by or waiting for 
a party’s proposal or application. It could also include more specific advice. A variety of case 
management techniques were identified in Chapter Four, for example imposing limits on the 
length and content of pleadings, ordering a staged approach to disclosure, requiring parties to 
identify witnesses of fact in their statements of case and ordering sequential exchange of expert 
evidence. The guidance would not prescribe certain techniques or suggest that some are more 
appropriate or effective than others. It would highlight that case management is a fact-specific 
exercise, and that it is crucial to its success that management orders are tailored to the needs 
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of a case rather than transposed from one to another. By collating information on different 
management techniques, the guidance would allow judges to consider a broader range of 
options than they might otherwise have done. 
 
A useful addition to this section would be a list of issues to be considered and questions to be 
asked at a CMC, similar to those included in the U.S. guidance.1542 This would enable judges to 
take control of the CMC by asking pertinent questions and ensuring, so far as possible, that 
potential problems are discovered and either dealt with on the spot or factored into the 
management going forward. Parties and lawyers could also use this list to fully prepare for a 
CMC. Matters on the list would include discussion of settlement and ADR and of steps taken to 
date, consideration of statements of case and identification of the main issues in dispute, and 
consideration of witness and expert evidence and the scope of disclosure, including relevant 
issues and practicalities. Judges should be encouraged to ask questions on these matters of 
their own initiative, rather than waiting for counsel to raise, for example, disagreements over 
issues in dispute or potential practical issues with providing disclosure. The guidance could 
also encourage judges to make clear to parties and lawyers, at the earliest opportunity, the 
court’s expectations in terms of behaviour, co-operation and compliance as well as the potential 
consequences of non-compliance. This is an approach often taken by U.S. management 
judges.1543 It might be argued that it is for lawyers to explain these points to their clients, 
however lawyers may be as culpable as parties themselves in taking an aggressive and non-
compliant approach. A clear and early on-the-record expression of the court’s expectations, and 
the risks of flouting them, would not only set the tone for the proceedings, but might bolster 
lawyers in advising clients to take a more co-operative approach. 
 
Proportionality: meaning and application 
 
Although there will be no structured proportionality test, the four limbs and some explanation 
as to their meaning would be a useful addition to case management guidance. This would give 
clarity and definition to the meaning of proportionality, and would provide starting points from 
which to commence the analysis. That could then be undertaken with the aid of a checklist.1544 
The aim of the checklist is not to set a rigid structure for the analysis, rather to serve as an aide-
mémoire as to factors that may be relevant. It is unlikely that all matters will be relevant in all 
 
1542 See ch 5 at 178-180. 
1543 See ch 5 at 179. 
1544 See Appendix One. 
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cases, but it would be better to consider and immediately dismiss a particular factor than to 
fail to consider it at all. Giving the checklist the status of guidance, rather than formalising it 
in a rule or Practice Direction, retains flexibility. The incorporation of a checklist into the rules 
might risk ossification, rather than allowing it to remain as a tool that can be used as 
appropriate and can be easily supplemented and amended. This would also avoid the problem 
highlighted by the Court of Appeal, that judge-made checklists can lead to a ‘mechanical’ 
application of relevant factors.1545 
 
The checklist does not contain any information on how the various factors should be balanced 
against each other. Consideration was given to creating a matrix to be populated by scores 
given to each relevant factor, with the score dependent on the importance of that factor in the 
analysis at hand. The problem with this approach is that while the balance can be determined 
easily once scores have been added to the matrix, questions of weight and incommensurability 
are just shifted back a stage. It would be artificial to give any factor a score without considering 
its place in the overall scheme of the matter. This approach would not remove or make any 
easier the issue of how relevant factors should be balanced; indeed, it would add an 
unnecessary layer of complexity. It is preferable to identify the potentially relevant factors, and 
to leave the weight to be given to those factors to the decision-maker’s discretion. Where 
appropriate, items on the checklist would cross-refer to more detailed commentary. 
 
The checklist distils the factors identified in Chapter Four. These can be divided into factors 
relating to the case, to the parties and to wider systemic interests, although there is inevitably 
some overlap between them. The main case-related factors are value, complexity, relevance 
and the substantive merits. Value reflects not only monetary value, but also the importance of 
non-monetary considerations, such as reputation, and remedies such as injunctions. The 
greater the value, the more likely it is that a higher expenditure of costs, time and resources 
will be proportionate. An important aspect of this factor is value to the parties, which includes 
characteristics such as their financial positions, and the effect that the proceedings may have 
on their reputation.  Failure to consider that aspect risks placing inappropriate weight on the 
decision-maker’s own preconceptions as to value, although it must be borne in mind that a 
party might place an exaggerated value on its claim. Value and importance to the wider public 
and the administration of justice in general must also be considered. Cases involving public 
bodies may have greater value in this regard than disputes between private individuals or 
 
1545 See ch 4 at 93. 
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entities, as may cases which deal with a point of substantive law that is widely applicable, for 
example in a consumer context. On a broader level, all cases have an inherent value in this 
regard as it is in the interests of the public and the administration of justice for matters to be 
dealt with, and to be seen to be dealt with, in accordance with the Overriding Objective. 
Turning to complexity, the more complex the issues, the easier it will be to justify expenditure 
of time, costs and resources on the basis of proportionality. It is important, however, to identify 
the true nature of the issues. Simple issues can be drafted so as to make them appear complex, 
and the court must determine complexity for itself. It is also important to separate value and 
complexity: a high value claim is not necessarily a complex one, and vice versa.  
 
The more relevant the subject of a decision is to one or more of the issues in dispute, the more 
likely it is that a higher expenditure of time, costs and resources will be proportionate. There 
are shades of nuance within this point. A proper consideration of relevance requires the issues 
to be identified and situated within the matrix of the case as a whole. Some issues will be 
central and determinative, while others will be more peripheral. The former are likely to merit 
more attention than the latter. Relevance must also be viewed as a spectrum. There will be an 
interplay between relevance and the centrality of issues, in that the subject of a decision could 
be essential to determining a peripheral issue, or merely useful in determining a centrally 
important issue. Where the balance lies will be a fact-specific decision.  
 
As to the substantive merits, once again the position is not black and white: the extent to which 
the merits are relevant will depend on both the nature of the decision being made and the stage 
of the proceedings at which that decision is made. There are two important points to remember 
in this context. The first is that the court should not conduct any kind of trial process at an 
interlocutory stage. Striking a balance between this and the need to take a robust approach to 
matters such as narrowing the issues in dispute may prove to be a delicate operation. Secondly, 
the merits are only one factor to be weighed in the balance and do not have any inherently 
greater weight than any other factor. This point is explicitly made on the checklist, to avoid a 
reversion to the RSC approach of prioritising substantive justice. 
 
The party-related factors on the checklist are inter partes prejudice, asymmetry, legitimate 
expectations and conduct. Several questions can help identify prejudice to a party. A judge can 
consider, for example, whether additional work will be required because of a decision, 
including whether any of that work will be duplicative and whether the burden of carrying it 
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out will fall more heavily on one party than others. They can ask whether there will be any 
delay and, if so, what effect it might have on the parties. In some cases, delay will have little 
practical effect. In others, prolonging litigation might adversely affect a party’s financial 
situation or reduce their chances of recovering on any eventual judgment if their opponent is 
in a financially precarious position. Prejudice may also take the form of an inability to pursue 
all or part of a case, or to put certain evidence before the court. This ties into relevance, in that 
not all cases and evidence are equal. A party is likely to suffer greater prejudice if it cannot 
present evidence that is essential to determining a central issue, than if the evidence is merely 
useful or the issue peripheral. Prejudice is also relevant to the question of party asymmetry. 
Asymmetry between parties can take various forms, for example asymmetry of information, 
where one party has most of the evidence required in its possession, or asymmetry of resources, 
where one party is able to engage more manpower in exercises such as disclosure or is able by 
the nature of its business to field more witnesses with expertise on a particular subject. 
Compensating for such asymmetry may render proportionate expenditure of time, costs and 
resources that might not be justified if the parties were on an equal footing. The extent to which 
prejudice can be compensated in costs cannot be disregarded, but it is also not decisive: the 
mere existence of prejudice must itself be weighed in the balance. 
 
Parties have legitimate expectations as to how cases will progress. They are, for example, 
entitled to assume that deadlines will be met and trial windows kept, and that they must meet 
and investigate their opponent’s case as pleaded.1546 It was noted in Chapter Four that while 
only a few cases expressly refer to the relevance to case management decisions of those 
expectations, their importance implicitly underlies many more such decisions.1547  As such, this 
factor is a part of some of those already considered. It also provides a useful additional angle, 
particularly where a party has made assurances from which they later seek to resile. Legitimate 
expectations are also linked to the final party-related factor on the checklist, namely conduct. 
Parties often conduct litigation in a manner that does not comply with CPR 1.3. Non-compliant 
conduct will not inevitably lead to the disproportionate expenditure of time, costs and 
resources, but it may well do so. There are different ways in which party conduct can be 
factored into management decisions. It is important first to consider the extent to which 
conduct has affected the progress of the case to date. If party conduct has already caused delay 
or the unnecessary expenditure of costs or resources, this may weigh against an indulgence 
 
1546 See ch 4 at 136. 
1547 See ch 4 at 136-137. 
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that might otherwise be granted. Secondly, if parties have taken a non-compliant approach to 
date, they may continue to do so, and this should be factored in to how the court manages a 
case going forward. Judicial control of party behaviour is a central aspect of case management. 
The fact that aggressive, disproportionate behaviour is so prevalent highlights the importance 
of including consideration of such behaviour in the checklist. 
 
The checklist then turns to systemic considerations. These are central to the Overriding 
Objective and case management, yet there is inconsistency in their application. Systemic issues 
can arise in a variety of ways. A matter may take up court time due to a large number of 
interlocutory applications, or late adjournment of trial may create a gap in the lists that cannot 
be filled at short notice. Removal and re-listing will both affect the court’s diary. Time used by 
one case cannot be used by another. The checklist recognises that there is a limit to the extent 
to which a court can fully assess the systemic consequences of an action or decision. In some 
instances, it may be possible to analyse the lists and determine these issues, but in many it will 
not. This potential lack of precision is not, however, a reason to ignore systemic considerations. 
The fact that an action or decision will have systemic consequences of any kind must be factored 
in. The inconsistency identified in Chapter Four makes this a particularly important item on 
the checklist. Judges should be encouraged to refer to systemic issues even if the result of the 
decision is such that consideration of those issues would not change the outcome. 
 
Sorabji has set out a proposed two-stage approach to applying proportionality in a relief from 
sanctions context.1548 This makes satisfying a requirement of systemic proportionality both 
determinative1549 and a condition precedent of moving on to an inter partes analysis.1550 A 
defaulting party would have to show that their default was ‘minimal in respect of the case 
management timetable set for its case’.1551 In Sorabji’s view, this would avoid the court lapsing 
into finding that because a trial on the merits was still possible, relief should be granted.1552 In 
other words, it would prevent the court from continuing to prioritise inter partes substantive 
justice. Anything more flexible, such as making the first stage of the test ‘merely indicative’ of 
how the court should exercise its discretion, would mean that the systemic aspect of 
proportionality would ‘be given no more than lip service’.1553 Sorabji goes onto say that this 
 
1548 See ch 1 at 21. 
1549 Sorabji, English Civil Justice (n 7) 246. Sorabji uses the term ‘collective proportionality’. 
1550 ibid 248. 
1551 ibid. 
1552 ibid. 
1553 ibid 246. 
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approach emphasises ‘the paramountcy of distributive justice over individual justice, and that 
the latter is only achieved through the former’.1554 This distributive justice is Lord Woolf’s 
conception of justice, which balances substantive justice, economy, efficiency, equality and 
proportionality, supporting the public policy aim of ensuring a fair distribution of limited 
resources.1555  
 
Sorabji’s proposal is based on concerns that courts were too often and quickly granting relief 
from sanctions decisions on a substantive inter partes basis and were not giving sufficient 
weight to systemic considerations. In making systemic considerations determinative, however, 
it risks leaning too far in the opposite direction. Systemic proportionality is only one factor to 
weigh in the balance. In some cases, the court will balance inter partes and systemic factors and 
determine that compliance with the Overriding Objective does require vacation of a hearing or 
amendment of a timetable.1556 Management decisions that comply with the Overriding 
Objective require analysis of the interplay between inter partes and systemic issues that a strict 
two stage approach does not allow. Imposing too rigid a structure on decisions that rest on an 
exercise of discretion may be counterproductive. It is impossible to identify every possible 
scenario, which means that imposing such a structure removes crucial flexibility. It is not, 
therefore, appropriate to incorporate this kind of structured approach into any case 
management guidance. If the guidance is clear on the equal weight to be given to substantive 
and procedural justice, and inter partes and systemic interests, this should be sufficient to steer 
judicial decision-making towards the correct approach. 
 
Controlling party behaviour 
 
The final point to be considered is party behaviour. This would cover the importance of 
controlling that behaviour, how it might be done, and how to respond when behaviour is 
disproportionate. The concern here is behaviour that does not comply with CPR 1.3, rather 
than non-compliance with court orders, as the latter will often have a built-in structure of 
consequences and sanctions. The court has two general categories of tools: those that relate to 
managing the progress and scope of the litigation, and those that relate to the costs of the 
litigation. The former ties into the need for early, active management. It must be made clear 
that an aim of that management is to control parties’ future behaviour, and decisions should 
 
1554 ibid 250. 
1555 ibid 3. 
1556 See ch 4 at 140-141. 
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be made with that aim in mind. Where, for example, interactions to date indicate a combative 
relationship between parties, the court may consider including specific co-operation 
requirements, perhaps with related progress reports, in its orders. In terms of costs, the court 
manages costs ex ante and makes costs orders ex post, with the latter being made at both 
interlocutory and final stages. Costs measures alone may be insufficient to control party 
behaviour. Costs management controls recoverable costs, but there is nothing to stop a party 
deciding to spend more than an agreed budget. The number of cases cited in Chapter Four 
where indemnity costs were awarded because a weak claim was pursued beyond the point 
where parties and lawyers should have known that it was hopeless suggests that the threat of 
a costs order is simply not enough. The intensely case-specific approach likely to be taken by 
parties and lawyers may incorporate a view that while other cases may have been subject to 
adverse costs orders, their own can be distinguished in some way. Costs measures must be 
combined with other management techniques in a multi-directional approach to controlling 
and directing parties’ behaviour.  
 
A consistently robust response to non-compliance with CPR 1.3 is crucial to controlling party 
behaviour in specific cases and across the system more generally. In individual cases, if parties 
do not see immediate, concrete consequences to disproportionate behaviour which affects 
either their pocket or their ability to present or progress their case, there is little incentive for 
them to adapt that behaviour. In more general terms, parties and particularly lawyers will look 
to other cases for indications as to how a certain approach or specific actions might be treated 
by the court. The more inconsistent and less robust the court’s response to disproportionate 
behaviour, the greater the likelihood that a risk might be taken. In addition, as parties and the 
court are likely to have different definitions of proportionate behaviour,1557 the court needs to 
be clear and consistent in imposing consequences on behaviour that falls outside its definition. 
The guidance might propose, for example, that courts consider imposing immediate 
interlocutory costs consequences, combined with specific requirements in management 
directions and orders going forward aimed at preventing similar behaviour. Where a court sees 
fit to criticise parties, consideration should be given to whether any immediate, tangible 
consequences can stem from that criticism. A generally stricter approach should be 
recommended, reflecting the support given by the case law to Lord Woolf’s determination that 
parties are unlikely to regulate their own behaviour to the required standard.  
 
 
1557 See above at 204. 
 221 
Guidance for Practitioners 
 
Guidance for judges would also be useful for practitioners. It is impossible to predict precisely 
how a judge will approach an issue. However, if guidance is published, and importantly 
followed, this will provide a clearer idea of how a case is likely to be managed. Guidance on 
issues to be dealt with at a CMC, for example, would enable lawyers to prepare appropriately. 
The proportionality checklist would provide insight into the reasoning behind management 
decisions and would enable applications and submissions to the court to be more accurately 
focused. There is, however, a case for guidance specifically aimed at practitioners, the central 
pillar of which would be the CPR 1.3 duty. The broad shape of this duty can be identified, even 
if precise boundaries are more difficult to pin down.1558 Guidance can be given on the 
importance of co-operation, with opponents and the court, and what this entails. 
Correspondence must be engaged with, for example, and in a helpful rather than aggressive 
manner. Tactical moves and game playing must be avoided. Settlement must be considered 
where appropriate. Parties must factor in systemic considerations when making decisions as to 
how they want a case to progress. These requirements may be antithetical to the way in which 
many parties want their cases to be run. A useful addition to guidance for practitioners would 
be pointers on matters to explain to clients at the start of a litigation matter. This could include 
the meaning and aims of the Overriding Objective and the co-operation requirements inherent 
in CPR 1.3. The potential consequences of non-compliance should also be explained. These 
matters could easily be included in a letter of engagement or other early communication with 
a client. A clear explanation at the start of a matter should mean that lawyers are better able 
to manage both the file and their client’s expectations in a way that is consistent with the 
Overriding Objective.  
 
This guidance would differ from existing handbooks, such as the Commercial Court Guide1559 
(‘CCG’) and the Technology and Construction Court Guide1560 (‘TCCG’). The CCG makes no 
reference to CPR 1.3 other than setting out the text of the rule in an appendix, although it is 
stated that the court expects ‘a high level of co-operation and realism from the legal 
representatives of the parties’ which applies ‘to dealings (including correspondence) between 
 
1558 See ch 3 at 74-75. 
1559 The Commercial Court Guide, HM Courts and Tribunals Service (10th edn, 2017). 
1560 The Technology and Construction Court Guide, HM Courts and Tribunals Service (2nd edn, 5th 
revision, 2015).  
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legal representatives as well as to dealings with the Court’.1561 The TCCG does refer to CPR 1.3, 
but only in the context of a general statement that in order to ‘assist the judge in the exercise 
of his costs and case management functions, the parties will be expected to co-operate with 
one another at all times. … Costs sanctions may be applied, if the judge concludes that one 
party is not reasonably co-operating with the other parties’.1562 There are points missing from 
these guides that could usefully be dealt with in supplementary guidance, for example the 
importance of factors extending beyond the case at hand that must be taken into account when 
applying for extensions and adjournments. The aim would be to focus less on the steps to be 
taken in progressing a case and more on how to take those steps in accordance with the 
principles underpinning the CPR. 
 
Guidance alone, however, may be insufficient. Zuckerman has argued that lawyers’ financial 
incentives are an obstacle to the reduction of litigation costs.1563 Lawyers’, particularly 
solicitors’, business models are certainly not conducive to reducing the time, cost and resources 
spent on litigation. Financial incentives, such as bonuses, are tied to billable hours, so there is 
a constant incentive to increase the number of hours recorded. An aggressive approach to 
litigation can be a marketable asset for lawyers, given that the very fact that a dispute has 
reached the litigation stage means that there is likely to be at least some animosity between 
the parties. Many clients will prefer a lawyer who takes an aggressive approach and leaves no 
stone unturned in the quest for victory, rather than one who recommends settlement from the 
outset. Lawyers may see an approach to litigation management that emphasises co-operation 
as one that will lose them business. Measures aimed at embedding a culture change which do 
not properly target these issues may have limited effect.  
 
Some amendments to the CPR proposed below would assist in resolving this issue, but there 
are other avenues to explore. Disconnecting financial bonuses from billable hours targets would 
remove the incentive to maximise time spent on a litigation matter. There has been some 
movement in this regard,1564 although it is an approach that is likely to be unpopular with the 
legal profession. Another avenue for reform is amending the professional rules that govern 
 
1561 CCG (n 1559) 8. 
1562 TCCG (n 1560) 19. 
1563 Zuckerman on Civil Procedure (n 11) ch 28 para 28.5. 
1564 Max Walters, ‘Clifford Chance drops billable hours for new bonus assessment’ (The Law Society 
Gazette, 2 May 2019) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/clifford-chance-drops-billable-hours-
for-new-bonus-assessment/5070158.article> last accessed 11 March 2021. 
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lawyers’ practices. The SRA’s new Code of Conduct1565 is broadly drafted and in the context of 
litigation does not require solicitors to inform clients of the nature or even the existence of their 
duty as litigants under the CPR. More detailed requirements in this regard might assist in 
dealing with concerns about loss of business. If all litigation solicitors are required to inform 
clients of their duties to co-operate and litigate proportionately, there may be less scope for 
those clients to shop around for an aggressive litigator. Amendments to the CPR and 
professional conduct rules aside, however, guidance would certainly be useful. 
 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CPR 
 
The preceding section proposed guidance on the application of the CPR as they currently stand. 
There is also scope for formal amendments to the CPR. The amendments suggested here fall 
into four categories: litigants’ duties, pre-action steps, requirements on filing a claim, and case 
management. They have two interlinked aims: first, to enhance the court’s ability to manage 
cases, and secondly to encourage party compliance, particularly with CPR 1.3. None reflect 





CPR 1.3 is short and broadly drafted: it simply states that parties are ‘required to help the court 
to further the overriding objective’. This duty can be sufficiently defined that more detail could 
be added to the text of the rule. It is clear, for example, that co-operation is required and that 
parties must give appropriate consideration to resolution by settlement or ADR. The 
overarching obligations in the Victorian CPA 2010 provide a useful model here.1566 They go into 
significantly more detail than CPR 1.3 as to what is required of parties and lawyers, and many 
of the obligations are in line with the case law that gives shape to CPR 1.3. Those obligations 
include, for example, co-operation, minimising delay, narrowing issues in dispute, using 
reasonable endeavours to resolve the dispute by agreement and only taking steps reasonably 
believed to be necessary to facilitate resolution or determination of the proceeding.1567 Another 
potentially useful addition from the CPA 2010 is the requirement that all parties must certify 
 
1565 <https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/standards-regulations/code-conduct-solicitors/> last accessed 
11 March 2021. 
1566 See ch 5 at 193. 
1567 ibid. 
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that they have read and understood the overarching obligations.1568 The CPR’s fast and multi-
track Directions Questionnaire requires legal representatives to confirm that they have 
explained to their client the need to consider settlement, the options available, and the 
possibility of cost sanctions if they refuse to try to settle. This could be amended to include 
confirmation that legal representatives have explained to their client the meaning of the 
Overriding Objective and their duty under CPR 1.3. 
 
One issue here is that the more detailed the rules, the more likely it is that an alleged breach 
might be used in an attempt to gain a tactical advantage. An explicit reference to co-operation, 
for example, may encourage parties to accuse their opponents of failing to co-operate as much 
as it would encourage them to actively co-operate. This would lead to an increase in 
interlocutory activity, with a resulting disproportionate increase in expenditure of time, costs 
and resources. A specific prohibition on the use of the rule for tactical purposes might assist. 
This is not without precedent in the CPR: the Practice Direction on Pre-Action Conduct and 
Protocols includes a similar provision.1569 While it should be obvious that attempts to gain a 
tactical advantage would be in clear contravention of CPR 1.3, as expanded or otherwise, it 
must be accepted that some parties will try to obtain such advantages where they can. This ties 
into the need for consistent, robust sanctions for failure to comply with CPR 1.3. This risk is 
not, however, on its own a reason to dismiss incorporating more detail into CPR 1.3. Doing so 
would make clear to parties and lawyers what is required of them and would also provide the 





The pre-action provisions in the CPR use permissive language. The Practice Direction on Pre-
Action Conduct, for example, states that steps to be taken before issue ‘will usually include’ 
exchange of correspondence and key documents.1570 Cases where parties are unable to at least 
exchange some correspondence pre-action are likely to be rare. Minimal prejudice would be 
caused by stating that parties must exchange pre-action correspondence, and disclosure where 
it is available, with a provision for exceptions, for example where there is insufficient time to 
comply before a limitation period expires. These more prescriptive pre-action requirements can 
 
1568 ibid. 
1569 Practice Direction - Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols, para 4. 
1570 ibid para 6. 
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be broadened to include consideration of settlement. At present, parties ‘should consider 
whether negotiation or some other form of ADR might enable them to settle their dispute 
without commencing proceedings’,1571 and ‘should review their respective positions’ once the 
necessary pre-action steps have been taken to ‘see if proceedings can be avoided’.1572 There is 
scope for more prescriptive language. Replacing the word ‘should’ with ‘must’ immediately 
gives the rule a more compulsory tone. It is recommended below that parties be required to 
inform the court on issue of pre-action settlement efforts. Reference to this in the pre-action 
rules, and to the fact that there may be adverse costs consequences where settlement is not 
considered, would highlight the importance of this provision. Another useful addition might be 
a compulsory pre-action meeting as, for example, is required by South Australia’s Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules.1573 Parties must use that meeting to attempt to resolve the dispute. A face-to-
face meeting, or even one that takes place over the telephone, may be more likely to lead to a 
consensual resolution, or at least move the parties closer to one, than written correspondence, 
which is a standard forum for posturing and aggressive tactics.  
 
A counterargument to these proposals is that they may result in disproportionate front-loading 
of costs. There is also a risk that parties will treat pre-action requirements as formalities and 
do the bare minimum possible to comply. Such actions have no real value. That risk can be 
dealt with fairly easily, as the courts have made clear that compliance with pre-action 
requirements involves complying with the spirit as well as the letter of the rules.1574 An addition 
to PAPs along these lines would make clear that bare compliance is not enough. In terms of the 
front-loading of work and costs, while this may be the case to a certain extent, a comprehensive 
and co-operative pre-action approach may be just as likely to save costs. Time and costs will be 
expended on a pre-action meeting, for example, but that meeting may mean that parties are 
better able either to settle or to proceed with litigation based on shared knowledge about the 
case and each other’s positions. This will save time and costs in the longer term. As with many 
aspects of litigation and case management, pre-action steps must be seen in the context of a 
dispute as a whole. It cannot simply be assumed that increased costs at the initial stages are a 




1571 ibid para 8. 
1572 ibid para 12. 
1573 See ch 5 at 194. 
1574 See ch 4 at 157. 
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Obligations when a Claim is Issued 
 
It would be useful for the rules to require provision of more information on pre-action steps 
when a claim is issued. Currently, the first information the court receives in that regard is in 
the Directions Questionnaire (on the fast and multi tracks). Earlier provision could mean that 
failure to comply is caught, and rectified, as soon as possible. It would also seem sensible for 
parties to include information as to what attempts, if any, were made to settle pre-action. The 
Practice Direction on Pre-Action Conduct currently states that, if proceedings are issued, parties 
‘may be required by the court to provide evidence that ADR has been considered’.1575 The 
Directions Questionnaire includes a section on settlement, but this does not require information 
to be provided about pre-action settlement attempts. Not only would receipt of this information 
inform early management decisions as to whether a stay for ADR or settlement would be 
appropriate, but it would also give an insight into the relationship between the parties. Stricter 
management might be required if parties have failed to co-operate pre-action in making a 
reasonable attempt to resolve the dispute. 
 
Introduction of a certification requirement, similar to that in Rule 11 of the U.S. FRCP,1576 may 
reduce the regularity with which parties aggressively pursue weak claims. In short, that rule 
requires lawyers (as opposed to parties) to certify that a claim has a proper factual and legal 
foundation, determined after reasonable investigation. This obliges lawyers to manage clients’ 
expectations in terms of whether their claims are realistic. It also ties into pre-action work, as 
an accurate certification will require some pre-action investigation, which should mean that 
the issuing party is better prepared to take the case forward efficiently. This certification would 
go beyond the statement of truth currently required by the CPR.1577 Even if that statement of 
truth is signed by a legal representative, they are by their signature confirming their clients’ 
belief in the truth of the relevant matters and their understanding of the consequences of a lack 
of honest belief.1578 Imposing a certification obligation on lawyers would provide an incentive 
not to pursue a claim simply because their client is insisting on doing so, and is willing to pay 
for it.  
 
 
1575 Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols, para 11. 
1576 See ch 5 at 176. 
1577 CPR 22; Practice Direction 22. 
1578 Practice Direction 22, para 3.8. 
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There would need to be sanctions for non-compliance, and it is notable that the FRCP confers 
broader powers on the court to sanction legal representatives than the CPR. At present under 
the CPR, the court can require legal representatives to pay costs, but this requires ‘unreasonable 
or improper conduct’.1579 Given that it is often lawyers that tend to drive or at least encourage 
tactical and aggressive litigation, there may be a case for broadening the court’s power in this 




The recommendations in this section deal with fast-track and multi-track case management. 
Disproportionality will be less problematic where there is a clear, imposed, proportionate 
structure, as there is on the small claims track, and more likely to be an issue where the 
procedure to be applied is at the court’s discretion. Compulsory CMCs are not recommended. 
This would shift matters too far from the intended flexibility of case management under the 
CPR and give yet more prominence to the issues of front-loaded costs that became a concern 
once Lord Woolf’s recommendations were implemented. Not every case requires a CMC, and 
to use court resources for CMCs in cases that do not require them would be inconsistent with 
the Overriding Objective. It is preferable to enable the court to make an informed decision 
whether a CMC is required, and to ensure that each CMC is as comprehensive as possible.  
 
The case management rules focus on the court giving or approving directions. A fixed CMC on 
the multi-track will be vacated if directions are issued by the court or agreed between the 
parties and approved by the court,1580 suggesting that there is likely to be insufficient value in 
a CMC if directions are already in place. Achievable directions require a foundation of 
comprehensive information about the case and the parties’ circumstances. An understanding 
of, for example, the scope of any disagreement and the nature of any resourcing issues will 
allow creation of a timetable that is less likely to require amendment. In many cases there will 
be matters that efficient progress requires to be dealt with sooner rather than later. These may 
include narrowing the issues in dispute, identifying potential problems with obtaining 
evidence, considering the practicalities of disclosure, or preventing a hostile relationship 
between parties from worsening. It may be easy to treat directions as something of a formality 
and to put off these issues at the start of a case. They may not be identified at all if there is no 
 
1579 CPR 44.11. 
1580 CPR 29.4. 
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requirement or incentive to fully analyse a case as early as possible. Either situation may lead 
to urgent applications, adjourned hearings and the need to balance issues of prejudice that 
would not have arisen had the issue been dealt with earlier. The management provisions in the 
CPR do not ignore this entirely. At the initial directions stage on the fast and multi-tracks, ‘the 
court’s first concern will be to ensure that the issues between the parties be identified and that 
the necessary evidence is prepared and disclosed’.1581 However, there is scope for improving 
the nature and quality of the information that parties are required to provide to the court. That 
information underpins decisions as to what directions should be given and whether a CMC 
should be held.   
 
Those initial decisions are based on parties’ statements of case and Directions Questionnaires. 
The required contents of statements of case are set out in CPR 16. They include details of 
quantum, the facts on which a claimant relies, and information on denial, admission and any 
alternative version of events from a defendant. The fast and multi-track Directions 
Questionnaire requires parties to inter alia provide information on whether they want to try to 
settle, and if not why not; to confirm whether pre-action requirements have been complied 
with and if they have not, to provide details; to provide details on applications that have been 
or will be made; to identify e-disclosure issues that the court may need to address and to 
propose directions for disclosure; to identify lay and expert witnesses and the nature of their 
evidence; and to provide ‘any other information’ that may help with management. The form 
itself gives no details as to what this ‘other information’ may include, although some detail is 
provided in Practice Direction 26. It may include ‘any particular facts that may affect the 
timetable the court will set’1582 and any facts which ‘may make it desirable for the court to fix 
an allocation hearing or a hearing at which case management directions will be given’.1583 There 
is no indication on the Directions Questionnaire that this additional guidance exists nor where 
it may be found. One way to improve the quality of the information provided to the court at 
this early stage would be to expand the content of the Directions Questionnaire. Parties should 
be required to provide details of pre-action steps that were taken, including whether attempts 
were made to settle. The ‘other information’ section could include specific examples of the sort 




1581 Practice Direction 28, para 3.3; Practice Direction 29, para 4.3. 
1582 Practice Direction 26, para 2.2(3)(e). 
1583 ibid para 2.2(3)(f). 
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The Directions Questionnaire could also be supplemented with items from the Commercial 
Court Case Management Information Sheet (the ‘CMIS’). The CMIS elicits useful information 
which the Directions Questionnaire does not, such as whether amendments are required to any 
statement of case and views on whether the case is appropriate for a preliminary issue or split 
trial. The CMIS itself could be expanded to include practical matters such as the nature and 
location of potential disclosure and whether any issues are envisaged in contacting potential 
witnesses. Another aspect of Commercial Court procedure which could usefully be applied 
more widely is the list of issues that parties must file and serve prior to a CMC.1584 This would 
assist the court in identifying whether face-to-face discussion at a CMC would be helpful. The 
aim is to introduce more comprehensive post-pleading requirements which will result in parties 
providing to the court as thorough a picture as possible of the state and possible development 
of the case. This should prompt parties and lawyers to identify and consider the shape of the 
whole case as soon as possible, and ensure that the court receives all available information in 
that regard at the earliest opportunity. An obvious counterargument to this approach is, again, 
that it will increase and front-load costs. However, full engagement from parties and lawyers 
at an early stage, together with fully tailored case management, may result in savings overall. 
It will reduce the risk of costs being incurred in dealing with matters such as late amendments, 
admission of new evidence and other interlocutory applications. In addition, true engagement 
with a matter by parties and lawyers will be encouraged more by requirements to take practical 
steps than by general exhortations.  
 
If a CMC does take place, the presiding judge has a broad discretion as to matters that will be 
covered. The fast track rules make no provision as regards matters that may or must be dealt 
with at a CMC, whereas the multi-track rules go into more detail. There are three items that 
the court ‘will’ deal with at any CMC, namely: reviewing the steps parties have taken in 
preparing the case, in particular compliance with directions; deciding on and giving directions 
about steps to be taken to secure progress in accordance with the Overriding Objective; and 
ensuring as far as it can that all agreements that can be reached about the matters in issue and 
the conduct of the claim are made and recorded.1585 These are broad, general matters. There is 
also a non-exhaustive list of topics that the court is ‘likely’ to consider at a CMC, including the 
clarity of the claim, whether any amendments are required, what disclosure is necessary, the 
obtaining and disclosure of factual and expert evidence, arrangements required to provide any 
 
1584 Practice Direction 58, para 10.8. 
1585 Practice Direction 29, para 5.1. 
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clarification or further information and the putting of questions to experts, and whether it will 
be ‘just’ and ‘save costs’ to order a split or preliminary issue trial.1586 There are only seven items 
on the list and although more specific than the compulsory considerations that precede them, 
none of the items are comprehensive. Item three, for example, provides that the court is likely 
to consider ‘what disclosure of documents, if any, is necessary’. There is no reference to 
identifying practical difficulties that either party may face in locating documents (although 
such additional considerations are covered by the non-exhaustive nature of the list).  
 
It has been proposed in this chapter that guidance might assist judges in ensuring that all 
relevant matters are considered, and questions asked, at a CMC. A more formal step would be 
to amend the CPR to increase the number of matters that judges are required to consider at a 
CMC. In respect of the multi-track, for example, paragraph 5.3 of Practice Direction 29 could 
be re-drafted in compulsory terms. There may also be scope for including a longer and more 
detailed compulsory list, or at least broadening the existing list. This list could include 
discussions on the clarity of parties’ cases and the issues in dispute, the extent to which those 
issues are agreed, whether any amendments are required to any statement of case, the 
requirements and practicalities of disclosure, factual and expert evidence requirements, and 
whether a split or preliminary issue trial would further the Overriding Objective. The same 
provisions could apply to the fast track in cases where a CMC is ordered (which, given the 
emphasis on giving directions without a hearing, may be a minority of cases).  
 
There are arguments both for and against this compulsory approach. It would ensure that a 
CMC is comprehensive, particularly when coupled with the provision of more detailed 
information, thus ensuring that truly appropriate directions are given. Where parties have 
compiled, and the court has received, detailed information about a case, it should be possible 
to identify which of the factors for consideration require the most attention. The incorporation 
of a compulsory list into the CPR would mean not only that the court does not omit anything 
from its management decisions, but also that parties and lawyers arrive at a CMC knowing that 
they will need to discuss certain issues. This should encourage thorough preparation, which 
may result in a more efficient CMC. On the other hand, it would limit the flexibility currently 
available to judges to tailor a CMC to the needs of a case. Although such limitation may be 
minimal in many cases, in that focus and time can still be weighted towards the most important 
items, it would still restrict judges’ ability to determine the level of management required. It is 
 
1586 ibid para 5.3. 
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essential that procedures remain proportionate. Having the court deal with a compulsory list 
of items at every CMC would run counter to this imperative, as it may mean that CMCs are 
longer and that each one absorbs more time and resources. In some cases, for example, it may 
be obvious that a CMC only needs to deal with one issue, in which case a compulsory list of 
matters to consider simply over-complicates matters and wastes time. Requirements for 
provision of additional post-issue information, together with guidance on case management, 
including questions to ask and issues to deal with at a CMC, should be sufficient to ensure a 
comprehensive CMC and appropriate directions. 
 
One exception is settlement and ADR. Other common law jurisdictions require the 
appropriateness of settlement negotiations and participation in ADR to be considered at 
management hearings.1587 Although the CPR does refer to the importance of judges 
encouraging and facilitating settlement,1588 a compulsory requirement would have real value. 
It would prompt judges, parties and lawyers to give early consideration to means of resolution 
other than trial. This may particularly be the case for parties and lawyers, if they know that 
they will have to discuss these questions at a CMC, and that they are likely to be pressed to 
provide a good reason for any reluctance. That may feed into a greater shift to a co-operative 
culture, as early consideration of settlement and ADR will become the norm.  
 
The next logical question is whether the rules should allow judges to order mediation or 
another form of ADR absent the parties’ consent, which again is a management power granted 
in other jurisdictions.1589 This issue, and the Court of Appeal’s comments in Halsey regarding 
the relationship between mandating ADR and the right of access to justice,1590 have prompted 
some extra-judicial commentary. Lord Dyson, in 2013, thought that Halsey struck the right 
balance in terms of supporting mediation.1591 Sir Gavin Lightman criticised Halsey, stating that 
the proposition that requiring a party to mediate against his will would breach ECHR Article 6 
 
1587 This requirement can be found in the procedural rules of the United States (Federal jurisdiction), 
Ontario, Saskatchewan, Australia (Federal jurisdiction) and the Northern Territory). 
1588 CPR 1.4(2)(e), (f). 
1589 This power is granted by the procedural rules of United States (Federal jurisdiction), Canada 
(Federal jurisdiction), Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador, Saskatchewan, Ontario, 
Australia (Federal jurisdiction), Northern Territory, New South Wales, South Australia, Western 
Australia and Queensland. 
1590 See ch 4 at 107-108. 
1591 Lord Dyson MR, ‘Compensation Culture: Fact or Fantasy?’, Holdsworth Club Lecture, 15 March 
2013, 13 <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/mr-speech-
compensation-culture.pdf> accessed 5 February 2021. 
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was ‘unfortunate’ and ‘clearly wrong and unreasonable’.1592 Lord Clarke1593 considered that, 
despite Halsey, it is ‘at least strongly arguable’1594 that courts do have the jurisdiction to require 
parties to mediate under a combination of CPR 1.4(2)(e) and 3.1(2)(m).1595 Nevertheless, the 
position at present is that judges cannot mandate the use of ADR procedures (other than ENE) 
absent the consent of all parties.  
 
Matters are moving towards an express expansion of the court’s powers in this regard, notably 
with the decision in Lomax, although at the time of writing there has been no fundamental 
reconsideration of Halsey.1596 The Judicial ADR Liaison Committee, set up on the 
recommendation of the Civil Justice Council ADR Working Group,1597 has been considering 
practical examples of ADR schemes that incorporate some compulsion, and how it works.1598 
This would be a useful discretionary power for the court to have, as there will be cases that are 
suited to ADR but in which parties’ recalcitrance prevents even an attempt at any form of 
resolution other than trial. The continued prevalence of aggressive, unco-operative attitudes 
suggests that if settlement and ADR are to take the place within the civil litigation system that 
has been envisaged for them under the CPR, judges may need to step in and require parties to 
at least try to reach an agreement. This could feed into the ongoing culture change, in that 
parties may be more likely to give unprompted consideration to a mediation or settlement 
meeting if they know that the court may order one anyway, with the attendant cost 
consequences of any lack of co-operation. If, however, there is any reluctance to introduce this 
power, initial steps such as requiring consideration of ADR at a CMC and encouraging judges 
to in turn be more robust in encouraging parties to settle should be taken first, and the results 




1592 Gavin Lightman, ‘Mediation: An Approximation to Justice’ (2007) 73(4) Arbitration: the 
International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management 400, 401. 
1593 Sir Anthony Clarke, ‘The Future of Civil Mediation’, The Second Civil Mediation Council National 
Conference, 8 May 2008 6; Lord Clarke, ‘Mediation – An Integral Part of Our Litigation Culture’, 
Littleton Chambers Annual Mediation Evening, 8 June 2009 2. 
1594 Clarke, ‘The Future of Civil Mediation’ (n 1593) 6. 
1595 ibid 7. 
1596 See ch 4 at 107-108. 
1597 ‘ADR and Civil Justice’, Civil Justice Council ADR Working Group, Final Report, November 2018, 
para 9.1 <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/CJC-ADR-Report-FINAL-Dec-
2018.pdf> accessed 30 March 2021. 
1598 Minutes of the Judicial ADR Liaison Committee, 20 January 2020, 2 
<https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/2-SUMMARY-MINUTES-Jan-2020-Judicial-




Proportionality is a useful case management tool. Its flexibility allows it to be adapted to the 
facts of any case. However, the results of the case law review make clear that there is room for 
improvement in its application. Care must be taken in deciding precisely how any such 
improvement is effected. Three points drawn from the case law analysis form the foundation 
of any improvement efforts: the inconsistency with which proportionality is applied, the 
centrality of the relationship between the parties and the court, and the fact-specific nature of 
the proportionality analysis. It is also important to consider the precise aims of any 
improvement measures. A realistic approach is needed, which recognises that there is no single 
perfect way to apply proportionality. Measures must target the parties and the court, aiming to 
incentivise compliance in respect of the former and to encourage and enable more effective 
control in respect of the latter. Another crucial target is the ‘culture change’ that Lord Woolf 
and subsequent reform efforts sought to embed into the civil litigation system. Improvement 
measures also cannot be counterproductive. Significantly increasing time and costs may itself 
be disproportionate, although it must be remembered that proportionality is not simply 
synonymous with reduction in expenditure of time and costs.  
 
As to how case management proportionality might be improved, it has been suggested that a 
structured test would reduce flexibility and risk an increase in inter partes and systemic costs 
and resources that could itself be disproportionate. One approach taken here has been to 
propose ways to improve the quality and consistency of the information available to 
management judges, while retaining the broad discretion that is central to case management. 
This has taken the form of comprehensive guidance, including a proportionality checklist, and 
amendments to the CPR requiring additional information from parties at the pre-CMC stage. 
Guidance has also been proposed for legal practitioners, aimed at improving compliance with 
CPR 1.3 by providing detail as to what that rule requires, what lawyers must explain to their 
clients, and how litigation should be progressed in a compliant manner. Proposed rule changes 
give more detail to the CPR 1.3 duty and include certification requirements aimed at deterring 
weak or under-investigated claims. 
 
Practical proposals have been made that are precisely targeted at the problems revealed by the 
case law review. The discretionary nature of case management, as well as the broad and flexible 
nature of the proportionality analysis, mean that perfection in its application is not attainable. 
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Striving for that perfection is a fool’s errand. It is better to work with those features to ensure 
that cases are managed and conducted not only proportionately but as consistently and 




































The application of proportionality in specific cases requires the balancing of different, 
sometimes conflicting, interests. A connection is drawn between means and ends, in that any 
cost and prejudice incurred as a result of the former must be justified by the latter.  
Proportionality provides a decision-making framework into which the facts and circumstances 
necessitating a particular decision may be placed, in order to determine how that decision may 
be made in a proportionate way (or whether a decision was made in such a way, if the analysis 
is conducted ex post). In the context of English civil procedure, proportionality is tied to the 
objectives of the system governed by the CPR and the nature of the justice provided by that 
system. To deal with cases ‘justly and at proportionate cost’ is to balance the features of a given 
case, the interests of the parties to that case and the need for a fair allocation of finite court 
resources. The outcome of that balancing exercise, if it is conducted in accordance with the 
principles underlying the Overriding Objective, is proportionate justice. All principles require 
implementation. Proportionality, in the context of civil procedure, is implemented through 
active judicial case management. The shift of responsibility for the progress of a case from 
parties to the court embodied in case management reflects an adjustment to the traditional 
adversarial system. Nevertheless, parties and their legal advisers retain a crucial role through 
the CPR 1.3 duty to assist the court in furthering the Overriding Objective.  
 
There is a significant gap between the ideals at the heart of proportionality and active case 
management and the reality of their application. Inconsistencies have been identified in judicial 
understanding as to the precise nature of the principles that underpin the CPR, notably the 
importance of balancing substantive and procedural justice and the need to consider both inter 
partes and systemic interests. Judges do not consistently take on the robust, active role that is 
required of them, and parties and lawyers do not consistently comply with their duty to assist 
the court in furthering the Overriding Objective. This prevents the full implementation of the 
Overriding Objective and limits the civil justice system’s ability to provide proportionate justice. 
That in turn has a negative effect on access to justice. It means that the court’s limited resources 
are not allocated as effectively as they might be, and that individual parties are having to spend 
disproportionate amounts of time, money and resources on litigating their disputes. This may 
prevent some from continuing with a legitimate case and may dissuade others from 
commencing litigation altogether. 
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It would be wrong, however, to give a purely negative impression of the current position 
regarding proportionality and case management. In many cases, judges do take an active 
approach to managing cases and conduct that management in accordance with the CPR’s 
underlying principles. They are often sensitive to both the specific needs of the parties before 
them and of the system in general. Robust management techniques are used, and parties are 
ordered to bear the consequences of their non-compliant behaviour. These cases provide a 
substantial body of information that can be drawn on to improve the application of case 
management proportionality. 
 
In deciding what form those efforts may take, the central features of the case management 
proportionality analysis must be borne in mind. It is fact-specific, and decisions are made within 
the bounds of a broad discretion. Improvement efforts must work with these features, rather 
than restrict them. It is also essential to take an approach that encompasses the court, parties 
and lawyers. When there are issues on both sides of the Bench, targeting only one will reap 
significantly fewer benefits than targeting both. Publication of guidance would promote 
consistency, without imposing a rigid structure. The focus must be on ensuring that all relevant 
factors are weighed in the balance in every decision, rather than prescriptively dictating how 
those decisions should be made. Guidance for lawyers is as important as that for judges 
because, even with the best management will in the world, a court can only go so far without 
engagement from legal advisers. Rule amendments are also directed at improving the 
consistency of management decision-making and judges’ ability to tailor decisions to the needs 
of each case, notably in the early stages of an action and at CMCs. By increasing the quality of 
the information on which judges base their decisions, and by requiring parties and lawyers to 
consider practicalities early on, management decisions would reflect as accurately as possible 
the needs of the case. These changes are complemented by amendments aimed at steering 
litigants and lawyers towards a more compliant approach to litigation. They comprise the 
addition of detail to the CPR 1.3 duty, and obligations to certify the factual and legal basis of 
a claim on issue.  
 
Appropriately enough, optimising the provision of proportionate justice through the application 
of proportionality and case management requires striking a balance. A middle ground must be 
found between steering the actions and decisions of all involved in the litigation process 
towards compliance with the concepts of proportionate justice, and ensuring that the discretion 
and flexibility central to case management remain intact. Shifting too far in either direction 
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would be counterproductive. It would risk either forcing the infinite number of litigation 
management circumstances into an artificial structure, or allowing inconsistencies to 
proliferate due to a lack of any guidance on the exercise of discretion. A focus on the availability 
and quality of information that informs litigation decision-making strikes that balance.   
 
The aim of this work has been twofold. It sought first to analyse, at a greater level of detail 
than has been explored in the literature to date, the meaning and application of proportionality 
in a case management context. Drawing on the results of that analysis, it then sought to make 
practical suggestions as to how the use of proportionality as a case management tool might be 
improved. The foundation on which those aims rest is that which underpinned Lord Woolf’s 
review of the civil justice system and all subsequent reform efforts: the need to increase access 
to justice. Proportionality is central to procedural justice, which itself is a fundamental part of 
the justice that the system must provide. Improving both understanding and consistency of 
application can only be to the benefit of the system and its users. In this way, it is intended for 



































This checklist sets out the main factors to be taken into account when determining the 





(4) the substantive merits; 
(5) party asymmetry; 
(6) inter partes prejudice; 
(7) legitimate expectations; 
(8) party conduct; 
(9) systemic considerations; 
(10) settlement; and 
(11) other consequences. 
 
The checklist is not intended to be prescriptive. It is intended to serve as a prompt to ensure 
that all relevant matters are considered during the decision-making process. The extent to 
which these factors are relevant, and the weight to be given to each in making a management 








(a) What is the monetary value of the claim? 
o Consider relative to the parties’ financial positions. 
 
(b) What is the non-monetary value of the claim? Consider: 
o the importance to the parties, e.g. in terms of reputation; 
o the seriousness of the underlying facts, e.g. in terms of any distress caused 
to a party; and 





(a) How complex are the issues? 
o Consider whether the issues are actually complex or whether they have 
simply been drafted to appear that way. 
 
(b) Separate complexity from value. Higher value does not necessarily mean higher 




(a) To which of the issues in dispute is the subject of this decision relevant? 
o How do those issues fit into the context of the case as a whole – are they 
central or peripheral? 
 
(b) How relevant is the subject of this decision to those issues? 
o Consider that relevance is a spectrum – is there sufficient relevance?  
o Is the matter in question essential, or merely useful? 
 
(c) To what extent will the outcome of this decision contribute to the resolution of 
the dispute as a whole? 
 
 
(4) The Substantive Merits 
 
(a) The substantive merits are only one factor to be taken into account and balanced 
against all others.  
 
(b) The relevance of the merits may differ depending on the nature of the 
management decision in question, for example: 
o Amendments to statements of case: in general, the later permission is 
sought, the stronger the merits of the proposed amendments must be. 
o Strike out due to non-compliance: merits are generally irrelevant, except 
potentially where the strength of the case to be struck out would entitle that 
party to summary judgment. 
 
 
(5) Party Asymmetry 
 
(a) Is there any resource inequality between the parties which needs to be 
accounted for? 
 




(6) Inter Partes Prejudice 
 
(a) What prejudice, if any, will each party suffer as a result of this decision? 
 
(b) Will a party be required to carry out additional and/or duplicative work, and if 
so how much?  
o Consider in the context of the work to which they are already committed. 
 
(c) Will there be a delay, and if so what effect it will have on the parties? For 
example:  
o Will a party’s financial situation be worsened?  
o Will their chances of recovering on any eventual judgment be reduced?  
o Will there be a delay in vindication? 
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(d) If there has already been delay, consider the effect of any additional delay. 
 
(e) Will a party be unable to have relevant evidence before the court, or be unable 
to pursue all or part of its case, as a result of this decision? 
o Refer to (3) above (‘Relevance’). 
o Consider whether a party will have a remedy against its legal advisors, but 
note that it may be unsatisfactory to relegate a litigant to a claim based on 
loss of chance. 
 
(f) To what extent, if at all, will any prejudice to a party have been caused by that 
party’s own actions or lack thereof? 
 
 
(7) Legitimate Expectations 
 
(a) Which of a party’s legitimate expectations are relevant to this decision and how, 
if at all, will the decision frustrate those expectations? For example: 
o an expectation that claims or counterclaims will be disposed of at the listed 
trial; or 
o an expectation that an opponent will or will not be relying on certain 
evidence, in reliance on which a party has carried out its preparations for 
trial. 
 
(b) Which of the court’s legitimate expectations are relevant to this decision and 
how, if at all, will the decision frustrate those expectations? For example: 
o an expectation that parties will comply with timetables and work to 
maintain listed hearing and trial dates; or 
o an expectation that parties will cooperate with each other and the court 
throughout the litigation process. 
 
 
(8) Party Conduct 
 
(a) Have the parties complied with the CPR, including pre-action requirements, and 
court orders and directions? 
 
(b) Have the parties complied with their CPR 1.3 duty? 
 
(c) Has the parties’ behaviour affected only this litigation, or has it also had systemic 
consequences? How have those effects manifested or how might they manifest 
in future? 
 
(d) Have parties taken steps to minimise or mitigate the effects of their behaviour? 
 
 
(9) Systemic Considerations 
 




(b) Consider the proceeding as a whole, rather than simply the immediate result of 
this particular decision. 
o If a hearing is adjourned, it will need to be relisted at some future point. 
o Will the decision lead to the use of more court time in terms of further 
applications or appeals? 
 
(c) Take into account any specific information available, for example the state of a 
given list, or the likelihood of finding other cases to fill any gaps in the court’s 





(a) Will the decision assist in encouraging settlement and/or participation in ADR? 
 
(b)  Conversely, will the decision make settlement and/or participation in ADR less 
likely? 
 




(11) Other Consequences 
 
(a) Is this decision likely to have any other consequences for the parties, the court, 
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